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ABSTRACT 
Mergers and acquisitions (M&As) are important corporate strategy actions that are vital for 
the companies in order to survive in this competitive global world. The popularity of those 
actions has increased over the years, especially in the international domain. In the UK, both 
the number and value of cross-border M&As has increased significantly over the years. 
Despite this increase, there haven’t been enough studies or clear evidence about whether 
venturing abroad to acquire foreign targets leads the companies to better performance 
compared to staying domestically. 
Therefore, the purpose of this thesis is to investigate the M&A phenomenon deeply and 
compare between cross-border and domestic M&As made by UK public acquirer firms. More 
specifically, the thesis concentrates on three main issues which are: (1) the difference between 
the returns to shareholders of acquirer firms involved in cross-border and domestic M&As; 
(2) the difference between the operating performance of acquirer firms involved in cross-
border and domestic M&As; and (3) the difference between the impacts of cross-border and 
domestic M&As on the operating performance of acquirer and target firms combined. 
Market-based and accounting-based approaches are used to investigate a sample of UK 
acquirer firms engaged in cross-border and domestic M&As both in the short-term and in the 
long-term periods. In general, the results reveal insignificant differences between the 
shareholders’ returns and operating performances of acquirer firms involved in cross-border 
and domestic M&As over the short- and long-term periods. On the other hand, the results for 
acquirer and target combined firms show that cross-border M&As have lower operating 
performances than domestic M&As. 
Recommendations are provided in order to help the decision and policy makers in the 
companies to decide whether cross-border M&As should be actively encouraged or 
discouraged in comparison with domestic M&As. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
Mergers and acquisitions, whether being domestic or cross-border, are of great importance for 
companies to survive in this competitive global world. The success and failure of these 
transactions are of great significance and have enormous consequences for the companies 
themselves as well as for the other constituencies in them (Sudarsanam, 2010).  
In a merger, two firms combine their assets and operations and share their resources to 
establish a new legal entity and achieve common objectives. Frequently, the two companies’ 
shareholders remain as mutual owners for the newly combined entity. In an acquisition, the 
acquirer firm purchases the shares or assets of the target firm, with the control of these assets 
and operations being transferred to the acquirer firm, while the shareholders of the target firm 
end their ownership of the firm and the acquired firm becomes an affiliate or subsidiary of the 
acquirer (UNCTAD, 2000; Sudarsanam, 2003). However, Sudarsanam (2010) defined M&As 
generally as the combination of two companies so as to attain several business and strategic 
goals.  
In general, mergers and acquisitions can be functionally classified into three categories. These 
comprise horizontal mergers, vertical mergers and conglomerate mergers. Horizontal mergers 
and acquisitions occur when two firms in the same line of business who are competing in the 
same market and industry combine together (Gaughan, 2007; UNCTAD, 2000). Vertical 
mergers and acquisitions occur when firms in different parts of the value chain combine 
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together by expanding backward to the supplier of raw materials or by expanding forward 
towards the final consumers (Gaughan, 2007; UNCTAD, 2000). Conglomerate mergers and 
acquisitions occur when the combining firms work in different industries and different 
business lines with unrelated activities (Gaughan, 2007; UNCTAD, 2000). 
The importance of horizontal mergers and acquisitions has risen somewhat over the years and 
the aim of the firms from consolidating their resources here is to achieve synergies and often 
greater market power. In the vertical mergers and acquisitions the firms typically aim to 
reduce their transaction costs as well as to take advantage of the economies of scope. In 
conglomerate mergers and acquisitions, the firms try to diversify their risk and extend 
economies of scope (UNCTAD, 2000). 
Depending on the mood of the target, the acquisition can be either friendly or hostile. In a 
friendly takeover, the target firm’s board agrees to engage in the M&A transaction. However, 
hostile takeovers take place in spite of the rejection of the target company’s board (UNCTAD, 
2000). 
Mergers and acquisitions can also be domestic or cross-border deals. Domestic M&As are 
those which include an acquirer and a target firm operating in the same home country, 
whereas cross-border M&As are those transactions where the acquirer and the target firm are 
placed in different countries (UNCTAD, 2000). 
The increase in the number and value of international M&A deals shows that cross-border 
M&As have gained more importance and popularity around the world over the years 
(Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Conn et al., 2005). Also in the UK, there has been a 
significant increase in the value and number of cross-border acquisitions. For example, the 
value of UK acquisitions by the year 2000 was the highest over the other years and also 
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occupied 30% of the world’s total value of cross-border acquisitions, which made the UK as a 
leading country in cross-border deals (Conn et al., 2005; UNCTAD, 2000). This high value 
may be explained by the occurrence of some mega deals which were started in 1999 and 
completed in 2000, such as the one where the UK Vodafone Airtouch Plc, the world’s largest 
wireless communications company, acquired the German cellular phone company 
Mannesmann for more than $200 billion, this transaction being the largest in the M&A 
history (DePamphilis, 2008; UNCTAD, 2000). 
Also, traditionally and over the years, the UK surpassed all the other European Union (EU) 
countries in terms of the intensity of merger and acquisition activity and its exposure to global 
M&As (Sudarsanam, 2010). Moreover, within the huge rise in takeover activity over the 
years, the UK proved to be a leading player in conducting M&A transactions which makes it “ 
the second largest M&A market after the US” (Sudarsanam, 2010, p.22). 
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 respectively show the number and value of cross-border M&A purchases 
made by UK acquirers compared with the world total values and numbers from 1987 to 2007. 
However, the whole tables as provided by the UNCTAD (2008) are available in Appendix 1.  
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Table 1.1: Number of Cross-border Merger and Acquisition Purchases 1987-2007 
 
Year World UK % 
1987 1 174 274 23% 
1988 1 879 528 28% 
1989 2 723 669 25% 
1990 3 360 584 17% 
1991 3 908 559 14% 
1992 3 724 482 13% 
1993 3 965 521 13% 
1994 4 566 596 13% 
1995 5 498 717 13% 
1996 5 868 743 13% 
1997 6 740 936 14% 
1998 7 995 1 022 13% 
1999 9 007 1 196 13% 
2000 10 031 1 291 13% 
2001 8 098 1 078 13% 
2002 6 553 814 12% 
2003 6 621 764 12% 
2004 7 270 901 12% 
2005 8 560 1 063 12% 
2006 9 075 1 103 12% 
2007 10 145 1 206 12% 
Source: UNCTAD cross-border M&A database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) 
Category: WIR-key Data from Annex of WIR 2008 
 
Table 1.2: Value of Cross-border Merger and Acquisition Purchases 1987-2007 
(Millions of dollars) 
 
Year World UK % 
1987 97 311 22 333 23% 
1988 137 630 26 901 20% 
1989 167 068 38 786 23% 
1990 200 389 29 877 15% 
1991 116 642 12 751 11% 
1992 112 939 15 988 14% 
1993 123 492 20 697 17% 
1994 170 575 29 827 18% 
1995 231 577 37 132 17% 
1996 264 254 46 638 18% 
1997 370 987 73 437 20% 
1998 692 686 121 624 18% 
1999 903 868 232 410 26% 
2000 1 349 777 406 621 30% 
2001 730 441 120 155 17% 
2002 483 238 85 838 18% 
2003 411 302 70 227 17% 
2004 565 871 70 636 13% 
2005 929 362 113 406 12% 
2006 1 118 068 125 747 11% 
2007 1 637 107 269 709 17% 
Source: UNCTAD cross-border M&A database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) 
Category: WIR-key Data from Annex of WIR 2008 
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It can be seen that there was a large scale increase in the number and value of the world’s total 
mergers and acquisitions during the period 1992 to 2000. During the nineties the vast increase 
in the number of mergers was accompanied by an economic boom which was represented by 
the vast growth in the internet and telecommunications industries and the development of the 
European new markets. However, after the millennium, when the dot com bubble burst in 
2000, there was a collapse in consumer confidence in those industries in the following years 
as well as an overcapacity in the traditional sectors which resulted in a reduction in the merger 
activity (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). 
For the UK, the pattern is similar to the world’s movements taking into consideration that the 
UK’s share of the world’s total number of cross-border purchases remained within 12% to 
14% from 1991 until 2007 as shown previously in Table 1.1, which shows that the UK is 
participating in an active way in cross-border M&As. 
The increase in the number and value of M&A transactions has been associated with an 
increase in the number of theories and publications examining this phenomenon. Some 
researchers expect an outperformance of cross-border M&As over domestic M&As for both 
acquirer and target firms (Martynova et al., 2007). The reason is that in cross-border M&As, 
the firms expand their businesses into new markets and internalize the target firms’ R&D 
capabilities, which gives them a competitive advantage over other firms and makes them 
benefit from the imperfections in the international capital market (Martynova et al., 2007). 
On the other hand, some issues may arise in cross-border M&As and cause difficulties in 
managing the newly combined firms. These include the differences between acquirer and 
target countries in their cultures and regulations, which may result in the failure of achieving 
the expected merger synergies and cause cross-border M&As to underperform domestic 
M&As (Martynova et al., 2007). 
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The examination of the M&A transactions has been conducted using two main approaches: 
one of them is the stock market-based approach and the other is the accounting- based 
approach (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007).  
Stock market studies have been conducted either over the short-term or over the long-term. 
The short-term approach is based on the idea of stock market efficiency which means the 
reaction of the stock market to the announcement or completion of the M&A transaction, and 
this reaction provides and reflects a reliable measure and information about the expected 
value of the acquisition (Sudarsanam, 2010). However, long-term studies assume that the 
market needs more time to assess the value implications of the M&A and to react to the news, 
which requires extending the examination for several years following the acquisition. 
In general, the studies which examined the domestic M&As over the short-term period have 
found that target firms’ shareholders achieve significant gains whereas acquirer firms’ 
shareholders achieve either small or insignificant gains. However, most of the studies 
conducted over the long-term period have found that acquirer firms suffer from significant 
wealth losses most of the time (Sudarsanam, 2010). Also, studies which examined cross-
border M&As over the short-term have found mixed results with some of them reporting 
positive returns, others reporting wealth losses, whereas the rest show insignificant returns. In 
general, cross-border M&As do not result in wealth gains for acquirers’ shareholders in most 
cases (Sudarsanam, 2010). 
In comparison with the market-based studies and the examination of the stock market 
reaction, only a few studies have been conducted to examine the operating performance of 
firms. However, the evaluation of the M&A on the basis of the operating performance is 
important and helps in providing additional insights into the effects and consequences of the 
M&A transactions (Sudarsanam, 2010). 
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In general, previous accounting-based studies examining the operating performance of firms 
following domestic and cross-border M&As have yielded inconsistent results (Selcuk and 
Yilmaz, 2011). Some of them report gains (Healy et al., 1992; Powell and Stark, 2005), some 
report losses (Dickerson et al., 1997) whereas others show insignificant results (Ghosh, 2001; 
Sharma and Ho, 2002).  
Most of the previous studies have used samples from the eighties and the early nineties in 
their examinations, which may make their results out of date with the changes in the global 
world nowadays. Also, those previous studies, whether being market-based or accounting-
based, haven’t differentiated between domestic and cross-border M&As in their examinations, 
which makes it unclear and ambiguous for the companies which are willing to conduct an 
M&A transaction to decide whether or not going abroad is better for them than staying in 
their home country. 
This thesis will try to fill these gaps in the literature by examining cross-border and domestic 
M&As using a sample of UK acquirer firms involved in cross-border and domestic M&As 
during the period 1996 to 2003, which is more recent than the periods examined in other 
previous studies. The examination will endeavour to provide a clear platform for the 
companies who are intending to go for an M&A transaction in a way that can help them to 
make their decisions about whether or not to go abroad. The examination will be conducted 
by studying the consequences of the M&A deals over the short-term and long-term periods 
using both market-based and accounting-based approaches.  
1.2 Aims and Objectives 
Despite the increase in the popularity and importance of cross-border M&As, there hasn’t 
been enough research on cross-border M&As and the difference between them and domestic 
M&As, which requires a more thorough analysis for this strategy. Although cross-border and 
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domestic M&As have common characteristics, cross-border M&As have distinctive and 
important differences (Shimizu et al., 2004). Previous studies have tried to answer some of 
the questions and assumptions concerning this phenomenon, but there are still some gaps in 
the literature that need to be filled.  
The main aim of this thesis is to provide an in depth analysis and comparison between cross-
border and domestic M&As made by UK public acquirer firms between 1996 and 2003. 
Therefore, in order to achieve this overall aim, the research concentrates on the key objectives 
as follows: 
Study One: To examine the difference between the reactions of the share prices of UK 
acquirer firms to the announcements of cross-border and domestic mergers and acquisitions. 
Study Two: To investigate the difference between the operating performances of UK acquirer 
firms involved in cross-border and domestic mergers and acquisitions.  
Study Three: - To examine the difference between the impacts of cross-border and domestic 
M&As on the operating performance of UK acquirers and targets combined. 
- To check whether the impacts of domestic and cross-border M&As on the 
operating performance of UK acquirers only are different from their impacts 
on the operating performance of UK acquirers and targets combined. 
1.3 Contribution of the Thesis 
This thesis attempts to examine some of the issues in a way which differs from the previous 
studies in the following aspects: 
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• This study attempts to examine whether there are significant deviations or differences 
in the results achieved by merger and acquisition transactions conducted in the 
domestic market and mergers and acquisitions conducted in the foreign market. 
Previous studies concentrated on each kind of merger and acquisition separately. 
• This study examines a sample which covers the years 1996 to 2003, which is more 
recent than previous studies that were conducted using samples from the eighties and 
the early nineties. Therefore, our sample is more up-to-date than the previous studies 
and reflects the changes in the global world nowadays. 
• The examination of the impacts of mergers and acquisitions on the operating 
performance of UK acquirer firms is virtually nonexistent in the previous literature, 
which makes the second study of the thesis a major contribution to the literature. Most 
of the previous researchers who examined the operating performance of firms 
involved in M&As have conducted their examination for the acquirer and target firms 
combined, which makes it unclear whether the acquirer firm alone or the target firm 
alone have gained from the acquisition or not. Therefore, examining the acquirer firms 
only without including the targets will give a better idea of the differences between the 
impacts of cross-border and domestic M&As on the operating performance of acquirer 
firms. 
• Also, the analyses conducted in this thesis combines the market-based approach with 
the accounting-based approach by using returns data as well as operating performance 
cash flow and accrual data in evaluating acquirer firms and the combined firms 
involved in cross-border and domestic M&As, using new methodologies and several 
measures and techniques. 
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Additionally, the significance of the thesis may be considered in the light of its contribution to 
the existing knowledge and the practical perspective in the following aspects: 
• The examination and comparison between cross-border and domestic M&As helps 
firms in developing strategic plans and makes it easier for them to make the best 
choice of whether to go internationally and cross the borders or stay in their home 
country, since it applies an in depth analysis of some of the main issues concerning the 
consequences of those M&A deals. 
• Findings from the thesis might shed some insights to academicians as well as decision 
and policy makers in formulating better strategies so as to improve resources 
allocation in a way that leads for the benefit of the firm as well as the economy as a 
whole. 
• The findings of the thesis might help managers who are thinking about conducting a 
merger and acquisition deal to identify their positions before they make any decision 
and give ideas on the strategies which they should follow in order to avoid losses and 
achieve the best results.       
1.4 Structure of the Thesis 
The thesis is structured into 5 chapters. Chapter 1 provides a general introduction and overall 
overview of the thesis. This includes a general background with some definitions, aims and 
objectives of the thesis, contributions and structure of the thesis. 
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are the empirical chapters of the thesis. Chapter 2 commences by 
presenting some of the motives, theories and regulations of takeovers in general. It then 
investigates the difference between the reaction of the market to the announcement of cross-
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border and domestic M&As by examining the returns to shareholders of UK acquirer firms. 
An event study methodology is applied and different methods and event windows around the 
announcement date are used to calculate the abnormal returns of acquirers’ shareholders 
followed by a regression analysis to examine the impact of some of the acquirer and deal 
characteristics on the returns to shareholders of acquirer firms. 
Chapter 3 presents the second empirical study of the thesis which can be considered as a 
continuation of the examination of the first empirical study of UK acquirer firms. It aims to 
investigate the difference between the operating performance of UK acquirer firms which are 
engaged in cross-border and domestic mergers and acquisitions. The study examines a time 
period of three years before and three years after the acquisition by applying different 
performance measures, models and benchmarks. Also, a regression analysis is applied in 
order to examine the impact of some of the deal characteristics on the post-acquisition 
operating performance of acquirer firms. 
Chapter 4 presents the third empirical study of the thesis. In the first empirical part of the 
study, the analysis is applied on the combined firms (acquirer and target firms together) in 
order to examine the difference between the impacts of cross-border and domestic M&As on 
the operating performance of the combined firms. However, the second empirical part of the 
study examines only the acquirer firms rather than the combined acquirer and target firms in 
order to check whether excluding the target firms from the analysis has any significant impact 
on the results. 
Finally, Chapter 5 summarises the key findings and conclusions of the previous chapters. The 
chapter also discusses some of the implications of the study, its limitations, as well as making 
suggestions for future research. Figure 1.1 presents the structure of the thesis. 
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Figure 1.1: Structure of the Thesis 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE RETURNS TO SHAREHOLDERS 
OF UK ACQUIRER FIRMS INVOLVED IN CROSS-BORDER AND 
DOMESTIC ACQUISITIONS  
 
2.1 Introduction 
Mergers and acquisitions are of significant importance to all the stakeholders in the merging 
firms whether they are shareholders, employees, consumers or the wider community 
(Sudarsanam, 2010). Thus, the assessment of the success of these mergers and acquisitions is 
very important and can be achieved in several ways.  
One of the ways for assessing the success of the mergers is by focusing on the shareholders’ 
value, since shareholders are the controlling power in the organization and the residual 
owners of the company (Martynova and Renneboog, 2008). Therefore, the shareholders must 
be the focal point for any study or valuation of the firm since focusing on the shareholder 
value yields an efficient evaluation criterion (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007).  
There have been a number of previous studies concentrating on the effects of merger and 
acquisition deals. Most of those studies focused on the examination of the market reaction due 
to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions and the impact on the target, acquirer or the 
combined firm. In general, most of the results for those short-term market-based studies have 
shown that target firms usually gain whereas bidders experience losses or no significant 
market reaction at all. Therefore, in general there has been no clear evidence of any net wealth 
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creation whereas there has been wealth transfers to target firm shareholders from acquiring 
firm shareholders (Fraser and Zhang, 2009). 
However, other studies examined the impact of M&As by examining longer time periods 
concentrating on the long-term stock performance of the combined firms rather than the short-
term market reaction only. However, those studies have shown that the evaluation of the stock 
price performance over a long time period is difficult due to the availability of other potential 
conditions that may have an impact on the price of the combined firms over the extended time 
period (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007; Fraser and Zhang, 2009). 
Over the years, the popularity of the merger and acquisition strategy for firms has increased 
and grown so much making mergers and acquisitions universal. They have become an 
important strategy used by many firms throughout the world. Within this global trend, the 
period after the mid- 1980s and 1990s witnessed an increase in the number and value of 
international acquisitions made by UK firms which were almost equal to that of domestic 
acquisitions (Conn et al., 2005). Figures 2.1 and 2.2 show the number and value of cross-
border and domestic acquisitions made by UK acquirers for the years 1987 to 2007 depending 
on the data provided by the UK National Statistics.  
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Figure 2.1: Number of Cross-border and Domestic Acquisitions by UK Acquirers 1987-
2007 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Value of Cross-border and Domestic Acquisitions by UK Acquirers 1987-
2007 
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Consequently, within the increased level of takeover activity, this has been accompanied by 
an increase in the number of academic studies which examine the performance of the targets 
and bidders of the combining firms (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). Although some research 
has been conducted regarding the returns to shareholders, most of the previous studies have 
examined either the domestic M&As or cross-border M&As separately. However, the 
approach in this study differs from those previous studies that dealt with the examination of 
the takeover activity in a way that compares directly between cross-border and domestic 
acquirers’ returns. Therefore, the emphasis is on examining the returns of each type of 
acquirer in isolation and then the comparison between the returns of acquirer firms engaged in 
cross-border and domestic M&As. 
Moreover, many of the previous studies were conducted using acquisition transactions based 
on data and samples covering time periods during the eighties and early nineties which make 
their results out of date in reflecting the rapid changes in the global business environment 
nowadays. 
However, the sample here covers an important and interesting period in the M&A activity, 
since in the nineties there was an increase both in the number and value of acquisitions, 
especially in 1996 which witnessed a steep increase in the total value of the US, UK and 
European acquisitions which reached about USD 1,117 million (Goergen and Renneboog, 
2004). This rise in the value of acquisitions continued in the following years which gave the 
M&A activity much more strength. Also, the increase in the M&A activity in the recent years 
was accompanied by a typical phenomenon which is a larger size of the acquisitions than ever 
before. Furthermore, the M&A activity has become more global with cross-border M&As by 
industrialised countries representing over 80% of all foreign direct investment (Conn et al., 
2005; Goergen and Renneboog,2004). 
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The results of the studies applied on samples covering the eighties and early nineties may not 
be applicable to the recent M&A activity due to the changes in global business environment 
nowadays. For example, there have been changes in the economic, institutional and cultural 
structures of firms in different countries over the years, which may impact the results of 
examining recent M&A transactions differently than previous years. 
Also, there has been an increase in the number of mega cross-border merger and acquisition 
deals in recent years in comparison with the eighties and early nineties, which may contribute 
to the existence of some differences in the results (UNCTAD, 2005). 
Recent studies which examined the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the returns to 
shareholders of acquirer firms around the announcement date have focused either on cross-
border M&As or domestic M&As separately. For example, Campa and Hernando (2004) 
examined European acquirer firms engaged in cross-border M&As with results showing 
insignificant cumulative abnormal returns.  
Gregory and McCorriston (2005) achieved similar results of insignificant abnormal returns for 
a sample of UK acquirer firms involved in cross-border M&As. However, Ben Amar and 
Andre (2006) found significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns to Canadian acquirer 
firms involved in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
Considering domestic mergers and acquisitions, Moeller et al. (2004) examined a sample of 
US acquirer firms engaged in domestic acquisitions with results showing significant positive 
cumulative abnormal returns. However, Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003, 2006) achieved 
different results for UK acquirer firms, with significant negative returns of 1.4% over the (-1, 
+1) event window. 
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The previous studies haven’t differentiated between domestic and cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions in their examinations of the returns to acquirer firms, which makes it unclear and 
ambiguous of whether or not cross-border M&As generate higher returns to acquirer firms 
than domestic M&As. 
Therefore, this study will fill the gap in the literature by the use of a sample that combines 
both cross-border and domestic M&As and the direct comparison of the returns to 
shareholders of acquirer firms involved in cross-border and domestic M&As, in order to find 
out whether or not there is any significant difference between them.  
Therefore, more specifically the objectives of this chapter are as follows: 
• To examine the difference between the reactions of the share market returns on the 
London Stock Exchange to the announcement of cross-border and domestic 
acquisitions by UK acquirers. 
• To examine the impact of some of the deals and acquirers characteristics on the 
returns to shareholders of UK acquirers. 
In order to achieve the objectives of this chapter, a sample of 585 UK public acquirer firms 
involved in domestic and foreign acquisitions over the period 1996-2003 is examined. Event 
study methodology is applied using three benchmark models which are the mean-adjusted 
model, the market model and the market-adjusted model. The results in general show 
significant positive returns to shareholders in domestic mergers and acquisitions compared 
with insignificant negative abnormal returns to shareholders in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. However, there has been no significant differences between the returns to 
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acquirers’ shareholders involved in cross-border and domestic M&As over most of the event 
windows examined around the announcement date. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 discusses the previous theoretical and 
empirical literature on domestic and cross-border M&As. Section 2.3 describes the regulation 
system of takeover bids in the UK. Section 2.4 presents the data sample and methodology, 
while section 2.5 reports and discusses the empirical results. Section 2.6 which is the final 
section summarizes the key findings and conclusions. 
2.2  Literature Review 
This section commences by reviewing the theoretical and empirical studies of the motives for 
mergers and acquisitions and then discusses the theoretical and empirical results of returns to 
shareholders in domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
2.2.1 Motives for Mergers and Acquisitions 
Theoretical research and studies over the years provided several explanations for the M&A 
strategy by examining various motives for mergers and acquisitions in general. Therefore, 
there have been a lot of possible reasons which were suggested as an explanation for why a 
company chooses M&A as a way of growth. In general, the most common cited motive is to 
achieve synergy. However, there are several other motives such as diversification, market 
power, improved management or tax motives (De Pamphilis, 2008). 
Trautwein (1990) argued that the motives of mergers and acquisitions haven’t received 
enough theoretical efforts from researchers as much as the merger consequences. However, 
most researchers agree that in reality, there are a number of different motives that drive 
mergers to take place and not only one motive (Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987; Trautwein, 
1990; Hopkins, 1999; DePamphilis, 2008). Therefore, it was useful to group these motives 
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into various categories (Mukherjee et al., 2004). For example, Trautwein (1990) classifies the 
theories for merger motives into seven categories which are efficiency, monopoly, raider, 
valuation, empire-building, process and disturbance theory. However, most of these theories 
haven’t got enough empirical results with which to support them. Berkovitch and Narayanan 
(1993) and Seth et al. (2000, 2002) indicate three major motives for mergers which are the 
achievement of the synergy, hubris and managerialism. Mueller and Yurtoglu (2007) divide 
them into synergy, market for corporate control, managerial discretion, overvaluation and the 
hubris hypotheses. Also, Mukherjee et al. (2004) mentioned some of the motives which 
include diversification, management incentives and tax considerations. 
Consequently, there are numerous theories that explain the reasons why mergers and 
acquisitions take place. The most common ones are the synergy or efficiency theory, the 
hubris, managerialism or agency theory, each of which will be discussed below in detail with 
the empirical findings on them. 
2.2.1.1 The Synergy Hypothesis  
The synergy hypothesis suggests that the motive for the acquisitions exists when it is a value 
increasing event, which means that the firm’s value after the combination is greater than the 
values of the individual firms operating separately (Bradley et al., 1988; Seth et al., 2000). 
This means that improving the efficiency of the combining firms is a popular explanation for 
acquisitions. Therefore, it follows that managers of acquirer and target firms intend to engage 
in the combination only if it results in shareholders’ wealth maximization for the acquirer and 
target firms (Berkovitch and Narayanan, 1993; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004).  
In general, the sources of value from synergy could be classified into three types, which are: 
operational synergy, managerial synergy and financial synergy. The operational synergy can 
arise from the economies of scale and scope or through the increased monopoly power. 
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Therefore, operational synergies will be available and result in gains to the shareholders of 
both firms if the combining firms share the same industry. If the companies are not from the 
same industry but are horizontally or vertically related then there will be an increase in their 
monopoly power (Sudarsanam et al., 1996). On the other hand, if the merger is conglomerate 
and the firms are from unrelated industries, then the value creation will result from non-
operational sources of synergy such as managerial or financial sources (Sudarsanam et al., 
1996).  
Empirical studies suggest that the operating synergy through economies of scale and scope are 
important determinants for shareholders’ wealth (DeLong, 2003). Economies of scale are 
reached by spreading the fixed costs over the increased production (Sudarsanam, 2003). 
However, economies of scope can be achieved through using an existing group of skills or 
assets which were already used to produce a specific service or product in producing related 
services and products (Sudarsanam, 2003).  This is most often found when the combination of 
a number of product lines in one firm is much cheaper than producing them in separate firms.  
Also, market power economies which are achieved by the ability of the firms to control prices 
due to their greater size represent another source of synergy. It is achieved by the monopoly 
power which refers to the firms’ ability to force buyers to accept higher prices, or through 
monopsony power which refers to the firm’s ability to force the suppliers in accepting lower 
prices (Sharma and Ho, 2002).  
Managerial synergy could arise when the bidder’s management team has managerial 
competency greater than what is needed for the current tasks in their firm. Thus, they may 
seek to take over a target which has less competent managers so as to employ their surplus 
managerial resources and improve the efficiency of the target which is less efficient due to 
their insufficient management. Therefore, the acquirers’ managerial surplus will combine with 
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the targets’ non-managerial organizational capital to create synergy by the merger with both 
bidder and target shareholders experiencing wealth gains (Sudarsanam et al., 1996). 
Moreover, there is scope for financial synergy in certain acquisitions. This kind of synergy 
occurs when the merger or the acquisition results in lower cost of capital for the acquiring 
firm or the newly formed firm. It can result from some possible sources which are: the tax 
advantage resulting from the unused debt capacity in any of the bidder or target firms, since 
there will be a much higher debt capacity resulting from the new combined firm; financial 
economies of scale through lower transactions and securities costs as well as “the 
complementary nature of the growth opportunities and financial resources of the merging 
companies and the coinsurance of debt of the two companies" (Sudarsanam et al., 1996, p. 
675). 
The synergy hypothesis was supported by the results of some of the empirical studies. 
Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) find in their examination of a sample of US firms engaged 
in domestic deals that the synergy is the most important motive for these takeovers supported 
by the positive total gains. 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004) investigated an intra European sample which contained 
acquirers and targets from the UK and Continental Europe (UK, Ireland, Germany, Austria, 
Switzerland, France, Scandinavia, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxembourg, Southern Europe and 
Central Europe). They examine whether the most common reason for takeovers is synergy, 
agency problem or managerial hubris. They found a significantly positive relationship 
between target gains and bidder gains and between target shareholder gains and total gains 
which suggest that synergies are the main motivations for bids, with targets and bidders 
sharing the wealth gains.  
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Therefore, although the rational may differ from one merger to the other, there’s a common 
measure of success for mergers, which is efficiency gains through synergies and the increased 
value of the combined firms (Mukherjee et al., 2004). 
2.2.1.2 The Hubris Hypothesis 
The hubris hypothesis proposes that acquisitions are the result of managers’ mistakes in 
evaluating target firms and that the synergy gain is zero (Roll, 1986). Consequently, when 
managers make errors of overestimating the synergies of the merger or the acquisition, the 
takeover may take place and as a result there might be an overpayment for the target.  
The hubris hypothesis is also referred to as the ‘‘winners curse’’. The reason for this comes 
from the reality that sometimes in the auctions and the existence of many bidders with a range 
of several bids for the target company, an increase in the competitive environment would 
make the estimation of the actual value of the target more difficult. Therefore, the winning bid 
may be much higher than the expected value of the target company. In this situation, the 
winner is described as being cursed and may regret paying much more than what the company 
is worth (DePamphilis, 2008). 
However, since the synergy is assumed to be zero, then the higher the gain for the target, the 
greater will be the loss to the acquirer firm and the total gain will be zero. Therefore, we may 
say in this case that there is a negative correlation between the targets’ and the acquirers’ gain, 
whereas there is no correlation between the target and the total gain (Berkovitch and 
Narayanan, 1993; Goergen et al., 2004). Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) found evidence of 
hubris in a sub-sample of US takeovers and Firth (1980) also found evidence of hubris that 
was reflected by positive gains to target firms while examining a sample of UK firms.  
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2.2.1.3 The Agency Hypothesis (Managerialism) 
The agency hypothesis proposes that takeovers are motivated by the acquirers’ management 
self-interest (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Therefore, this leads to the problem that the 
managers who are working as agents for the owners (stockholders) may have some conflicting 
interests. This is because some managers are interested in the actions that provide them with 
extra power and prestige such as growth, size and diversification (Hopkins, 1999), whereas 
the owners (stockholders) are more likely to be interested in the profitability of their firm as 
well as the increase in their stock prices. Therefore, unlike the hubris hypothesis, the 
acquirers’ management here will knowingly overpay in takeovers to maximize their own 
wealth and corporate growth rather than the firm shareholders’ wealth (Seth et al., 2000). 
Some managers may have the motive to do that if their salaries and bonuses are dependent on 
the size of their firms rather than on their performance.  
In comparison with the previous hypotheses, there will be a negative correlation between the 
targets value and the bidders’ value, and negative correlation between the targets value and 
the total value (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). Using a sub-sample of US takeovers which 
took place during 1963-1988, Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993) found evidence for the 
managerialism hypothesis which was reflected by the negative correlation between target and 
total gains.  
2.2.2 Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions Motives 
The dynamics of cross-border M&As have great similarities to those of domestic M&As 
(Shimizu et al., 2004). However, since cross-border mergers and acquisitions have some 
unique characteristics, costs and benefits, due to their international nature, there may be some 
possible systematic differences in the different motives for domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions (Harris and Ravenscraft, 1991; Seth et al., 2000). Also, we shouldn’t ignore the 
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fact that cross-border M&As involve some unique challenges caused by the different 
economic, cultural, and institutional structures within the different countries (House et al., 
2002; Shimizu et al., 2004). Therefore, we shouldn’t treat cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions as an extension of domestic mergers and acquisitions since they are more 
complex due to the various differences between the countries of the acquirer and the target 
companies (Sudarsanam, 2003). As a result, managers need to take into consideration those 
differences in domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions in the cultural, 
environmental, legal and accounting rules differences (Sudarsanam, 1995). 
Generally speaking, the synergy, hubris and managerialism may be possible motives for both 
domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. For example, the synergy hypothesis is 
also applied in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Eun et al. (1996) test the synergy 
hypothesis using a sample of foreign acquirers acquiring U.S. firms during the period 1979-
1990. Their findings generally show that cross-border M&As are synergy-creating activities. 
Moreover, Kiymaz and Mukherjee (2000) show that country diversification results in 
synergistic benefits. Also, it was found by Seth et al. (2000) who examined a sample of 
foreign acquisitions of US firms that the synergy hypothesis is the main explanation for those 
transactions (Mukherjee et al., 2004). Therefore, efficiency gains through synergy are 
probably the most obvious reason for mergers and acquisitions whether being domestic or 
cross-border (UNCTAD, 2000). 
The hubris hypothesis may also be relevant to cross-border acquisitions and not only to 
domestic mergers and acquisitions. This relies upon the belief that the information asymmetry 
is on average greater in cross-border deals between a foreign bidder and a domestic target 
than in domestic deals between a domestic bidder and a domestic target (Seth et al. 2000). 
Therefore, the lack of information in this situation will increase the probability that the 
   26 
bidders’ managers overvalue the targets while mistakenly believing their evaluation to be 
correct.  
Moreover, the managerialism hypothesis has been suggested as a motive for domestic mergers 
and acquisitions. However, it may also be relevant to the cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions if managers of the foreign firms are willing to acquire greater power and 
authority within their firm or reduce their human capital risk through diversification (Amihud 
and Lev, 1981; Seth et al., 2000).  
There have been many other explanations for the reason why companies choose to do cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. Hitt et al. (2001) described five reasons which are: 
increasing market power, overcoming entry barriers, diversification, speed of entry to market 
and overcoming the cost of new product development. Sudarsanam (1995) addressed other 
motives for cross-border M&As such as achieving economies of scale and extending market 
by external growth, access to inputs such as raw materials, labour or technology, defensive 
ways to reduce earnings volatility by diversifying products and markets as well as exploiting 
unique advantages such as management capabilities, production, brand, design and reputation. 
The difference in the macroeconomic conditions in two countries may be a driver for cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. These may be the rate of growth, the lower costs and many 
other opportunities which are available in other countries. Therefore, it may seem reasonable 
to expect the slower growth countries being more often home to acquirer firms with the faster 
growth countries being more often home to targets (Hopkins, 1999). 
Another motive for cross-border mergers and acquisitions is to use it as a mode of entry to 
new markets internationally by acquiring other companies in new countries. This will help the 
firm to protect and grow its market position by acquiring rather than starting up a new 
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company and thus gaining a more competitive advantage and experience. In comparison with 
other modes of entry such as exporting, licensing, franchising, joint ventures or wholly owned 
subsidiaries, mergers and acquisitions offer a high degree of control, high need for resource 
commitment and are fast to implement (Hopkins, 1999). Therefore, mergers and acquisitions 
are often considered as the fastest way for the firms to achieve the desired goals (UNCTAD, 
2000), especially if considered from the international point, since cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions are considered as the quickest way of entry into international markets because 
they shorten the time needed to access new countries by acquiring an existing firm and 
facilitate the entry into the market in a competitive way. 
2.2.3 Theory of Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions 
Within this global environment and the increase in globalization of businesses, a number of 
opportunities have emerged for the firms and more pressure is put on them to engage in cross-
border mergers and acquisitions (Hitt et al., 1998). Dunning (1993) has developed an eclectic 
model, which is relatively known as the OLI Paradigm, as an attempt to create an overall 
framework which covers numerous theories to explain why firms invest outside their home 
countries and the motivations behind that. The OLI Paradigm explains the FDI decision 
process which leads to cross-border acquisitions and divides the process into three decisions 
which are: the Ownership, Location and Internalization decision (OLI). 
2.2.3.1 The Ownership Decision 
The ownership decision states that the firm must have some competitive advantages in its 
home market in a form that can be exploited and transferred to foreign subsidiaries. These 
must be firm-specific and not easily copied by other firms so as to allow the firm to create 
value through the foreign production decision. Also, these proprietary or ownership 
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advantages are generally costly to create in the home country, whereas having low costs if 
transferred to new locations (UNCTAD, 2000). 
2.2.3.2 The Location Decision 
The location decision states whether or not the firm is attracted to a foreign location that is 
superior to the location in the firm’s home country and best meet the deployment of its 
ownership assets. If so, the firm should be able to obtain use of the characteristics of the 
foreign market that will allow it to exploit and make the most of its competitive advantages in 
that market. 
2.2.3.3 The Internalization Decision 
Under the internalization decision, the firm must decide whether or not it can maintain its 
competitive position under the foreign acquisition or through alternative modes such as 
licensing or strategic expansion. 
According to the previous theories, there are a lot of perils as well as opportunities 
accompanied with cross-border acquisitions which may affect their performance in 
comparison with domestic acquisitions. Therefore, there have been a number of theories and 
reasons why acquirers involved in cross-border M&As are expected to underperform or 
outperform their domestic rivals. 
One of the hurdles that is expected to affect the outcome of the merger deals and make 
international acquisitions underperform domestic ones is cited by Finkelstein and Larsson 
(1999) who present a theory of greater employee resistance in cross-border transactions. In 
their opinion, the reason for the underperformance is that the employees react negatively to 
change. Therefore, since the management style as well as the alteration of the career paths or 
compensation structures is much more different between companies from different countries 
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than in companies from the same country, international acquirers are expected to 
underperform their domestic rivals.  
Another reason why underperformance is expected in international acquisitions in comparison 
with domestic acquisitions stems from the problem of Information Asymmetry. This 
asymmetry and lack of information in cross-border deals may cause international acquirers to 
overvalue the targets and be more prone to overbid. Therefore, after the acquisition, the 
international acquirers may experience greater difficulties in integrating the target than 
domestic acquirers (Gioia and Thomsen, 2004) which may result in the underperformance. 
Moreover, cross-border acquisitions may be accompanied with some challenges such as the 
increased level of competition and the higher costs which may affect the acquirer gains 
inversely (Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). Moreover, hubris and agency problems may be 
higher in cross-border acquisitions and cultural conflicts may be much more than in domestic 
acquisitions, which may lead to lower bidder returns (Denis et al., 2002).  
On the other hand, there are other researchers who list some reasons why international 
acquirers are expected to outperform their domestic rivals. For example, Moeller and 
Schlingemann (2005) showed that acquisitions of foreign assets provided acquirer firms with 
different opportunities than those arising from domestic transactions, such as risk 
management, technology improvements and, sometimes, better government policies. Also, 
cross-border acquisitions give the opportunity for the companies to access new markets. This 
will provide the combined company with an increase in the economies of scale; since the 
combined production and increased sales will enable them to make cuts in the unit cost. 
Therefore, cross-border acquisitions are expected to prove superior in typical manufacturing 
businesses where scale is a key to success (Morck and Yeung, 2003). 
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Moreover, Bertrand and Zitoun (2005) presented a theory which states that international 
acquisitions allow acquirers to transfer their technological and managerial competencies to the 
home country of the target, which will result in improving the target’s performance. This as a 
result predicts that international transactions will outperform domestic ones. 
Also, the rationalisation gains may be higher in cross-border acquisitions than in domestic 
ones. This arises from the different marginal production costs that may exist between the 
acquirer and the target that are located in different countries. Therefore, this will give the 
acquirer the opportunity to take advantage of this difference in cost and move the production 
to countries with lowest costs (Bertrand and Zitouna, 2005). 
2.2.4 Review of the Empirical Studies 
A number of empirical studies have been carried out to examine the issue of the returns to 
shareholders in mergers and acquisitions. These studies have been conducted either for the 
short-term or the long-term. In the short-term studies, the period under examination comprises 
days or a few months around the announcement of the merger and acquisition deal, whereas 
in the long-term studies the researchers extend their examination period to include several 
years around the announcement day.  
Each of these two event study periods has its own advantages and disadvantages. Regarding 
the short-term approach, there is an assumption of stock market efficiency. This means that 
the reaction of the stock market to the announcement of the acquisition gives a reliable 
measure of the acquisitions’ expected value. Therefore, if the capital market is information 
efficient, it will take just a short time to recognize the expected costs and benefits of the 
merger and reflect them into share price reactions at the time of the merger (Sudarsanam, 
2003). Thus, a short event window will be enough in this occasion to reflect all the valuation 
effects of the merger announcement.  
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On the other hand, some researchers find that even though short-term studies “are relatively 
straight forward and trouble free” (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007, p.148), the announcement 
returns in this situation may tend to reflect the investors’ expectations and thus be subject to 
bias (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). Therefore, those researchers suggest that they need to 
lengthen the event window to several years so as to capture the whole impact of the merger 
announcement. They rely on the idea that the markets need a long period of time to revise 
their judgment and evaluate the value implications of the acquisition and its progress and the 
competitors’ reaction. However, even though the long event window has its own advantages, 
it creates other, bigger problems. These include the increase in chances for the existence of 
changes in other strategic, operational or financial events for the acquirer firms in the longer 
event windows, which may impact the valuation of the acquisition, since it is difficult to 
isolate the takeover effect from those caused by other changes. Moreover, the long window 
reduces the reliability of the test results and raises the bad model problem (Tuch and 
O’Sullivan, 2007).  
In general, when the returns are measured over short time intervals or windows around the 
announcement day of the merger, most of the previous studies have shown significant positive 
wealth gains for target firm shareholders due to the premium paid for their shares. However, 
the results for the bidder firms were divided between those that reported negative abnormal 
returns and others that reported zero or slightly positive abnormal returns (Sudarsanam and 
Mahate, 2006). On the other hand, studies conducted over long time intervals following the 
mergers have shown mixed results depending on the kind of methodology used but generally 
speaking, returns to acquirers’ shareholders are often significantly negative (Mueller and 
Yurtoglu, 2007).  
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Previous empirical studies were conducted for both the short-term and the long-term periods 
for the bidder and target companies in different countries. The results of these empirical 
studies may differ from one country to the another; therefore, the results for each country are 
presented separately for both domestic and cross-border studies. 
2.2.4.1 Domestic Mergers and Acquisitions 
The results for both US and UK studies show a clear conclusion that target firm shareholders 
achieve economically high and statistically significant wealth gains. On the other hand, the 
impact of acquisitions at the time of the bid announcement on the returns of bidder firm 
shareholders is mixed with some studies showing small positive or negative returns and others 
showing zero returns (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). The 
studies which showed significant positive returns to acquirers in the US and UK were mostly 
those studies which were conducted for takeovers that took place during the 1950s and 1960s 
when the takeovers might have been more beneficial to shareholders in acquiring firms (Tuch 
and O’Sullivan, 2007). However, recent studies show more negative performance for 
acquirers in the US and the UK, with recent evidence from other countries being more 
positive (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007).  
Also, the results for the long-term post-acquisition performance of acquirers are mixed and 
inconclusive because of the sensitivity of the shareholder wealth performance over the long-
term period to the benchmark model used for calculating the long-term abnormal returns, 
which represents a major methodological issue (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). However, 
the majority of the previous studies report wealth losses for acquirers at the time of the bid 
announcement as well as during the post-acquisitions period (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). 
   33 
2.2.4.1.1 US Domestic Acquirers 
The short-term studies which are conducted for the US show that target firms’ shareholders 
realize substantial gains. On the other hand, the results for the bidder firms’ shareholders 
show either no significant difference in the returns to acquirers, small positive or negative 
significant returns around the announcement of the bid (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). In the 
long-term period most of the studies conducted for the US bidders find negative significant or 
insignificant returns, especially those conducted for public targets.  
 
Fuller et al. (2002) examined the short-term shareholder returns for a sample of 539 US public 
acquirers who acquired five or more foreign and domestic targets within a three-year period 
between 1990 and 2000. They examined the five-day event period (-2, 2) around the 
announcement day using the market-adjusted model. Their study considered public, private 
and subsidiary targets, relative size and the method of payment. The results for all the bids are 
statistically significant positive CARs of 1.77%. More specifically, the results indicate that 
bidders who buy private firms experience gains with significant positive returns of 2.08%, 
gain when the target is a subsidiary of a public firm  with significant positive returns of 
2.75%, whereas they lose when the bidder buys a public firm suffering significant negative 
returns of -1%. In addition, the results show that when the bidder uses stock as a payment 
method or when the target is large relative to the bidder, the gain or loss for the bidder firms is 
greater in absolute value.  
Moeller et al., (2004) examined a comprehensive sample of 12,023 domestic acquisitions 
made by US public acquirers between 1980 and 2001, taking into consideration the size 
effect. In the short-term, they used the market model to calculate the three-day (-1, +1) 
cumulative abnormal returns and in the long-term the Fama-French three factor model was 
used over the 36 months period. The results show positive significant cumulative abnormal 
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returns of 1.102% over the three-day period, whereas in the long term the results show 
insignificant positive returns of 1.8%. However, their results show that the announcement of 
acquiring small firms is significantly better than large firms with abnormal returns 2.24 
percentage points higher than that associated with acquisition announcements for large firms. 
 
2.2.4.1.2 European Domestic Acquirers 
Regarding the European countries, there is little information about the share price 
performance of the firms involved in merger and acquisition activities, especially those 
written in the English language (Sudarsanam, 2003). However, the review for the existing 
studies show results which are similar to those achieved in the US and the UK studies. They 
show gains to target firms in most of the cases, whereas the acquirers just about break even 
(Sudarsanam, 2003).  
2.2.4.1.3 UK Domestic Acquirers 
The studies that have been conducted for the UK companies in the short-term period give 
results which show target shareholders realizing substantial gains whereas acquirers recieve 
either zero insignificant returns, small significant positive or small significant negative returns 
around the announcement of the bid (Tuch and O’Sullivan 2007; Sudarsanam 2003). 
Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003) examine the performance of a sample of 5l9 UK acquirers 
between 1983 and 1995 both in the short- and long-term periods to establish whether the 
performance depends on their pre-bid status or type as being glamour or value acquirers, 
measured by the PE ratio and MTBV and the impact of the method of payment used. They 
use a variety of benchmark models to calculate the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHARs) 
which are the size-adjusted, the market-adjusted, the market to book value-adjusted and the 
means-adjusted model. They report abnormal returns for three periods: the bid announcement 
   35 
period from day - 1 to day +1, the bid period from day +2 to day +40 and the post acquisition 
period ranging from +41 to +750 days.  
For the bid announcement period (- 1, +1), the whole sample of acquirers experience 
statistically significant negative abnormal returns (-1.4%). This result is consistent with some 
other previous studies done for the UK, such as Sudarsanam et al. (1996) who report 
cumulative abnormal returns of -1 .26%, and Holl and Kyriasis (1997) who report cumulative 
abnormal returns of -1.4% for UK acquirers in the time period 1979-1989. In the second event 
window (+2, +40) acquirers realize insignificant negative and positive BHARs which range 
from -1.89% to 0.5%. In the long-term over the three-year window, more than half of the 
acquirers experience wealth losses with significant negative returns at an average of -15% 
across the various benchmark models. 
Again in 2006, Sudarsanam and Mahate used the same sample as that in 2003 in order to 
examine the bid period and the long-term three-year shareholder wealth performance of four 
types of acquirers. This includes the single friendly bidder, the single hostile bidder, the white 
knight bidder (the friendly bidder who competes with a hostile bidder for the same target and 
wins the bid) and the multiple hostile bidder, and thus did not limit their study to just friendly 
and hostile acquirers.  
For the short-term period they calculated the pre-bid returns over days from -20 to -1, and the 
bid announcement period over the -1 to +1 days. The results show that the abnormal 
performance index return APR which they interpret as the value gain associated with the 
event over days -20 to -1 is on average 1.1% to 1.6% for friendly acquirers; 2.5% to 2.9% for 
single hostile; 1.6% to 2% for white knights and 1.3% to 1.7% for multiple hostiles. In the bid 
announcement period, -l to +1 days, the overall sample return is about -1.4% with both 
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friendly acquirers and single hostile acquirers suffering value losses (about -1.5% and -1.9% 
respectively). 
2.2.4.2 Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions 
Sudarsanam (2003) made a review of some of the previous cross-border studies that 
investigated the shareholder wealth effects, especially those focusing on the short term 
surrounding the takeover announcement. The results of these studies were mixed with some 
of them reporting positive returns and others showing wealth losses depending on the country 
of the acquirer. In general, his review shows that cross-border acquisitions in the US and 
Europe do not generate wealth gains for acquirer shareholders in most cases. 
For example, one of the studies he mentioned is the one conducted by Eun et al. (1996) who 
examined the impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions on foreign acquirer firms of US 
targets between 1979 and 1990. The acquirer firms were from different countries which were 
Australia, Canada, UK, France, Hong Kong, Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Germany, and others. The results show that on average, foreign acquirer shareholders of US 
targets experienced wealth gains that varied across countries of acquirers. For example, 
Canadian acquirers had moderate wealth increases whereas Japanese shareholders 
experienced major wealth increases. However, shareholders of UK acquirers experienced 
significant wealth losses. Therefore, the results of examining cross-border acquisitions in 
general depend on the country of the acquirer as well as the periods of the studies and the 
length of the event windows examined. 
2.2.4.2.1 US Cross-border Acquirers 
Doukas and Travlos (1988) examined the impact of cross-border mergers and acquisitions on 
the stock prices of US bidder firms. They found that when the US bidder firms expand into 
new industries and geographic markets, the shareholders of these firms experience significant 
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positive abnormal returns. Whereas when the US bidder firms already have operations in the 
target firms’ country, the shareholders experience insignificant negative abnormal returns. 
Also, in a study of US international acquisitions, Doukas (1995) found that his sample of 463 
US acquirers which took place between 1975 and 1989 achieved small positive abnormal 
returns. However, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) found insignificant negative cumulated 
abnormal returns of -3.7% for US acquirers who acquired Canadian targets during the twelve 
months following the announcement of the merger. 
2.2.4.2.2 European Cross-border Acquirers 
The number of studies which examined the international acquisitions of European 
corporations has been relatively few (Lowinski et al., 2004). For example, Goergen and 
Renneboog (2004) investigated the short-term returns for large European (Continental Europe 
and the UK) domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions for the period 1993-2000. 
Their sample which included 178 mergers and acquisitions with deal values of more than 
$100 million had both a European bidder and target. They measured the short-term wealth 
effects for the firms using the market model and applied six different measures of beta using 
several event windows which are (-1, 0), (-2, +2),  (-40, 0) and (-60, +60) in days. The results 
in general showed significant positive abnormal returns for the target firms which ranged 
between 9.01% and 23.10% over the different event periods. Also, the results for acquirer 
firms showed significant positive abnormal returns of 0.70% and 1.18% over the (-1, 0) and (-
2, +2) event windows, compared with insignificant results over the other windows.  
This is consistent with the results found by Campa and Hernando (2004) who examined the 
impact of merger and acquisition announcement on the shareholders’ returns for a sample of 
European firms including the UK. Their sample included European targets and bidders over 
the period 1998-2000. They used the CAPM method to examine seven different windows pre, 
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post and around the announcement date which are (-90,-1), (-60,-1), (-30,-1), (-1, +30), (-30, 
+30), (-1, +1), (-30, +1). They found that on average, target firm shareholders received a 
significant cumulative abnormal return of 9% in a one- month window around the 
announcement date. On the other hand, there were no significant cumulative abnormal returns 
for the acquirer firm shareholders on average. However, the sample period in Campa and 
Hernando (2004) study is only two years (1998 to 2000) which might make their results 
insufficiently representative. 
Also, Corhay and Rad (2000) didn’t find any evidence of significant announcement effects for 
cross-border mergers in their examination of Dutch firms. In Germany, there have been 
similar conclusions from the short-term perspective for cross-border acquisitions (Lowinski et 
al., 2004). From the long-term perspective, negative stock price reaction to German bidders 
were found during the first months after the announcement of the merger whereas there was 
significant positive cumulative abnormal returns after 24 months of the merger announcement 
(Lowinski et al., 2004).  
2.2.4.2.3 Cross-border Mergers and Acquisitions in Other Countries 
Ben-Amar and Andre (2006) examined 327 acquisitions conducted by Canadian listed firms 
for the years 1998-2002. The main reason for their study was to investigate the relationship 
between ownership structure and acquiring firm performance. Using the market model, they 
found that the average Cumulative Abnormal Returns (CAR) around the announcement date 
(-1, +1) were positive and significant 1.06% and so Canadian M&A created value for the 
acquiring firm shareholders during the short-term. They also found that cash deals, 
acquisitions of private targets and cross-border deals resulted in a positive impact on the 
announcement abnormal returns. In general, their results showed that on average, the markets 
perceive Canadian M&A as value creating transactions. 
   39 
Those results are similar to the ones obtained by previous studies on Canadian acquirers. 
Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) found similar results while examining a sample of domestic and 
US foreign bidders acquiring Canadian targets during the period 1964-1983. They found that 
Canadian domestic acquirers do better than the foreign US acquirers since over the twelve-
month period after the acquisition announcement the Canadian bidders realized significantly 
negative cumulative abnormal stock returns of -0.63% compared to the US foreign bidders 
who earn insignificant negative cumulative abnormal returns of  -3.72%. However, the sample 
used in this study covers a very old time period which is out of date with changes in the 
modern world. 
2.2.4.2.4 UK Cross-border Acquirers 
Aw and Chatterjee (2004) studied a sample of UK acquirer firms involved in merger and 
acquisition deals whose value exceeded US$400m and involved 79 deals over the period 
1991–1996. The targets were from three geographical locations, namely the UK, USA and 
Continental Europe. They used two models to compute the expected returns, which were the 
market model (MM) and the market- adjusted returns model (MAR). Four test periods were 
examined: t + 6, t + 12, t + 18 and t + 24 in months. The results of this study showed that for 
the whole sample, UK firms experienced significant negative cumulative abnormal returns 
over the period examined when they acquired large targets. Also, the performance of UK 
bidders in domestic transactions (UK targets) surpassed that of UK bidders of US targets, and 
the performance of UK bidders of US targets exceeded that of UK bidders of Continental 
European targets who suffered the worst post-takeover CARs. 
Gregory and McCorriston (2005) conducted a study to examine the short- and long-term 
performance of UK acquirer firms involved in foreign acquisitions using a sample of 343 
acquisitions in the time period 1984-1994. In their short-run study, they applied the market 
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model considering two event windows which were a five-day window (-3, 1) and a longer 
window (-10, 10). Their results showed that for the first window (-3, 1) the foreign UK 
acquisitions as a whole resulted in negative but not statistically significant CARs of -0.022%. 
For the US acquisitions, the short-run returns were positive (0.2372%), but were negative for 
the EU (-0.719%) and also negative for the rest of the world (-0.2026%), but none of the three 
was statistically significant. Using the second window (-10,10) they generated similar results 
as the first window but the wealth gains for US acquisitions and for conglomerate acquisitions 
became negative but not statistically significant. Generally, the descriptive results for the full 
sample revealed that the short-term results for the returns around the event date were not 
statistically significantly different from zero regardless of the target firms’ home country.  
2.2.4.3 Cross-border vs. Domestic M&A 
Some theories expect more gains and returns in international deals in comparison with 
domestic ones, whereas others show different conclusions, which are the outperformance of 
domestic acquirers over international acquirers. However, evidence till now on whether cross-
border transactions have a relatively more positive, or negative, effect on bidder CARs, 
compared to domestic acquisitions is still mixed, depending on the country of the acquirer and 
the time period covered in the previous studies. 
For example, Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) examined the stock performance for a sample 
of US acquirers involved in domestic and cross-border acquisitions between 1985 and 1995. 
They applied the market-adjusted returns model for the (-1, +1) event window around the 
announcement day. For the cross-border sample the CARs were insignificant 0.307% whereas 
for the domestic sample the returns were a significant 1.173%, and so US acquirers in cross-
border transactions had lower announcement returns than acquirers in domestic transactions. 
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They also found that bidder returns were negatively related to the target country’s economic 
restrictiveness. 
Conn et al. (2005) examined the announcement and post-acquisition share returns of UK 
firms as acquirers of domestic and foreign targets, considering both public and private targets 
for a sample of acquisitions that occur during 1984-1998. For the announcement period 
returns, they used a three-day window (-1, 1) around the announcement date and used the 
market-adjusted model to calculate the abnormal returns. The results showed significantly 
positive returns of 0.68% for the domestic acquisitions and significant positive returns of 
0.33% for the cross- border acquisitions. These positive returns resulted from mergers with 
private targets rather than public targets. In the long-term, they found that acquiring firms’ 
shareholders in cross-border transactions experienced significant negative long-term returns 
after acquisition of private targets. 
2.2.5 Impact of Acquirer and Deal Characteristics on Shareholders’ Returns 
It is well known in the literature that some of the deal and acquirer characteristics affect 
acquirer returns in general, since some previous studies show that the sign and magnitude of 
the acquiring firm’s returns seem to depend on those characteristics. Therefore, it is expected 
that if these characteristics differ systematically between cross-border and domestic 
acquisitions, a difference between their impacts on the returns could exist (Moeller and 
Schlingemann, 2005). These characteristics include the payment method, relative size, 
industry relatedness, the status of the target and other various characteristics (Antoniou et al., 
2007). Some of these different characteristics which are examined later using the regression 
analysis are explained below with their empirical evidence.  
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2.2.5.1 Method of Payment in Mergers and Acquisitions 
The choice of the payment method is of significant importance for the researchers who focus 
on examining the determinants of the bidder returns in the merger and acquisition deals. In 
general, the part of the literature which emphasized the impact of payment methods on the 
shareholders’ returns in the previous studies finds evidence which suggests that cash 
acquisitions perform better and generate higher returns for both target and bidder firms than 
equity bids at the time of the bid announcement as well as in the post-acquisition period (Tuch 
and O’Sullivan, 2007; Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Huang 
and Walking, 1987; Franks and Harris, 1989). 
Regarding the returns earned by the bidder, Travlos (1987) reported positive abnormal returns 
when the acquisition is financed with cash whereas there were significant negative abnormal 
returns when the operation is financed with stock. This is consistent with the results of Martin 
(1996) who found greater abnormal returns for the bidders making cash offers than those 
making stock offers. Additionally, Antoniou and Zhao (2004) ) reported that the bidders’ 
return for a sample of 179 successful British bids were higher when the operation was 
financed with cash and mixed offers than in the case of stock offers.  
The negative and positive impact on the returns due to the payment method is consistent with 
Myers and Majluf’s hypothesis (1984) who considered that the method of payment 
represented an information signal to the market. This hypothesis is based on the principle that 
there is an asymmetry between the information owned by the managers and the other agents 
in the market. In other words, managers have access to private information concerning the 
firm’s stock value and other investment opportunities to which the external investors do not 
have access.  
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Consequently, the managers of the acquiring firm will prefer to use the cash payment method 
for the acquisition if they believe that their shares are undervalued and that they are worth 
more than their current market price. Conversely, the bidding management will prefer to 
finance the acquisition with equity if they believe that their shares are overvalued. Thus, the 
announcement of the equity bid may be a signal to the market that the bidding firm’s 
management believes that their firm’s shares are overpriced (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004). 
On the other hand, the market may view the announcement of the cash bid as a signal that the 
management of the acquiring firm is expecting an increase in the value of the firm over the 
post-acquisition period (Myers and Majluf, 1984; Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007) which may 
have good results for the bidder shareholders.  
Hansen (1987) hypothesizes that bidders make stock offers if they have less information 
regarding the target’s value. Also, managers may have to take into account the taxation factor 
when they determine the payment method used to finance the acquisition. The taxation of 
capital gains is immediate for cash acquisitions, whereas it is postponed for stock 
acquisitions. Therefore, the bidding firm will be encouraged to finance the deal with stock if 
the option of postponing this taxation is important for the target’s shareholders. 
However, the impact of the payment method may vary in cross-border M&As compared to 
domestic M&As. The positive signal of the cash bid might be diminished and not have that 
strong effect in the case of cross-border bids because of the existence of other factors that may 
influence the means of payment (Conn et al., 2005). In cross-border deals, the information 
problems and the uncertainty connected with acquiring abroad and the difficulty in evaluating 
the foreign targets, especially the private ones, may force the acquiring company to pay for 
the bid with equity. Therefore, the negative signal of equity bids compared with cash bids 
may be invalid if the acquiring shareholders recognize this problem. However, the foreign 
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target sometimes might be unwilling to accept the foreign equity which is offered from the 
acquirer, which will force the acquirer to pay with cash and this may make the signaling effect 
of using the cash as a payment method neutralised. Consequently, the positive impact that the 
cash offers have on the returns in cross-border deals may be less obvious than in domestic 
deals as shown by Conn et al. (2005, p.824): 
“The positive impact of cash on returns may therefore be less apparent in bids for overseas 
public firms than in bids for domestic public firms and less apparent in bids for private than 
for public companies generally”. 
However, the results for the cross-border studies give mixed results depending on the country 
of the acquirer. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) found after examining a cross-border sample 
of European acquisitions that over both short- and long-term windows, that the shareholders 
of the acquiring firms responded to equity offers more favorably (1%) than cash offers 
(0.4%). This implies that making an all-equity offer does not in this case indicate to the 
market any negative signal. Furthermore, Eckbo and Thorburn (2000) found that the returns to 
shareholders of US acquirer firms were on average 3.1% for deals paid with cash, 3% for 
deals financed by stock, and 5.1% for deals financed with a mixed payment (cash and stock). 
Also, Andre’ et al. (2004) found for a sample of Canadian acquirers involved in domestic and 
cross-border mergers that deals which were financed by equity underperform relative to deals 
financed with cash.  
2.2.5.2 Public vs. Private Targets                                                                                                                                                             
Previous studies show that the market reacts differently to the acquisition of private targets in 
comparison with public acquisitions. Therefore, there have been many reasons to expect some 
differences between the returns to bidder firms in private and public targets whether being in 
domestic or cross-border deals. Some of these reasons have been explained by the liquidity 
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hypothesis, the managerial hypothesis and the bargaining power hypothesis (Draper and 
Paudyal, 2006).  
According to the liquidity hypothesis, the market for privately held companies is usually 
illiquid. This means that in comparison with listed targets where most of the information is 
available and bidders may compete for control, the opposite can be said about private targets. 
It means that information is likely to be poor on unlisted targets and competition over them is 
weak, which makes buying and selling them more difficult than public firms. As a result, this 
enhances the bargaining power of the acquirer and may possibly cause underpayment by 
bidding firms for privately held targets which makes it more likely for the bidder returns to be 
positive as a result of this discount (Fuller et al. 2002; Conn et al., 2005). Therefore, the lack 
of liquidity in the non-public firms makes them less attractive than more liquid investments, 
which gives the acquirers the ability to capture this discount in purchasing non-public targets 
for a better price.  Therefore, private firms usually offer their shares at a discount in order to 
create an incentive for potential acquirers as a profitable investment opportunity (Antoniou et 
al., 2007). This as a result may lead to more gains for the acquirers of private targets. 
On the other hand, the managerial motive hypothesis assumes that there are two types of 
managers. The first type are those who may seek to maximise their private benefits and 
increase the size and prestige of the firms they manage, and the other type are those who have 
the desire to enhance and increase their shareholders’ wealth. Those who are motivated by a 
desire for prestige and size will be prepared to buy publicly listed firms which are generally 
larger and more prestigious than private firms. This as a result will require a payment of 
higher premiums for those large firms, which will have an adverse effect on the share price of 
the bidder. Conversely, the acquisition of smaller private firms will be motivated by the desire 
to increase the synergies and maximize shareholders’ wealth rather than managers’ private 
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benefits. These kind of managers will be unwilling to pay high premiums for the private firms 
they are bidding for so as not to affect the price of the acquiring firm adversely at the time of 
the bid announcement. Also, smaller private targets may be easier to integrate into the 
business of the acquiring firm than larger listed firms which may result in a more favourable 
perception by the market and more gains for the takeover of privately held companies than 
listed companies (Draper and Paudyal, 2006). 
The last hypothesis, which is the bargaining power hypothesis, assumes that privately held 
companies don’t suffer from high agency problems since they are often controlled by a small 
group of partners or a family. The reduced agency considerations give them the opportunity to 
control the sale more closely and to choose the timing of the sale and the buyer they like. This 
means more significant bargaining strength for the sellers which allows them to ask for and 
receive a better price for their firm and may result in more gains for the bidder of private 
firms than for the bidder of public firms.  
Therefore, generally speaking, the results show higher returns when acquiring a private firm 
compared to acquiring a public firm (Conn et al., 2005). Antoniou et al. (2007) examined the 
shareholders’ wealth effects of a sample of UK frequent acquirers over the period 1987 to 
2004. They found that, in the short-term, acquirer firms broke even when acquiring public 
targets and gained significantly (a significant positive CAR of 1.59%) when buying private 
and subsidiary targets. This finding is to a great extent consistent with other studies such as 
those of Ang and Kohers (2001) and Draper and Paudyal (2006) who documented substantial 
gains from acquiring privately held firms. 
Fuller et al. (2002) found that for the five days (-2, 2) around the announcement day, bidder 
shareholders experienced losses when acquiring a public firm with significant negative CAR 
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of -1%, whereas experience gains when buying a private firm showed a significant positive 
CAR of 2.08%. 
Conn et al. (2005) found that the announcement returns from acquiring domestic public firms 
were significantly negative -0.99%, whereas the returns from acquiring domestic private 
targets resulted in significant positive returns of 1.05%. The negative significant returns from 
acquiring domestic public targets are consistent with some previous studies such as 
(Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003). However, in cross-border acquisitions, Conn et al. (2005) 
found that the returns from acquiring public targets were an insignificant -0.09%, whereas the 
returns from acquiring private targets were significantly positive 0.38%. For the whole 
sample, returns for public acquisitions were significantly negative -0.82%, compared to a 
significantly positive 0.86% in all private acquisitions. 
2.2.5.3 Relative Size of Target and Bidder 
In addition to the method of payment and the public status of the target, some studies suggest 
that certain joint characteristics of the target and bidder firms may influence the performance 
of the acquirers whether being domestic or cross-border (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). For 
example, some researchers propose that acquiring larger targets might end in better post-
acquisition performance than buying smaller targets. One of the proposed reasons for that is 
the difficulty of integrating large targets into a combined organization, which makes the 
competition on targets between potential acquirers much smaller. As a result, this gives more 
advantageous terms to acquirers of large targets due to the lack of competition (Roll, 1986). 
Also, acquiring a larger target may have stronger economic impact on the post-acquisition 
performance for the combined firm (Bruner, 2002). 
However, Moeller et al. (2004) argue that the concentration on the size effect should be turned 
to smaller acquirers rather than to larger targets since the economic impact on the small 
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acquirers will be very high. Therefore, small acquirers need to take high levels of care when 
making decisions about any bid. 
Empirically, most of the studies which focused on the relative size of target and bidder firms 
found that it has a strong impact on bidders at the announcement period with greater gains 
from acquiring large targets (Asquith et al., 1983; Franks and Harris, 1989; Tuch and 
O’Sullivan, 2007). 
In general, the previous studies which have been discussed in this section show mixed results 
about the impact of cross-border and domestic M&A announcement on the returns to 
acquirers’ shareholders. Some of them report significant increase in the returns to acquirers’ 
shareholders (Fuller et al., 2002; Conn et al., 2005; Ben-Amar and Andre, 2006), some show 
significant decrease in the abnormal returns (Sudarsanam, 2003; 2006), whereas others show 
insignificant abnormal returns (Campa and Hernando, 2004; Gregory and McCorriston, 
2005). 
The difference in the results of the previous studies could be as a result of the examination of 
different samples and time periods as well as from using different benchmark models in the 
analysis. Also, some of the previous studies, such as Aw and Chatterjee (2004) and Goergen 
and Renneboog (2004), constrained their examinations through limiting their samples by only 
selecting the large mergers, which may lead to results that cannot be generalized across all 
sizes of mergers. 
Moreover, it can be seen from the literature that most of the previous studies were conducted 
using acquisition transactions based on data and samples covering the 1980s and early 1990s, 
such as Conn et al. (2005) who used a sample of UK acquirers between 1984 and 1998, 
Gregory and McCorriston (2005) who used a sample between 1984 and 1994 of UK acquirers 
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and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) who examined a sample of US acquirers between 1985 
and 1995. Therefore, the results of these studies are not up-to-date in reflecting the rapid 
changes in today’s global business environment. Goergen and Renneboog (2004) examine a 
sample of European acquirers which is more recent than other previous studies and covers the 
years 1993 to 2000, but the main reason for their study was to examine a specific time period 
that covered the fifth merger wave, which may have effects on the results of their study. 
Also, previous studies have been conducted to examine the returns to shareholders of acquirer 
firms by examining either a domestic sample or cross-border sample of merger and 
acquisition deals without giving any clear evidence about the difference between the returns 
to shareholders of acquirer firms in domestic and cross-border acquisitions.  
Therefore, this chapter will fill this gap in the literature and examine the returns to 
shareholders of acquirer firms in general and whether there are any significant differences in 
them between cross-border and domestic deals. Also, the sample in this study is distinguished 
in covering a time period that is more recent than other previous studies in order to be more 
up-to-date with changes in the global world and to check whether the results have changed 
with the changes in the surrounding conditions, especially with the increase in the number and 
value of merger and acquisition deals.  
2.3 The Regulation of Takeover Bids in the UK 
A takeover is a way that the acquirer company can use in order to achieve a controlling 
interest in the target company. Therefore, there should be some regulations and rules to 
monitor and govern this process properly.  
In privately held companies the shares are not widely held, therefore, there is less need for the 
regulations to control them than for public and listed companies (Sudarsanam, 2003). 
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However, when the takeover is for a public target in the UK, it is regulated by the City Panel 
on Takeovers and Mergers (the Panel) under the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the 
Code).  
Therefore, in order to make a comparison between the impact of the announcement of 
domestic and cross-border acquisitions on the shareholders’ returns, there should be some 
understanding of the rules and regulations which monitor these deals, because the corporate 
governance regulations differ substantially between countries. Therefore, these differences in 
the regulations may contribute to the differences in the impact of the announcement of 
domestic and cross-border merger and acquisition deals on the shareholders’ returns (Goergen 
and Renneboog, 2004). 
Goergen and Renneboog (2004, p.13) state that: 
‘‘In addition to product and factor market imperfections, differences in takeover legislation 
and regulations may contribute to the differences in wealth effects of domestic and cross-
border acquisitions ’’. 
  
2.3.1 The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the Panel) 
The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers (the Panel) was supported by the Bank of England to 
come into being due to the rising concern about some of the market manipulative activities of 
bidders and target managements (Sudarsanam, 2010). It was established in 1968 as an 
independent body consisting of representatives from UK financial institutions and 
professional associations. This panel is selected to be a supervisory authority with the main 
purpose of issuing and administering the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code) and 
supervising takeovers and other issues related to the Code rules. 
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The panel aims to provide a speedy response to takeover situations, and to ensure that the 
transfer of ownership of companies in the stock market is done in a fair and orderly way. 
Therefore, its philosophy is not to have only minimal acceptable conduct among those 
involved in the takeover, but to promote them to achieve best practices (Sudarsanam, 2003). 
2.3.2 Nature and Purpose of the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code) 
The City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (the Code) governs how takeover bids in the UK 
are carried out and it is primarily enforced by the takeover panel.  
It exists principally to supervise the overall conduct of bids and to ensure a fairly equal 
treatment of shareholders in relation to takeovers. This Code does not cover the financial or 
commercial advantages or disadvantages of a takeover. Neither is it concerned with other 
issues such as the competition policy and other public policy issues, which are the 
responsibility of the government and other bodies. 
The Code attempts to attain a fair balance between the interests of the bidder company and 
that of the target company and its shareholders. Following implementation of the EU 
Takeover Directive in the UK, the City Code now has statutory effect. The rules set out in the 
Code have jurisdiction over bids for UK resident public companies whether being listed or 
unlisted and certain statutory, chartered and private companies (Sudarsanam, 2010). 
The Code consists of a number of General Principles which govern the conduct of takeover 
offers and other matters to which the Code applies. They are essentially statements of 
standards of commercial behaviour. The Code also contains a series of rules covering each 
stage of a takeover or merger which seek to implement the general Principles and are clarified 
by notes which supplement them. 
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The General Principles of the City Code as stated in The City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers, Freshfields Bruckhaus Deringer (2006, Appendix 1, p. 22) are as follows: 
1. “All holders of the securities of an offeree company of the same class must be 
afforded equivalent treatment; moreover, if a person acquires control of a company, 
the other holders of securities must be protected. 
2. The holders of the securities of an offeree company must have sufficient time and 
information to enable them to reach a properly informed decision on the bid; where it 
advises the holders of securities, the board of the offeree company must give its views 
on the effects of implementation of the bid on employment, conditions of employment 
and the locations of the company’s places of business. 
3. The board of an offeree company must act in the interests of the company as a whole 
and must not deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of 
the bid. 
4. False markets must not be created in the securities of the offeree company, of the 
offeror company or of any other company concerned by the bid in such a way that the 
rise or fall of the prices of the securities becomes artificial and the normal functioning 
of the markets is distorted. 
5. An offeror must announce a bid only after ensuring that he/she can fulfil in full any 
cash consideration, if such is offered, and after taking all reasonable measures to 
secure the implementation of any other type of consideration. 
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6. An offeree company must not be hindered in the conduct of its affairs for longer than 
is reasonable by a bid for its securities.” 
2.3.3 Antitrust Regulation 
Since 1965, mergers in the UK have been the subject of antitrust regulations. The main 
purpose of the antitrust regulation is to maintain a level of effective competition. However, 
other issues are also considered in determining whether a merger should be allowed or not, 
such as the issue of the public interest (Sudarsanam, 2003). 
The emergence of some other issues has to be considered while conducting the antitrust 
regulations such as the globalization and the privatization aspects. Due to the globalization of 
product and services markets, the cross-border takeover activity has increased to a high scale. 
This has resulted in an increase in the scope for multiple antitrust jurisdictions over a 
proposed merger and sometimes in conflicts between those jurisdictions among different 
national and regional regulators (Sudarsanam, 2003). 
The other development is the privatization of the monopolies that were previously owned by 
the Government, the setting up of sector-specific regulators such as the Office of 
Telecommunications (OFTEL) or the Office of Water (OFWAT). In the case of mergers 
involving such privatized companies, those mergers have to be cleared by both sector-specific 
regulators as well as the antitrust regulators. 
Therefore, companies contemplating mergers must carefully evaluate their antitrust 
implications and evolve strategies to minimize the regulatory risk as well as the cost of a deal 
being blocked on antitrust grounds. 
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2.3.4 The UK Antitrust Regime 
The merger control regime in the UK is considered as neutral in its attitude towards mergers. 
In general, merger regulation is part of the UK government’s competition policy which aims 
to maintain effective competition in various product markets within the UK or a substantial 
part of it. 
Although the government has been responsible for the restrictive trade practices since 1948, 
mergers became the focus of government competition policy in an explicit way only in 1965, 
with the enactment of the Monopolies and Mergers Act. This Act controls mergers in an 
administrative way in the form of a Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) for the 
reason of investigating mergers when called upon to do so. 
The Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) became the Competition Commission 
(CC) under the Competition Act 1998. This resulted in an amendment in the powers of the 
Commission and the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), which is responsible for administering 
competition law.   
In the UK, merger investigation consists of a two-stage process. The first stage includes a 
preliminary screening done by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT), which was created under the 
Fair Trading Act (FTA) in 1973 as an independent supervisory body which monitors all 
merger proposals or actual mergers in the UK. This first stage may result in a 
recommendation to the Secretary of State for Trade and Industry for a more detailed 
investigation. However, there are no specific rules for the OFT recommendation, since they 
judge each case by taking into account the impact of the proposed merger on the following 
factors as summarised in Sudarsanam (2003, p.415): “Competition in the UK, efficiency of 
the merging firms, employment and regional distribution of industry, international 
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competitiveness of UK firms, national strategic interest, the viability of the merging firms as a 
result of the method of financing , and the scope for turning around the acquired firm.” 
The second stage is done by the Competition Commission (CC), which is an independent 
advisory body, which undertakes this kind of detailed investigation and presents a report to 
the Secretary, who then takes a decision of either accepting or rejecting its recommendation. 
However, the Secretary’s decision may be challenged in the court. 
The recommendation given by the CC to the Secretary as shown in Sudarsanam (2003, p. 
416) is one of three conclusions which are: 
• “The merger does not operate against the public interest and can, therefore, be allowed 
to proceed or stand. 
• The merger operates against the public interest and should, therefore, be prevented. 
• The merger can be allowed subject to the adverse effects on competition being 
remedied.” 
One of these three decisions will be taken after considering whether the merger as a whole or 
in parts operates against the public interest, using the following criteria as listed in 
Sudarsanam (2003, p.416): “Maintenance of effective competition in the UK, promotion of 
consumer interests, promotion of cost reduction, new techniques and products, and new 
competitors, balanced UK distribution of industry/employment and promotion of UK 
companies’ international competitiveness”. 
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The competition regime in the UK was changed substantially by the 2002 Enterprise Act, 
which took effect from June 2003. Under the Enterprise Act 2002, the Competition 
Commission’s (CC’s) decision was changed from making recommendations to the Secretary 
of State for Trade and Industry to a determinative decision which makes it as a final decision 
that might be changed only by a legal appeal. However, since the 1980s the concentration of 
the Commission’s reports has been turned towards the competitive effects of the mergers 
(Arnold and Parker, 2007). 
Empirically, some previous studies have found that when the City values a share during a 
merger enquiry, this will have an important effect on the shareholders’ wealth. Also, 
competition regimes have been suggested by some studies as one of the reasons that may lead 
to substantial losses to shareholders through share price movements. For example, Arnold and 
Parker (2007) studied a sample of 50 mergers in the UK which were investigated by the 
MMC/CC between 1989 and 2002 in order to examine the impact of UK competition policy 
on shareholder value and whether the competition regimes could destroy shareholder value or 
not, and if the regulatory process decreased efficient market behaviour or not. They used the 
market model focusing on a three-day window around the announcement day for their 
examination. Their empirical results supported the findings of earlier work in the USA and 
UK regarding the general level of shareholder value created for the bidder and target 
companies with target company shareholders being the main beneficiaries. They also found 
that high abnormal losses are incurred by target company shareholders when a decision is 
announced by competition authorities prohibiting a merger but didn’t find evidence which 
supported the idea of the overall loss to shareholders of target company shareholders when the 
merger is prohibited. Instead, a small gain to target company shareholder value was recorded. 
They also found that the capital market behaves in an efficient way in response to new 
information when the regulatory regime is well understood and stable, whereas it operates less 
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efficiently when the regulatory regime is new and the capital market has little or no 
experience with respect to mergers.  
Thus, it can be seen that the regulatory systems in any country may affect the impact of the 
announcement of mergers and acquisitions on returns. And since those regulations differ 
between countries, this may give an explanation for the difference in the outcome of the 
merger and its impact on the shareholders’ returns between domestic and cross-border deals. 
For example, UK domestic deals will be more affected by the UK regulations than cross-
border deals, whereas cross-border transactions will be affected by the regulations of other 
countries which may have an effect on their returns and cause differences between them. 
However, the reason for this chapter is not to examine those regulations and their effects, but 
to present an overview of them in order to help in understanding them, which may in turn help 
to explain the difference between the returns in domestic and cross-border deals if present. 
2.4 Data Sample and Methodology 
This section describes the sample used in this chapter followed by a detailed description of the 
event study methodology which is applied in the analysis of the returns to shareholders of 
acquirer firms. 
 
2.4.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources 
This chapter examines a sample of UK public acquirer companies that are engaged in 
domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions, announced and completed between 
January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2003.  
The information about the firms involved in the merger activities was collected manually 
from the Thomson Financial magazine Acquisitions Monthly. The deals section of this 
magazine mostly records the announcement dates, the names of the firms involved in the 
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acquisition, the means of payment in the offer and the industry codes. Daily stock returns for 
the acquirer firms in the sample and daily market index returns (FTSE-All Share Index) are 
extracted from the Datastream database. 
Also to be included in the sample, transactions must fulfil the following conditions: 
• Acquirers are UK firms publicly traded on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) and 
have returns data for at least 240 days prior to the announcement date and 40 days 
after the announcement date of the acquisition for the short-term analysis available 
from the Thomson Financial Datastream database. 
• Deals values are available, which are defined by the acquisitions monthly as the total 
value of consideration paid by the acquirer, excluding fees and expenses. 
• The targets are UK firms for the domestic analysis and non-UK firms for the cross-
border analysis.  
2.4.2 Sample Description 
The preliminary total number of completed merger and acquisition deals collected from the 
Acquisitions Monthly magazine for the period from 1996 to 2003 is 1,171 deals, but only 585 
of them have all the data required for the study on the Datastream database. That’s why the 
sample used for the study has only 585 observations engaged in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions. Appendix 2.A provides a list of the names of acquirer and target firms used in 
the sample and indicates whether they are cross-border or domestic deals. 
A description of the sample used in this chapter is provided in Table 2.1 which highlights the 
salient features of the sample and breaks down the full sample into two parts according to 
whether the deal is a cross-border or domestic acquisition made by a UK acquirer firm.  
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Table 2.1: Distribution of Sample M&As by Year and Deal Characteristics 
 
 Cross-border M&A Domestic M&A Total 
 Number % Number % Number % 
 Panel A: By Year of M&A: 
1996 28 9.24 35 12.41 63 10.77 
1997 31 10.23 48 17.02 79 13.50 
1998 58 19.14 74 26.24 132 22.56 
1999 61 20.13 49 17.38 110 18.80 
2000 54 17.83 31 11.00 85 14.53 
2001 26 8.58 11 3.90 37 6.32 
2002 20 6.60 8 2.84 28 4.80 
2003 25 8.25 26 9.21 51 8.72 
Total 303 100.00 282 100.00 585 100.00 
 Panel B: By Deal Characteristics: 
Payment Method 
All Cash 105 34.65 108 38.30 213 36.41 
All Shares 11 3.63 13 4.61 24 4.10 
Mix 77 25.41 111 39.36 188 32.14 
Not Available 110 36.31 50 17.73 160 27.35 
Total 303 100.00 282 100.00 585 100.00 
 Country of Target 
UK 0 0.00 282 100.00 282 48.21 
US 126 41.58 0 0.00 126 21.54 
EU 108 35.65 0 0.00 108 18.46 
RoW 69 22.77 0 0.00 69 11.79 
Total 303 100.00 282 100.00 585 100.00 
 Relatedness 
Same SIC code 151 49.84 155 54.96 306 52.31 
Different SIC code 139 45.87 103 36.53 242 41.37 
Not Available 13 4.29 24 8.51 37 6.32 
Total 303 100.00 282 100.00 585 100.00 
 Target Status 
Public 89 29.37 77 27.30 166 28.38 
Private 214 70.63 205 72.70 419 71.62 
Total 303 100.00 282 100.00 585 100.00 
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Panel A of Table 2.1 shows the distribution over time of cross-border, domestic and total 
transactions. Consistent with the UNCTAD numbers, the sample shows that the number of 
merger and acquisition transactions by UK acquirer firms increases over the years, then a 
decrease happens after the millennium followed by another increase. 
The increase and decrease in the number of M&A deals over the years can be explained by 
the existence of the merger waves, since M&As usually occur in cyclical waves (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). Thus, the increase over the first years of the sample is due to their 
coincidence with the fifth merger wave which occurred from 1993 till 2000 (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004). The fifth merger wave was known for its mega deals, where firms were 
motivated to conduct M&A transactions and increase their size due to a global view of 
competition, which means that companies have to be big in order to compete (Lipton, 2006). 
The wave also emerged coinciding with a growth in the telecommunications and internet 
industries (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004), where most of the mergers are from the 
telecommunications, media and technology industries (Lipton, 2006). After the millennium, 
there has been a reduction in the M&A activity due to the “collapse of consumer confidence 
in these industries as well as overcapacity in the traditional sectors” (Goergen and 
Renneboog, 2004, p. 10). However, there has been a recovery in the acquisition activity from 
the previous crash in the number of M&As  in subsequent years with another new merger 
wave (Sudarsanam, 2010).  
Panel B of Table 2.1 presents the distribution of the sample over some of the deal 
characteristics which are the payment method, country of target, relatedness and the status of 
the target. With regard to the method of payment, the takeovers here are classified into three 
groups which are pure cash, pure equity and mixed payment. The pure cash (equity) offer is 
the one where the final consideration paid from the bidder to the target firm shareholders is 
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100% cash (equity), whereas the mixed offer is the one where the final consideration paid is a 
mixture of equity, cash or any other form of payment.  
It is clear that cash is the main method of payment in cross-border acquisitions and equity is 
less often used as a form of payment, which is consistent with other previous studies such as 
Conn et al. (2005) and Moeller and Schlingemann (2005). 
Concerning the country of the target, it is clearly seen that the UK acquirers in cross-border 
deals show a preference for targets in the industrialized and English speaking countries, with 
the majority of their targets located in the United States (41.58%) followed by Europe 
(35.63%).  
Acquisitions between firms in related industries (which are defined here as the same 2-digit 
standard industrial trade classification code or SIC code) occur in 49.84% of the cross-border 
sample and 54.96% of the domestic sample. 
Finally, consistent with other previous studies, private targets are much more numerous than 
public targets with more than 70% of the transactions involving privately held target 
companies. 
2.4.3 Event Study Methodology 
In this section, the event study methodology is applied to derive the short-term returns around 
the event date and to calculate the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for different periods 
around the announcement date using three different approaches to calculate the normal 
returns. The event study methodology as well as the three models applied in this chapter are 
described below. 
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The history of the event study methodology is a very long one which might go back to the 
early 1930s. It was started by the work of James Dolley (1933) who conducted a stock split 
study, which was perhaps the first published event study (MacKinlay, 1997). 
The level of sophistication of event studies increased over the years from the early 1930s until 
the late 1960s (MacKinlay, 1997). Examples of some of the event studies that have been 
conducted during that time period included Myers et al. (1948), Barker ( 1956, 1957, 1958), 
and Ashley (1962). In addition, some seminal studies have been conducted in the late 1960s 
by Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969). The methodology that was introduced in 
these previous two studies is said to be the same as the one which is in use these days 
(MacKinlay, 1997; Solibakke, 2002). 
In the years since those pioneering studies, other useful papers made some practical 
modifications to the event study methodology, such as the work done by Brown and Warner 
(1980, 1985) for data sampled at monthly and daily intervals.  
In the case of some events like merger and acquisition announcements, the event study 
methodology is usually conducted to measure the share price performance of the combined 
firms. This has been used to analyze the impact of takeovers on the shareholders’ wealth in 
both the short term and long term periods taking into consideration the requirement of the 
assumption of the market efficiency which means that “share prices react in a timely and 
unbiased manner to new information and that the extent of the gains reflect the value of the 
firm in the forthcoming periods” (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007, pp.142-143). Thus, event 
studies are used to capture the flow of information about an event to the market and how it 
affects the stock returns and the resulting impact on the value of the firm (Sudarsanam, 2003). 
Therefore, given rationality in the marketplace, the changes in security prices will 
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immediately reflect the effects of the event and thus allow us to measure the impact of the 
event over a relatively short time period (Solibakke, 2002). 
As a result, the popularity of this methodology comes from the reality that it examines stock 
price changes which are supposed to incorporate all relevant information without the need to 
analyze accounting-based measures (Sudarsanam, 2003). 
In general, the first step in conducting an event study is to define the event of interest which is 
associated with the announcement of the merger and acquisition deal, whether being domestic 
or cross-border. Then, to identify the event window, which covers the period over which the 
share prices of the firms involved in the merger and acquisition event will be examined, 
which will allow for capturing all the effects of the event on the stock prices. 
The event period is usually centred on the announcement date, which is designated day 0 in 
event time. Normally, the event window is chosen to be larger than the specific period that 
we’re interested in. This allows for better examination of periods that surrounds the event 
(MacKinlay, 1997).  
Although there is no consistency between the event windows used in existing studies, ranging 
from short- to long-term windows, we will apply here the short-term window which is 
relatively “straight forward and trouble free” (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007, p. 148), but also it 
may be at risk of bias, since announcement returns tend to reflect the investors’ expectations 
(Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). However, even though longer periods will try to capture all the 
effects of the event, but the estimates may be subject to more noise in the data. Also, the long-
term event studies are associated with more significant problems (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 
2007). 
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In this study, five event windows around the announcement date will be taken into 
consideration in order to capture some of the windows used in previous studies for the later 
comparison of results. These windows are (-1, +1), (-2, +2), (-5, +5), (-10, +10) and (-40, 
+40) in days. 
These windows contain the eleven-day window (-5, +5), which was suggested by Brown and 
Warner (1985), along with two longer windows and two smaller windows. The application of 
the longer windows with an eighty-one (-40, +40) and twenty-one day interval (-10, +10) aim 
in capturing the effects of any information leakage to the market if present and the fact that 
the market may take some time to react to the news, but without distorting the effect of the 
acquisition due to any noise. Some researchers show that the capital markets have become 
more efficient recently having the ability to incorporate the effects contained in the 
announcement in a fast way (Comment and Jarrel, 1995). Others suggest that the existence of 
tougher regulations on insider trading and information leakage nowadays prevent the market 
from reacting in advance to the announcement (Grill and Jaskow, 2007). As a consequence, 
the use of the smaller five-day window (-2, +2) would be reasonable. Also, to be more 
accurate about the market reaction to the announcement of the merger and to avoid the 
sensitivity of the results to the model chosen for expected returns, a three-day window (-1, 
+1) around the announcement date is also used. This window is said to be one of the most 
commonly used event windows in merger studies (Conn et al., 2005). Also, Arnold and 
Parker (2007) show that using a three-day window should encompass immediate lead effects 
(stock market anticipation of the announcement content, rumors) and lag effects (time needed 
for the market to understand the full likely effect on the share price of the announcement) 
while excluding the chance of including changes in share price resulting from events 
unrelated to the regulatory process. 
   65 
After deciding the event windows chosen for examination, the abnormal return of the firms is 
calculated, which is defined as the return for the firm in day t minus the expected or normal 
return for the firm in day t, 
                                                                                                               (2.1) 
The return on day t is calculated as the percentage change in the return index between two 
successive days  
                                                                                                                   (2.2) 
The definition of the return index (RI) which is collected from the Datastream database and 
the other variables used in this chapter are included in appendix 2.B as provided by 
Datastream. 
It is well known that the performance of any security can only be considered abnormal with 
reference to some benchmark. Therefore, an important step here is to specify a model to 
generate the normal or expected returns before the abnormal returns can be measured. 
The next step is to calculate the predicted or normal return for each day and each firm in the 
event period. These normal returns represent those returns that would be expected if no event 
occurs. In generating these normal returns, some of the previous merger and acquisition event 
studies used an estimation period that covered either the pre-event period or an estimation 
period covering both sides of the event (Aw and Chatterjee, 2004). This study uses the pre-
event estimation period since this will be consistent with most of the other studies especially 
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those that are concerned with international acquisitions which would make the comparison of 
results with previous studies much easier. 
To calculate the normal or predicted returns there are basically three known methods that will 
be used in this chapter. These are the mean adjusted return method, the market model method 
and the market adjusted return method. Calculating abnormal returns using these three 
different benchmark models gives the ability to compare the results with previous studies as 
well as to ensure that the conclusions are not model-specific. Each of the three methods that 
will be used to calculate the expected returns are described below based on Weston et al. 
(2004). 
2.4.3.1 The Mean Adjusted Return Method 
The expected return for security j in time t is given by: 
                                                                                                                          (2.3) 
According to this method, the expected return on any security is constant across time but can 
differ across securities.  
The first step for this method is to choose a clean period which includes days on which no 
information related to the event is released. This period may be before or after the event 
period or both. In this chapter, a pre event clean period is used which covers the days from     
-240 to -41 days which is similar to that used by many other previous studies, such as the 250-
days prior to the announcement used by Gregory and McCorriston (2005) and Sudarsanam 
and Mahate (2003).  
   67 
The average daily return for every firm in the sample is estimated for this clean period and is 
called the expected return. 
 =                                                                                               (2.4) 
Following that, the abnormal return (residual) for the event period is calculated by subtracting 
the expected return obtained above from the daily return for each firm. The average abnormal 
returns (AAR) and cumulated average abnormal returns (CAAR) are then calculated for 
different event windows. 
Some researchers, such as Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003), used this method recently along 
with some other methods in examining the returns to shareholders in domestic acquisitions. 
Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) found that even though the constant mean return method is 
perhaps the simplest model, it often yields results that are similar to those of more 
sophisticated models. 
2.4.3.2 The Market Model Method 
This model assumes that stock returns are determined by using the following ordinary least 
squares (OLS) equation: 
                                                                                                      (2.5) 
with the expected stock returns being given by:                                                                               
                                                                                             (2.6) 
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where: 
E (Rjt): the expected return on security j in time period t 
jj βα ˆ,ˆ  : coefficients estimated using an ordinary least squares regression of returns on 
security j against the returns on the market index, and 
Rmt : the return on the market index. 
Since this model involves a regression of the firm returns series against the market index, the 
calculation must have a clean period that is not included in the event window, as in the 
previous method which is the returns for 200 trading days before the announcement day from 
-240 to -41 days. These returns are then regressed against the market index which is 
represented here by the FTSE All Share from the Datastream. 
The abnormal returns (residuals) in the market model are given by:  
ARjt = Rjt – E(Rjt) which is equal to ARjt= mtjjjt RR βα ˆˆ −−                                                  (2.7) 
where:  
ARjt = abnormal return of stock j on day t 
Rjt = actual return on the jth stock on day t 
Rmt = return on the market index, FTSE All Share. 
   69 
αˆ  and βˆ  = the market model parameter estimates for stock j for the control period (event day 
- 241 through - 41). The estimated coefficients are used to compute the daily abnormal returns 
for the test period (event day -40 to +40) where event day +t (-t) represents the trading day 
after (before) the announcement date (t=0) (Weston et al., 2004).  
The average abnormal returns are then calculated and accumulated over the entire event 
period to obtain the cumulative average abnormal returns CAAR which has been extensively 
used in event studies.  
2.4.3.3 The Market- Adjusted Return Method (MAR) 
It is suggested by Brown and Warner (1980, 1985) that even though the market-adjusted 
model is very simple, it leads to deriving expected and abnormal returns in a more powerful 
way than other more complex models. The MAR assumes that the securities’ expected return 
in any period is the same as the expected market return in that period. Thus, the expected 
return for a security in period t, would be equal to the market return in period t.  
The market return is defined as the percentage change in the FTSE All Share return in two 
successive days, which is collected from the Datastream. 
                                                                                                                  (2.8) 
Moreover, it can be said that the MAR is an approximation to the market method except that 
the α and β coefficients in the ordinary least squares regression are set to 0 and 1 respectively. 
As a result, the market model equation turns into the market adjusted returns model equation, 
as follows:  
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mtjjjt RRE βα ˆˆ)( +=                                                                                                              (2.9) 
When and , the market model becomes the market adjusted model 
mtjt RRE =)(                                                                                                                     (2.10) 
Once the measures of abnormal returns are estimated using the three different methods, 
average abnormal returns and cumulative average abnormal returns are calculated and the 
results are presented and interpreted. Then, within a certain level of confidence we can infer 
whether these abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns are different from zero. This 
can be done by calculating the t-statistic for different time periods for the domestic, cross-
border and full samples. 
Following Weston et al. (2004), the corresponding test statistic for the hypothesis that the 
cumulative average abnormal returns equals zero for n number of firms and over an event 
period extending from t = t to t = T is as follows: 
t=                                                                           (2.11) 
2.5  Empirical Results 
This section presents the results of the tests conducted for the whole sample, domestic sample 
and cross-border sample of UK acquisitions. The analyses begin by examining acquirer 
announcement returns as measured by the CAR around the announcement period with the 
examination of the significance of the CAR for the whole, cross-border and domestic 
acquisitions. After that, an equality test is conducted with mean and median-difference tests 
for the cross-border and domestic samples. Then, a regression equation is estimated to 
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examine the impact of some of the deal and acquirer characteristics on the returns to 
shareholders of bidding firms.  
2.5.1 Short-term Returns and Significance Test 
The empirical results presented in Table 2.2 show the short-term cumulative average 
abnormal returns for different time intervals around the announcement day using three models 
for the whole sample of UK acquisitions, cross-border acquisitions and domestic acquisitions 
with the t-statistics shown in brackets. 
Table 2.2: Announcement Period Cumulative Average Abnormal Returns (CAAR) of 
UK Acquirers 
 
Event Window  CAAR All  CAAR Cross-border  CAAR Domestic 
Mean -Adjusted Model 
(-1,+1) 0.0205 
(0.2624) 
0.0338 
(0.2226) 
0.0064 *** 
(3.4170) 
(-2,+2) 0.0398 
(0.3946) 
0.0690 
(0.3516) 
0.0089 *** 
(3.6942) 
(-5,+5) 0.0907 
(0.6071) 
0.1725 
(0.5927) 
0.0044 
(1.2286) 
(-10,+10) -0.3242  
(-1.5708) 
-0.6395  
(-1.5905) 
0.0085 * 
(1.7197) 
(-40,+40) -0.4399 
(-1.0850) 
-0.8346 
(-1.0569) 
-0.0233 ** 
(-2.3980) 
Market Model 
(-1,+1) 0.0194 
(0.2506) 
0.0308 
(0.2040) 
0.0074 *** 
(4.0555) 
(-2,+2) 0.0310 
(0.3098) 
0.0507 
(0.2602) 
0.0102 *** 
(4.3192) 
(-5,+5) 0.0802 
(0.5402 
0.1525 
(0.5272) 
0.0040 
(1.1278) 
(-10,+10) -0.3497 * 
(-1.7043) 
-0.6869 * 
(-1.7186) 
0.0061 
(1.2515) 
(-40,+40) -0.4758 
(-1.1805) 
-0.9084 
(-1.1573) 
0.0192 ** 
(-2.0195) 
Market-Adjusted Model 
(-1,+1) -0.0013 
(-0.0170) 
-0.0109 
(-0.0716) 
0.0088 *** 
(4.3132) 
(-2,+2) 0.0034 
(0.0341) 
-0.0055 
(-0.0282) 
0.0129 *** 
(4.9217) 
(-5,+5) 0.0074 
(0.0497) 
0.0060 
(0.0205) 
0.0090 ** 
(2.3106) 
(-10,+10) -0.4847 ** 
(-2.3464) 
-0.9574 ** 
(-2.3803) 
0.0142 *** 
(2.6388) 
(-40,+40) -1.0599 *** 
(-2.6126) 
-2.0803 *** 
(-2.6336) 
0.0171 
(1.6209) 
Values between brackets are t-statistics, ***= significant at the 1% level, **= significant at the 5% level, *= significant at the 
10% level 
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The results shown in Table 2.2 are mostly similar across the three models used, with the 
market adjusted model showing more negative results for the cross-border sample even 
though not all of them are statistically significant. In general, the results show insignificant 
cumulative abnormal returns to acquirer shareholders in both the whole sample and cross-
border sample of acquirer firms, whereas significant positive abnormal returns for acquirer 
shareholders involved in domestic acquisitions. 
More specifically, when the mean-adjusted model is used, the results show insignificant 
positive returns for both the whole sample and the cross-border sample for the first three event 
windows, whereas insignificant negative returns for the twenty-one and eighty-one day 
windows. However, the domestic sample shows significant positive returns of 0.64%, 0.89% 
and 0.85% for the three-, five- and twenty-one-day windows respectively, significant negative 
returns of -2.33% for the eighty-one day window, whereas insignificant positive abnormal 
returns for the eleven-day window. 
The market model shows similar results as the mean-adjusted model, with insignificant 
positive returns to the whole sample and the cross-border sample for the first three windows, 
insignificant negative returns for the last window while significant negative returns for the 
twenty-one-day window. The domestic sample shows significant positive returns of 0.74%, 
1.02% and 1.92% for the three-day, five-day and eighty-one-day windows respectively, 
whereas insignificant positive returns for the eleven-day and twenty-one-day windows. 
The market-adjusted model gives more significant results especially for the domestic sample 
being 0.88%, 1.29%, 0.90% and 1.42% for the three-day, five-day, eleven-day and the 
twenty-one-day windows respectively whereas insignificant positive returns for the eighty-
one day window. For the whole and cross-border samples, the results show significant 
negative returns for the twenty-one- and eighty-one-day windows whereas there are 
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insignificant results for the other windows, which is similar to the insignificant CARs for the 
cross-border sample in the study of foreign acquisitions by UK acquirers done by Gregory 
and McCorriston (2005). 
Figures 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 show the results of Table 2.2 for the cross-border, domestic and full 
sample of UK acquirer firms. 
Figure 2.3: CAAR for Cross-Border UK Acquirers 
 
 
Figure 2.3 shows a decrease in CAAR for acquirer firms involved in cross-border M&As 
using the mean, market and market-adjusted model. However, the market-adjusted model 
shows more negative returns than the two other models. 
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Figure 2.4: CAAR for Domestic UK Acquirers 
 
 
Figure 2.4 shows an increase in the cumulative abnormal returns of acquirer firms involved in 
domestic acquisitions using the mean, market and market-adjusted model. The market-
adjusted model show more positive results than the other two models. 
Figure 2.5: CAAR for All UK Acquirers  
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The results of the full sample of acquirer firms shown in figure 2.5 are of great similarity to 
the results of acquirer firms involved in cross-border M&As, since they show a decrease in 
the cumulative abnormal returns of acquirer firms using the mean, market and market-
adjusted model being more negative using the adjusted model. 
2.5.2 Equality Test 
Table 2.3 presents means and medians of the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) for the 
sample of 303 cross-border transactions and compares these with the means (medians) of the 
282 domestic transactions. To test the significance of differences between means and medians 
of the two samples, t-tests are used for equality in means and a Wilcoxon /Mann–Whitney test 
is used for equality of medians. 
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Table 2.3: Univariate Analysis 
 
% Cumulative Abnormal Return 
 Cross-border 
Acquisitions (1) 
Domestic 
Acquisitions (2) 
Difference 
(1-2) 
p-value 
Panel A: Mean-Adjusted Model 
(-1,+1) 3.447 
(-0.151) 
0.602  
(0.125) 
2.845 
(-0.276) * 
0.480 
(0.076) 
(-2,+2) 6.947 
(-0.598) 
0.878  
(0.529) 
6.069 
(-1.127) *** 
0.438 
(0.006) 
(-5,+5) 7.380 
(0.253) 
0.411 
(0.018) 
6.969 
(0.235) 
0.354 
(0.652) 
(-10,+10) -6.361 
(-0.321) 
0.816 
(0.588) 
-7.177 
(-0.909) 
0.322 
(0.166) 
(-40,+40) -0.838 
(-0.021) 
-0.024 
(-0.003) 
-0.814 
(-0.018) 
0.323 
(0.249) 
Panel B: Market Model 
(-1,+1) 3.218 
(-0.256) 
0.693  
(0.036) 
2.525 
(-0.292)** 
0.483 
(0.047) 
(-2,+2) 5.006 
(-0.623) 
1.043  
(0.487) 
3.963 
(-1.11)*** 
0.482 
(0.004) 
(-5,+5) 5.373 
(0.713) 
0.423 
(0.169) 
4.950 
(0.544) 
0.347 
(0.764) 
(-10,+10) -69.060 
(-6.36e-05) 
0.630 
(0.389) 
-69.69 
(-0.309) 
0.328 
(0.380) 
(-40,+40) -0.912 
(-0.028) 
-0.019 
(0.000) 
-0.893 
(-0.028) 
0.327 
(0.154) 
 
 
Panel C: Market- Adjusted Model 
(-1,+1) -1.069 
(-0.103) 
0.826  
(0.180) 
-1.895 * 
(-0.283)* 
0.086 
(0.051) 
(-2,+2) -0.616 
(-0.230) 
1.310  
(0.545) 
-1.926 ** 
(-0.775)*** 
0.011 
(0.010) 
(-5,+5) 0.520 
(0.359) 
0.937  
(0.564) 
-0.417 
(-0.205) 
0.564 
(0.754) 
(-10,+10) -9.474 
(0.687) 
1.521 
(0.386) 
-10.995  
(0.301) 
0.332 
(0.924) 
(-40,+40) -2.097 
(0.003) 
0.021 
(0.025) 
-2.118 
(-0.022) 
0.331 
(0.121) 
The table shows mean values of cumulative abnormal returns for the domestic and cross-border samples with the median 
values in brackets for different event windows using three models. The difference tests are based on t-tests for equality in 
means and a Wilcoxon/Mann-Witney test for equality of medians. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
Table 2.3 shows the difference between the means and medians of cumulative abnormal 
returns for acquirer firms in cross-border and domestic acquisitions using the three models 
and different windows around the announcement date. Panel A in Table 2.3, which presents 
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the test results for the mean-adjusted model, shows no significant difference between means 
for cross-border and domestic acquisitions whereas there are significant negative differences 
between medians using the three-day and five-day windows. 
In Panel B and for the market model returns, the results are similar to the ones in Panel A with 
insignificant differences between the means for the two samples and significant negative 
differences in medians for the three- and five-day windows around the announcement date. 
Panel C gives more significant results for the differences between the means and medians of 
cross-border and domestic cumulative abnormal returns. It shows significant negative 
differences in means for the three- and five-day windows around the announcement day, with 
similar results when the comparison of the abnormal returns is done using the median 
difference tests. When the market-adjusted model is used, the results show that there are some 
significant results for the underperformance of the cross-border acquisitions in comparison 
with domestic acquisitions which is similar to the previous results of the studies conducted for 
UK acquirers such as Conn et al. (2005).   
   
2.5.3 Regression Analysis 
The theoretical and empirical literature on acquisition activity generally presented some of the 
bids’ characteristics that may affect the bidders’ returns. Therefore, it would be very useful to 
examine the impact of some of these characteristics on the bidders’ returns by running a 
regression test with event period (short-term) abnormal returns, which includes employing 
standard ordinary least squares analysis.  
The variables which are examined here are: whether the merger is a domestic or cross-border, 
the payment method, whether the target is a public or private firm, the country of the target in 
cross-border deals, the size of the deal value, acquirer size, relative size and the industrial 
relatedness.  
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The dependent variable is the cumulative abnormal return (CAR) for each company using the 
mean, market and market-adjusted models over different windows around the announcement 
day. The independent variables (explanatory variables) are as follows: 
Cross-border = dummy variable equal to one, if target is cross-border, zero if domestic  
The cross-border dummy variable examines the impact of cross-border M&As on the returns 
to shareholders of acquirer firms around the announcement date, after controlling for the other 
factors that are expected to affect acquirer returns. 
Some of the previous studies expect a positive impact of international acquisitions on the 
gains and returns of acquirer firms in comparison with domestic acquisitions. The reason for 
that stems from the assumption that acquirer firms are likely to benefit from expanding into 
new markets and by internalizing the capabilities of target firms and taking advantage of 
imperfections in the international capital market (Martynova et al., 2007). 
However, other researchers expect lower returns to acquirer shareholders involved in cross-
border M&As in comparison with domestic M&As due to some differences between acquirer 
and target countries in the economic, regulatory and cultural structures (Shimizu et al., 2004). 
Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) and Conn et al. (2005) found significant negative impact of 
cross-border M&As on the announcement returns to acquirer firms. 
US = dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is made in the US, zero if not 
EU = dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is made in the EU, zero if not 
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Those two variables segment the data by geographical region for the cross-border regression 
analysis, since some of the previous studies have shown that international acquirers 
experience cross-country variation in returns due to some differences between countries such 
as the variation in the corporate governance. For example, while the corporate governance 
structure of the US is similar to that of the UK; the EU has some differences (Gregory and 
McCorriston, 2005). 
Cash Payment = dummy variable equal to one, if payment is made with cash, zero if not 
Mixed Payment = dummy variable equal to one if payment is made with a mix of cash, shares 
or other payments, zero if not 
The cash payment and mixed payment dummy variables examines the impact of the payment 
method on the returns to shareholders of acquirer firms. The examination of the choice of 
payment method is of significant importance due to the existence of a large amount of 
theoretical literature which suggests that cash acquisitions generate higher returns to acquirer 
firm shareholders than other payment methods (Goergen and Renneboog, 2004; Tuch and 
O’Sullivan, 2007). 
This is consistent with Myers and Majluf’s hypothesis (1984) which assumes that the method 
of payment represents an information signal to the market. This means that the announcement 
of the cash bid is viewed by the market as a signal that the management of the acquiring firm 
is expecting an increase in the firm’s value following the acquisitions, which may have good 
results for the bidder returns. On the other hand, the announcement of the equity bid may be 
viewed by the market as a signal that the bidding firm’s management believes that their firm’s 
shares are overpriced which may impact the returns to acquirer shareholders negatively. 
The signalling hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984) was supported by the empirical studies 
which reported positive abnormal returns for acquisitions financed with cash whereas 
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negative abnormal returns for acquisitions financed with equity and mixed payments (Travlos, 
1987; Eckbo and Thorburn, 2000; Andre’ et al., 2004). 
Related = dummy variable equal to one if the acquisition is made in an industry with the same 
two-digit SIC code, zero if not 
The related dummy variable examines the impact of the industrial relatedness between the 
acquirer and target firms on the returns to shareholders of acquirer firms. 
Some researchers expect more synergies for takeovers conducted between acquirer and target 
firms that share similar industrial sectors (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). As a result of this 
synergy, the takeover should result in positive results for the shareholders of acquirer firms.  
Empirically, Gregory and McCorriston (2005) and Conn et al. (2005) didn’t find any 
significant impact for the industrial relatedness on the short-term cumulative abnormal 
returns. 
Private = dummy variable equal to one if target is privately held firm, zero if publicly traded 
The private dummy variable examines the impact of the status of target firms on the returns to 
acquirer firm’s shareholders. The reason for the examination is based on the previous studies 
which have shown that the market reacts differently to the announcement of the acquisition of 
private targets in comparison with public targets (Draper and Paudyal, 2006). 
Empirical studies in general show a positive impact from acquiring private targets on the 
announcement returns to acquirer shareholders (Sudarsanam and Mahate, 2003; Conn et al., 
2005; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005). 
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Deal value = the log of the total value of consideration paid by the bidder excluding fees and 
expenses 
Acquirer Size = the log of the market value of equity of the acquirer firm (MV) 
Relative Size = the relative size of the target, which is the ratio of the deal value to the 
acquirers’ size. 
Those three variables examine the impact of the size of target firm, the size of acquirer firm 
and the relative size of the target to acquirer firm on the returns to shareholders of acquirer 
firms. 
Some researchers propose that acquiring larger targets result in better post-acquisition 
performance than buying smaller targets due to the lack of competition on large targets which 
gives more advantageous terms to acquirer firms of large targets (Roll, 1986). The size of 
acquirer firms may also have effect on the performance of firms as argued by Moeller et al. 
(2004) who suggested that the concentration should be turned to the size of acquirers rather 
than the targets when examining the size effect. 
Empirically, most of the studies which examined the relative size of target to acquirer firms 
around the announcement period found greater gains from acquiring large targets (Fuller et 
al., 2002; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005; Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007).  
Tables 2.4, 2.5, 2.6, 2.7 and 2.8 present the results of the regression estimates obtained for the 
(-1, +1), (-2, +2), (-5, +5), (-10, +10) and (-40, +40) windows around the announcement dates 
for the full, cross-border and domestic samples.  
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Table 2.4: Regression Tests of Determinants of Event Period Returns (-1, +1) 
 
Panel A: Mean Model (-1, +1) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant -0.216865 
(-1.025221) 
-0.413874 
(-0.988470) 
-0.031008 
(-0.879276) 
CB -0.022730 
(-0.306689)   
US 0.089099 
(1.100121) 
0.070437 
(0.604293)  
EU 0.014928 
(0.184178) 
0.025981 
(0.227736)  
Cash Payment 0.070253 
(1.275327) 
0.145562 
(1.416483) 
0.001313 
(0.151569) 
Mix Payment 0.013496 
(0.234376) 
0.010440 
(0.092703) 
-0.000848 
(-0.098438) 
Relatedness 0.050707 
(1.146776) 
0.082148 
(0.933158) 
0.003073 
(0.464811) 
Private -0.064748 
(-1.308295) 
-0.135530 
(-1.385425) 
-0.004255 
(-0.578876) 
Log (Deal Value) 0.011258 
(0.818665) 
0.017223 
(0.676701) 
0.004499* 
(1.914895) 
Log(MV) 0.004157 
(0.299477) 
0.015185 
(0.541939) 
-0.005803*** 
(-2.671215) 
Relative Size -0.000132 
(-0.268920) 
-8.54E-05 
(-0.117678) 
-0.007610 * 
(-1.923303) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001416 -0.005874 0.008835 
F-statistic 0.924218 0.822851 1.333645 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
Panel B: Market Model (-1, +1) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant -0.202275 
(-1.069047) 
-0.380761 
(-1.017151) 
-0.033534 
(-0.946167) 
CB -0.023359 
(-0.352356)   
US 0.084655 
(1.168555) 
0.068060 
(0.653097)  
EU 0.017251 
(0.237952) 
0.026855 
(0.263290)  
Cash Payment 0.062216 
(1.262660) 
0.129401 
(1.408441) 
-0.000138 
(-0.015835) 
Mix Payment 0.013760 
(0.267145) 
0.012741 
(0.126540) 
-0.000951 
(-0.109848) 
Relatedness 0.044515 
(1.125499) 
0.072262 
(0.918135) 
0.002501 
(0.376370) 
Private -0.057325 
(-1.294944) 
-0.119451 
(-1.365760) 
-0.004488 
(-0.607423) 
Log (Deal Value) 0.010974 
(0.892179) 
0.016355 
(0.718728) 
0.004688 ** 
(1.985319) 
Log(MV) 0.002825 
(0.227466) 
0.012344 
(0.492742) 
-0.005585 ** 
(-2.558336) 
Relative Size -0.000127 
(-0.287843) 
-8.75E-05 
(-0.134881) 
-0.006233 
(-1.567379) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001279 -0.006093 0.005131 
F- Statistic 0.931543 0.816287 1.193048 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
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Panel C: Market-adjusted Model (-1, +1) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant 0.070669 
(1.230814) 
0.138042 
(1.258718) 
-0.032421 
(-0.902575) 
CB -0.000513 
(-0.025522)   
US -0.025655 
(-1.166999) 
-0.024014 
(-0.786572)  
EU 1.93E-05 
(0.000879) 
-0.004000 
(-0.133858)  
Cash Payment -0.007645 
(-0.511324) 
-0.019193 
(-0.713055) 
-0.001363 
(-0.154420) 
Mix Payment 0.007999 
(0.511782) 
0.019446 
(0.659208) 
-0.001418 
(-0.161475) 
Relatedness -0.017610 
(-1.467281) 
-0.033270 
(-1.442868) 
0.004067 
(0.603890) 
Private 0.008630 
(0.642459) 
0.022502 
(0.878203) 
-0.001834 
(-0.244967) 
Log (Deal Value) -0.001672 
(-0.447925) 
-0.004723 
(-0.708523) 
0.004426 * 
(1.849416) 
Log (MV) -0.005451 
(-1.446497) 
-0.007430 
(-1.012386) 
-0.005280 ** 
(-2.386464) 
Relative Size -9.65E-06 
(-0.072283) 
-1.24E-05 
(-0.065435) 
-0.004014 
(-0.995905) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.005156 -0.001107 -0.000776 
F- statistic 1.277794 0.966455 0.970988 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
 
Dependent variables are the cumulated abnormal returns CARs over the period (-1, +1) around the 
announcement period using the mean, market and market-adjusted models. Independent variables are 
explained within the text. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level,  
** Statistical significance at the 5% level and  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
Table 2.4 which is conducted for the three-day window (-1, +1) around the announcement 
date shows significant positive results for the effect of the deal value, negative significant 
results for the effect of acquirer size and the relative size on the domestic returns using the 
mean adjusted model. The market model and the market-adjusted model also show significant 
positive results for the effect of the deal value and negative significant results for the effect of 
acquirer size on the returns of acquirer shareholders involved in domestic acquisitions. 
However, the results for the whole and cross-border samples do not show any significant 
impact from the deal and acquirer’s characteristics on the returns to acquirer’s shareholders. 
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The results of the market-adjusted model for the whole sample of M&As differ from the 
results of Conn et al. (2005) which showed that the announcement returns of acquirer firms 
are positively influenced by noncash methods of payment and private targets and negatively 
influenced by cross-border M&As. The difference in the results may be related to the different 
samples and time periods covered by the two studies. 
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Table 2.5: Regression Tests of Determinants of Event Period Returns (-2, +2) 
 
Panel A: Mean Model (-2, +2) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant -0.436746 
(-1.062601) 
-0.829044 
(-1.017216) 
-0.049211 
(-1.226541) 
CB -0.045860 
(-0.318458)   
US 0.181445 
(1.152996) 
0.147046 
(0.648098)  
EU 0.029311 
(0.186114) 
0.051246 
(0.230767)  
Cash Payment 0.129203 
(1.207103) 
0.270213 
(1.350861) 
0.002753 
(0.279224) 
Mix Payment 0.024715 
(0.220897) 
0.009337 
(0.042590) 
0.007314 
(0.745948) 
Relatedness 0.100053 
(1.164532) 
0.163204 
(0.952419) 
0.005859 
(0.778974) 
Private -0.121908 
(-1.267735) 
-0.255645 
(-1.342534) 
-0.009534 
(-1.139981) 
Log (Deal Value) 0.021463 
(0.803247) 
0.033754 
(0.681321) 
0.005768 ** 
(2.158133) 
Log (MV) 0.011392 
(0.422337) 
0.032191 
(0.590187) 
-0.005955 ** 
(-2.409619) 
Relative Size -0.000221 
(-0.230797) 
-0.000135 
(-0.095838) 
-0.008426 * 
(-1.871950) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001084 -0.005948 0.016826 
F-statistic 0.941934 0.820656 1.640536 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
Panel B: Market Model (-2, +2) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant -0.321987 
(-1.087301) 
-0.598358 
(-1.019831) 
-0.061226 
(-1.517898) 
CB -0.036654 
(-0.353271)   
US 0.130966 
(1.155085) 
0.105196 
(0.644051)  
EU 0.024889 
(0.219345) 
0.040265 
(0.251872)  
Cash Payment 0.094718 
(1.228214) 
0.198974 
(1.381755) 
-0.000262 
(-0.026412) 
Mix Payment 0.021363 
(0.265001) 
0.014032 
(0.088912) 
0.004159 
(0.421853) 
Relatedness 0.069990 
(1.130655) 
0.114557 
(0.928645) 
0.003690 
(0.487896) 
Private -0.088451 
(-1.276635) 
-0.186023 
(-1.357025) 
-0.005632 
(-0.669839) 
Log (Deal Value) 0.016663 
(0.865551) 
0.024906 
(0.698324) 
0.006821** 
(2.538488) 
Log(MV) 0.006732 
(0.346412) 
0.021818 
(0.555658) 
-0.006436 *** 
(-2.590279) 
Relative Size -0.000174 
(-0.251956) 
-0.000112 
(-0.110050) 
-0.008234 * 
(-1.819510) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001350 -0.006073 0.015794 
F- Statistic 0.927715 0.816905 1.600619 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
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Panel C: Market-adjusted Model (-2, +2) 
Independent Variable Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant 0.039300 
(1.015241) 
0.089130 
(1.303289) 
-0.061615 
(-1.515081) 
CB -0.006423 
(-0.473543)   
US -0.017916 
(-1.208808) 
-0.019559 
(-1.027328)  
EU 0.004308 
(0.290424) 
0.001274 
(0.068356)  
Cash Payment 0.001486 
(0.147384) 
-0.000639 
(-0.038074) 
-0.000371 
(-0.037177) 
Mix Payment 0.014513 
(1.377256) 
0.023866 
(1.297435) 
0.004724 
(0.475272) 
Relatedness -0.014418 * 
(-1.781856) 
-0.028904 ** 
(-2.010193) 
0.004728 
(0.620074) 
Private 0.000402 
(0.044410) 
0.003605 
(0.225613) 
-0.000511 
(-0.060330) 
Log (Deal Value) 4.65E-05 
(0.018479) 
-0.002565 
(-0.617121) 
0.006450 ** 
(2.380719) 
Log (MV) -0.004385 * 
(-1.726005) 
-0.005146 
(-1.124332) 
-0.005746 ** 
(-2.293557) 
Relative Size -2.04E-05 
(-0.226525) 
-1.91E-05 
(-0.161266) 
-0.005773  
(-1.265239) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.015340 0.009241 0.006117 
F- statistic 1.835037 * 1.282929 1.230363 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
 
Dependent variables are the cumulated abnormal returns CARs over the period (-2, +2) around the 
announcement period using the mean, market and market-adjusted models. Independent variables are 
explained within the text. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level,  
** Statistical significance at the 5% level and  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
For the five-day window (-2, +2) around the announcement date, Table 2.5 shows similar 
results to the previous three-day window using the mean and market models with the returns 
being significantly positive for the impact of the deal value, and negatively significant for the 
impact of the market value of acquirers and the relative size on the returns of acquirers in the 
domestic sample and insignificant results for the whole and cross-border samples.  
However, the market-adjusted model shows positive significant impacts from the deal value 
and negative significant results for the impact of the acquirer size on the domestic sample, 
negative significant results for the effect of the relatedness on returns to acquirers in the cross-
border sample, and negative significant results for the impact of relatedness and acquirer size 
on the returns to shareholders in the whole sample. 
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Table 2.6: Regression Tests of Determinants of Event Period Returns (-5, +5) 
 
Panel A: Mean Model (-5, +5) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant -1.093158 
(-1.136097) 
-2.058366 
(-1.078490) 
-0.034132 
(0.5727) 
CB -0.080989 
(-0.240234)   
US 0.426659 
(1.158126) 
0.351826 
(0.662177)  
EU 0.057476 
(0.155894) 
0.112094 
(0.215555)  
Cash Payment 0.287112 
(1.145814) 
0.613419 
(1.309542) 
-0.003819 
(-0.257191) 
Mix Payment 0.054613 
(0.208502) 
0.022533 
(0.043894) 
0.012658 
(0.857024) 
Relatedness 0.236006 
(1.173376) 
0.402570 
(1.003224) 
-0.008823 
(-0.778723) 
Private -0.267632 
(-1.188843) 
-0.575797 
(-1.291268) 
-0.011150 
(-0.885019) 
Log (Deal Value) 0.053080 
(0.848577) 
0.084710 
(0.730154) 
0.006632 * 
(1.647118) 
Log(MV) 0.027044 
(0.428258) 
0.076762 
(0.600987) 
-0.010006 *** 
(-2.687738) 
Relative Size -0.000498 
(-0.222325) 
-0.000291 
(-0.087800) 
-0.005562 
(-0.820291) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001019 -0.005905 0.020067 
F-statistic 0.945412 0.821939 1.766469 * 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
Panel B: Market Model (-5, +5) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant -0.972603 
(-1.163710) 
-1.812183 
(-1.093292) 
-0.047559 
(-0.811532) 
CB -0.069502 
(-0.237345)   
US 0.372104 
(1.162829) 
0.306682 
(0.664622)  
EU 0.053225 
(0.166201) 
0.100785 
(0.223159)  
Cash Payment 0.251287 
(1.154546 
0.536862 
(1.319670) 
-0.004231 
(-0.293860) 
Mix Payment 0.052038 
(0.228722) 
0.028049 
(0.062912) 
0.011261 
(0.786241) 
Relatedness 0.203780 
(1.166417) 
0.350924 
(1.006956) 
-0.011979 
(-1.090298) 
Private -0.228400 
(-1.168043) 
-0.497656 
(-1.285040) 
-0.003535 
(-0.289376) 
Log (Deal Value) 0.047817 
(0.880068) 
0.075238 
(0.746719) 
0.007414 * 
(1.899112) 
Log(MV) 0.021948 
(0.400140 
0.065292 
(0.588603) 
-0.010416 *** 
(-2.885445) 
Relative Size -0.000447 
(-0.229921) 
-0.000268 
(-0.093105) 
-0.005497 
(-0.836073) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.001079 -0.005889 0.023366 
F- Statistic 0.942226 0.822423 1.895464 * 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
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Panel C: Market-adjusted Model (-5, +5) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant -0.034460 
(-0.978913) 
-0.027470 
(-0.547823) 
-0.057611 
(-1.006615) 
CB 0.003592 
(0.291210)   
US -0.012992 
(-0.963950) 
-0.014764 
(-1.057668)  
EU 0.007465 
(0.553408) 
0.007691 
(0.562935)  
Cash Payment 0.007564 * 
(1.825106) 
0.015873  
(1.289777) 
-0.004286 
(-0.30479) 
Mix Payment -0.031048 *** 
(3.240010) 
0.051642 
(3.828898) 
0.009094 
(0.650144) 
Relatedness -0.010906 
(-1.482150) 
-0.015320 
(-1.453174) 
-0.006240 
(-0.581516) 
Private -0.007366 
(-0.894406) 
-0.014556 
(-1.242460) 
0.000808 
(0.067687) 
Log (Deal Value) 0.004900 ** 
(2.141397) 
0.003290 
(1.079294) 
0.007581 ** 
(1.988383) 
Log (MV) -0.006731 *** 
(-2.913667) 
-0.003409 
(-1.015822 
-0.009465 *** 
(-2.684860) 
Relative Size -6.03E-05 
(-0.736315) 
-2.58E-05 
(-0.296403) 
0.001434 
(0.223273) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.037597 0.050990 0.023699 
F- statistic 3.093899 *** 2.629791 *** 1.908569 * 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
 
Dependent variables are the cumulated abnormal returns CARs over the period (-5, +5) around the 
announcement period using the mean, market and market-adjusted models. Independent variables are 
explained within the text. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level,  
** Statistical significance at the 5% level and  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
Table 2.6 which is conducted for the eleven-day window (-5, +5) around the announcement 
day shows significant positive impact of deal value and significant negative impact of the 
market value on domestic returns, while insignificant results for the whole and cross-border 
samples using the mean and market models. The market-adjusted model shows similar results 
with significant positive impact of deal value and significant negative impact of the market 
value on domestic returns. The results for the whole sample show significant positive impacts 
of cash payment method and deal value and significant negative impacts from the mix 
payment method and the acquirer size on the abnormal returns of acquirer firms. However, 
the results for the cross-border sample do not show any significant impact of acquirer and deal 
characteristics on acquirers’ returns. 
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Table 2.7: Regression Tests of Determinants of Event Period Returns (-10, +10) 
 
Panel A: Mean Model (-10, +10) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant 3.869513 
(1.117543) 
7.341189 
(1.068371) 
-0.103100 
(-1.292887) 
CB 0.270839 
(0.223252)   
US -1.581767 
(-1.193145) 
-1.309187 
(-0.684399)  
EU -0.178575 
(-0.134598) 
-0.368188 
(-0.196656)  
Cash Payment -1.020074 
(-1.131282) 
-2.152666 
(-1.276442) 
-0.020127 
(-1.027284) 
Mix Payment -0.084319 
(-0.089456) 
0.092852 
(0.050238) 
0.003231 
(0.165794) 
Relatedness -0.893313 
(-1.234223) 
-1.486752 
(-1.029099) 
-0.015833 
(-1.059082) 
Private 0.869221 
(1.072980) 
1.966064 
(1.224636) 
-0.029771* 
(-1.790981) 
Log (Deal Value) -0.176098 
(-0.782329) 
-0.302040 
(-0.723116) 
0.012462 ** 
(2.345737) 
Log (MV) -0.115828 
(-0.509717) 
-0.272250 
(-0.592038) 
-0.008976 * 
(-1.827314) 
Relative Size 0.001564 
(0.194133) 
0.001046 
(0.087846) 
-0.004426 
(-0.494746) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000661 -0.006141 0.037369 
F-statistic 0.964618 0.814874 2.452956 ** 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
Panel B: Market Model (-10, +10) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant 4.173468 
(1.115273) 
7.929301 
(1.067737) 
-0.112099 
(-1.455006) 
CB 0.298802 
(0.227900)   
US -1.700061 
(-1.186564) 
-1.405120 
(-0.679665)  
EU -0.195251 
(-0.136172) 
-0.400295 
(-0.197830)  
Cash Payment -1.098038 
(-1.126763) 
-2.321963 
(-1.273953) 
-0.018180 
(-0.960380) 
Mix Payment -0.093030 
(-0.091325) 
0.099362 
(0.049744) 
0.000546 
(0.029009) 
Relatedness -0.962720 
(-1.230739) 
-1.602842 
(-1.026557) 
-0.015774 
(-1.092093) 
Private 0.951161 
(1.086405) 
2.138317 
(1.232409) 
-0.022136 
(-1.378354) 
Log(Deal Value) -0.190360 
(-0.782502) 
-0.326291 
(-0.722807) 
0.012977 ** 
(2.528288) 
Log(MV) -0.125979 
(-0.512964) 
-0.295456 
(-0.594496) 
-0.010097 ** 
(-2.127503) 
Relative Size 0.001677 
(0.192581) 
0.001113 
(0.086464) 
-0.005308 
(-0.614098) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000716 -0.006150 0.033738 
F- Statistic 0.961674 0.814596 2.306846 ** 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
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Panel C: Market-adjusted Model (-10, +10) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant 5.934079 
(1.117363) 
11.26019 
(1.068409) 
-0.094169 
(-1.261688) 
CB 0.439181 
(0.236026)   
US -2.417387 
(-1.188858) 
-2.001710 
(-0.682252)  
EU -0.282524 
(-0.138837) 
-0.575770 
(-0.200504)  
Cash Payment -1.555581 
(-1.124773) 
-3.299262 
(-1.275491) 
-0.019799 
(-1.079659) 
Mix Payment -0.128959 
(-0.089201) 
0.150930 
(0.053242) 
-0.003250 
(-0.178180) 
Relatedness -1.359663 
(-1.224769) 
-2.279826 
(-1.028861) 
-0.005666 
(-0.404893) 
Private 1.360320 
(1.094803) 
3.041269 
(1.235094) 
-0.021556 
(-1.385524) 
Log (Deal Value) -0.271491 
(-0.786363) 
-0.461005 
(-0.719588) 
0.010829 ** 
(2.177951) 
Log (MV) -0.178424 
(-0.511917) 
-0.422955 
(-0.599671) 
-0.006784 
(-1.475528) 
Relative Size 0.002406 
(0.194781) 
0.001572 
(0.086029) 
0.006381 
(0.761963) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000707 -0.006041 0.028617 
F- statistic 0.962118 0.817846 2.102643 ** 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
 
Dependent variables are the cumulated abnormal returns CARs over the period (-10, +10) around the 
announcement period using the mean, market and market-adjusted models. Independent variables are 
explained within the text. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level,  
** Statistical significance at the 5% level and  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
 
Table 2.7 shows the results for the regression analysis conducted for the twenty-one days 
window (-10, +10) around the announcement day. The results show significant negative 
impact of the target’s private status on the returns to acquirer shareholders involved in 
domestic acquisitions using the mean model, positive impact of deal value and negative 
impact of market value on acquirers’ returns in domestic sample using both the mean and the 
market model. The market-adjusted model shows significant positive impact of deal value on 
the returns to acquirer shareholders in domestic transactions. 
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Table 2.8: Regression Tests of Determinants of Event Period Returns (-40, +40) 
 
Panel A: Mean Model (-40, +40) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant 4.858134 
(1.120987) 
2.54262 ** 
(2.468060) 
-0.175127 
(-0.919544) 
CB 0.369772 
(0.243523)   
US -2.032362 
(-1.224827) 
0.287459 
(0.080391)  
EU -0.284121 
(-0.171098) 
-3.318836 
(-0.925062)  
Cash Payment -1.243599 
(-1.101901) 
-0.855751 
(-0.387289) 
0.013977 
(0.298687) 
Mix Payment -0.128855 
(-0.109223) 
-2.291644 
(-0.989603) 
0.001635 
(0.035131) 
Relatedness -1.137258 
(-1.255371) 
-1.691911 
(-0.967427) 
-0.057310 
(-1.605106) 
Private 1.040147 
(1.025839) 
-1.509872 
(-0.762098) 
-0.098269 ** 
(-2.475297) 
Log (Deal Value) -0.221036 
(-0.784550) 
-1.122634 *** 
(-1.764063) 
0.020077 
(1.582425) 
Log (MV) -0.143253 
(-0.503665) 
-0.336998 
(-0.565548) 
-0.010998 
(-0.937438) 
Relative Size 0.001929 
(0.191362) 
-0.003516 
(-0.239518) 
-0.030758 
(-1.439478) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000974 0.011985 0.035696 
F-statistic 0.947869 1.337218 2.385488 ** 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
Panel B: Market Model (-40, +40) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant 5.395427 
(1.126980) 
2.12134 
(1.295005) 
-0.165618 
(-0.910897) 
CB 0.392014 
(0.233705)   
US -2.219011 
(-1.210577) 
0.660221 
(0.163658)  
EU -0.265450 
(-0.144704) 
-4.356028 
(-1.073657)  
Cash Payment -1.390579 
(-1.115365) 
-3.360486 
(-1.455412) 
0.013405 
(0.300073) 
Mix Payment -0.152427 
(-0.116958) 
-0.137085 
(-0.053462) 
0.004724 
(0.106313) 
Relatedness -1.244081 
(-1.243143) 
-1.528695 
(-0.765213) 
-0.046519 
(-1.364714) 
Private 1.191096 
(1.063385) 
3.228037 
(1.508679) 
-0.080022 ** 
(-2.111385) 
Log(Deal Value) -0.247522 
(-0.795301) 
-0.587497 
(-1.016343) 
0.017821 
(1.471294) 
Log(MV) -0.157496 
(-0.501263) 
-0.241107 
(-0.378424) 
-0.009163 
(-0.818110) 
Relative Size 0.002159 
(0.193849) 
0.005810 
(0.350618) 
-0.030965 
(-1.517984) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000733 0.004365 0.023311 
F- Statistic 0.960759 1.119238 1.893327 *** 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
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Panel C: Market-adjusted Model (-40, +40) 
Independent 
Variable 
Full Sample Cross-border 
Sample 
Domestic Sample 
Constant 12.87019 
(1.123235) 
2.86652 
(1.170272) 
-0.133898 
(-0.901065) 
CB 0.968662 
(0.241287)   
US -5.267661 
(-1.200732) 
-0.366142 
(-0.060210)  
EU -0.637063 
(-0.145103) 
-12.62759 ** 
(-2.057799)  
Cash Payment -3.333826 
(-1.117274) 
-8.275931 
(-1.503450) 
0.012185 
(0.333735) 
Mix Payment -0.293662 
(-0.094148) 
0.625049 
(0.102534) 
0.008301 
(0.228580) 
Relatedness -2.921443 
(-1.219733) 
-4.392072 
(-0.924142) 
0.003999 
(0.143543) 
Private 2.953510 
(1.101736) 
7.729358 
(1.531183) 
-0.057338 *** 
(-1.851036) 
Log (Deal Value) -0.595022 
(-0.798814) 
-1.273561 
(-0.921391) 
0.010219 
(1.032283) 
Log (MV) -0.375765 
(-0.499698) 
-0.521185 
(-0.345340) 
0.004226 
(0.461629) 
Relative Size 0.005335 
(0.200132) 
0.015760 
(0.398094) 
0.005581 
(0.334730) 
Adjusted R-squared -0.000653 0.009071 0.003286 
F- statistic 0.965001 1.276668 1.123379 
Sample Size 585 303 282 
 
Dependent variables are the cumulated abnormal returns CARs over the period (-40, +40) around the 
announcement period using the mean, market and market-adjusted models. Independent variables are 
explained within the text. Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics.  
*** Statistical significance at the 1% level,  
** Statistical significance at the 5% level and  
* Statistical significance at the 10% level. 
 
 
Finally, the results in Table 2.8 do not show any significant results for the impact of the deal 
and acquirer characteristics on the returns to shareholders in the full sample using the mean, 
market and market-adjusted method. However, the results show a significant negative impact 
of the deal value on cross-border returns using the mean-adjusted model and significant 
negative impact of the acquisitions in Europe on returns to shareholders using the market-
adjusted model. Also, the results show significant negative impact from the targets’ private 
status on the returns to shareholders involved in domestic acquisitions for the three models 
used.  
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2.6 Summary of the Results and Conclusions 
This chapter examines the returns to shareholders of UK public acquirer firms around the 
announcement date using a sample of 585 acquisitions announced between 1996 and 2003. 
The sample includes acquisitions of both domestic and cross-border targets for reasons of 
comparison between the reactions of the share prices of acquirer firms to the announcements 
of each kind of acquisition. The examination is conducted by focusing on the returns to 
acquirers’ shareholders involved in cross-border and domestic acquisitions around the 
announcement date. 
The sample period in this study is distinguished in being more recent than the periods used in 
previous studies and not studied before which may make it more up to date with the rapid 
changes in today’s global world. This sample also allows domestic and cross-border 
acquisitions to be directly contrasted with each other, and permits us to reach conclusions on 
the impacts of the merger announcement on the returns to shareholders of UK acquirer firms. 
Event study methodology is conducted in this chapter and three different benchmark models 
are applied to calculate abnormal returns which are the mean-adjusted model, the market 
model and the market-adjusted model. 
In general, the results show insignificant cumulative abnormal returns of acquirer firms in the 
whole sample and in the cross-border sample, compared with significant positive cumulative 
abnormal returns of acquirer firms involved in domestic acquisitions. The results show great 
similarities to those achieved by Moeller and Schlingemann (2005) in their examination of 
US acquirer firms. Also, the insignificant cumulative abnormal returns of acquirer firms 
involved in cross-border acquisitions is similar to the insignificant returns achieved by 
Gregory and McCorriston (2005) in their examination of foreign UK acquisitions. Moreover, 
the significant positive cumulative abnormal returns of acquirer firms involved in domestic 
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acquisitions is similar to that of Conn et al. (2005) in their examination of domestic UK 
acquirer firms, whereas it contradicts the results of Sudarsanam and Mahate (2003, 2006) who 
found significant negative returns to UK acquirer firms in domestic acquisitions. 
The potential reasons for the differences in the results with those of Sudarsanam and Mahate 
(2003, 2006) could be resulted from the differences between them in terms of the time periods 
and models used. For example, their sample of M&As took place during 1983-1995 whereas 
the sample here is more recent covering the years 1996-2003. Also, Sudarsanam and Mahate 
(2003, 2006) used the buy and hold abnormal returns BHARs) in their analysis, whereas the 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) are used in this chapter. 
Equality tests show no significant differences in means using the mean-adjusted model and 
the market model. However, the market-adjusted model shows significant negative 
differences in means and medians for the three-day and five-day windows around the 
announcement day, which may be a signal for the underperformance of cross-border 
acquisitions in comparison with domestic acquisitions.  
Regression tests were conducted over different event windows to check the impact of some of 
the deal and acquirers’ characteristics on the bidders’ returns. The results do not show any 
significant differences between the returns to shareholders of acquirer firms involved in cross-
border and domestic acquisitions, which may imply that the UK capital market is highly 
integrated with the world’s capital market. 
The regression analysis results show significant positive effects from the deal value on the 
domestic acquirers’ returns, whereas there is a negative significant impact from the market 
value of equity (which represents the acquirers’ size) on the domestic acquirers’ returns using 
all the three methods and during all event windows.  
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Other issues, such as the operating performance of firms, are also important and need to be 
examined and explored alongside the shareholders’ returns in order to have a wider view 
about the difference between domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions over the 
long term. To examine the difference between the operating performance of acquirer and 
combined firms involved in domestic and cross-border mergers and acquisitions therefore 
becomes the major work in chapters three and four respectively. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE OPERATING PERFORMANCES 
OF THE UK ACQUIRERS INVOLVED IN CROSS-BORDER AND 
DOMESTIC MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS 
 
3.1. Introduction 
The performance of firms involved in merger and acquisition transactions has for a long time 
been an important area of study and research. In spite of the increasing amount of literature, 
the issue of whether those transactions are wealth creating or wealth reducing events for the 
acquirers, targets or combined firms is still of great importance and an ongoing debate. 
Previous studies have made several attempts to shed light on this issue in order to have a 
better understanding of whether mergers and acquisitions have led to better performance or 
not, since only such an improvement can justify using mergers and acquisitions as a tool of 
corporate strategic expansion (Ramakrishnan, 2008). 
There have been many previous studies concentrating on the effects of merger and acquisition 
deals. Some of those have tried to evaluate the impact of M&As by using an approach which 
was provided by Healy et al. (1992). The approach depends on examining the operating 
performance of the combined firm over the pre- and post-acquisition periods. In general, the 
results have shown an improvement in the post-merger operating performance of the 
combined firm in comparison with non-merging firms from the same industry (Powell and 
Stark, 2005). 
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Other studies have followed the Healy et al. (1992) approach and added to it with results 
showing positive, negative or no significant improvements in the operating performance of 
the combined firms depending on the measures and benchmarks used (Ghosh, 2001; Powell 
and Stark, 2005). 
The majority of the previous studies which examined the operating performance of firms 
concentrated on the combined firms rather than the target or acquirer firms separately. The 
problem with this approach is that it doesn’t give a clear idea about the impact of the merger 
and acquisition on the acquirer firm only or the target firm only. 
To the best of my knowledge, there has been no empirical evidence on the difference in 
operating performance of acquirer firms between cross-border and domestic acquisitions, 
especially in the UK. Most of the previous studies which examined the post-acquisition 
performance of firms focused on the combined firms rather than acquirer firms and also didn’t 
differentiate between cross-border and domestic deals.  
The previous chapter has dealt with the issue of the reaction of share price performance due to 
the announcement of M&A deals using different methods and event windows in order to 
check the difference between the shareholders’ returns of acquirer firms involved in cross-
border and domestic M&As. The results show insignificant changes in the abnormal returns 
of acquirers involved in cross-border M&As, compared with a significant increase in the 
abnormal returns of acquirer firms involved in domestic M&As. However, the results do not 
show significant differences in the returns to shareholders of acquirer firms involved in cross-
border and domestic M&As.  
The overall results from the previous chapter do not show strong evidence about whether the 
share market prices on the London Stock Exchange respond significantly less or more 
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favourably to the announcement of cross-border acquisitions in comparison with domestic 
acquisitions. This could be interpreted as an indication that investors in the market may have 
felt that cross-border acquisitions would not be less or more profitable than domestic 
acquisitions. Thus, the study in this chapter is conducted to check whether the cross-border 
acquisitions have less or more favourable impacts on the operating performance of the bidders 
than the domestic acquisitions by examining the same sample of acquirer firms used in the 
previous chapter.   
More specifically, this chapter aims to complement the results which have been presented on 
the stock return performance in the previous chapter and to provide further insight into the 
difference between cross-border and domestic M&As by examining the operating 
performance of UK acquirer firms over a longer time period and checking whether there are 
any significant differences between the performance of acquirer firms who engage in 
domestic acquisitions and the acquirers who go for cross-border acquisitions. 
Therefore, the main objective of this chapter is to examine the difference between the impacts 
of cross-border and domestic M&As on the operating performance of UK acquirer firms only 
and not the combined firms. Thus, the appropriate approach that would achieve this objective 
is by examining the performance of acquirer firms before and after the acquisition and 
comparing the results between cross-border and domestic acquisitions. 
More specifically, the purposes and contributions of this chapter are as follows: 
• Firstly, to provide a clearer idea and further insight into the impacts of merger 
and acquisition deals by examining the operating performance of acquirer 
firms only, rather than the combined firms, and thus have the advantage of not 
mixing the results of the target and acquirer firms together. 
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• Secondly, to examine whether there are any changes or improvements in the 
operating performance of acquirer firms three years after the acquisition 
relative to three years before the acquisition using different performance 
measures and benchmarks. 
• Thirdly, to check whether there is any difference in the operating performance 
of acquirer firms involved in cross-border and domestic acquisitions. 
• Fourthly, to investigate whether there is any significant impact of some of the 
deal characteristics such as the method of payment, relative size and industrial 
relatedness on the post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms.  
• Finally, in order to avoid any methodological or benchmark problem and to 
have a degree of comparability with other previous studies, different models 
and benchmarks are used in this study which are also up to date 
methodologies. 
The analysis in this chapter generally examines the acquirer firms for the sample that have the 
operating performance data available for at least one year before and one year after the 
acquisition. This comprises 555 acquirer firms consisting of 286 acquirers involved in cross-
border acquisitions and 269 acquirers involved in domestic acquisitions.  
Different measures of operating performance are used in this study to examine the impact of 
M&As on the operating performance of acquirer firms and whether there is any significant 
difference in those operating performances between domestic and cross-border M&As. The 
results show some variations in terms of the impacts on changes in the operating 
performances following mergers and acquisitions depending on the type of firm acquired - 
whether being domestic or cross-border. However, most of the measures used show 
insignificant differences between the operating performances of acquirer firms involved in 
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cross-border and domestic acquisitions, which is similar to the results achieved in the 
previous chapter using share price returns data. 
This chapter is organised as follows: Section 3.2 discusses the previous theoretical and 
empirical literature on the operating performance of acquirers in domestic and cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. Section 3.3 describes the data sample selection procedure and 
methodology used to measure changes in operating performance. Section 3.4 presents the 
main empirical results of the analysis about changes in the operating performance of UK 
acquirer firms following acquisitions. Section 3.5, which is the final section, summarizes the 
key findings and results. 
3.2. Literature Review 
The theories which are discussed in the previous chapter also apply to the study reported in 
this chapter. Therefore, this section starts with an overview of some of the methodological 
issues and then presents the previous empirical studies that are conducted on the operating 
performance of acquirer firms following corporate acquisitions.  
3.2.1 Review of Some of the Methodological Issues 
Previous studies have shown that it is preferable to use operating cash flow measures rather 
than other measures to assess the performance of firms after or around some significant 
corporate events such as mergers and acquisitions, since they are less likely to be affected by 
managers’ decisions and cannot be manipulated by them (Powell and Stark, 2005). The 
following sections will provide an overview of the performance measures, deflators and 
benchmarks used in this chapter. 
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3.2.1.1 Performance Measures 
Previous studies have presented different definitions of cash flows in their examination of 
post-acquisition operating performance. Some of those studies used accrual definitions of 
cash flows such as the pre-depreciation profit or the pre-tax operating cash flow (see, e.g., 
Healy et al., 1992; Ghosh, 2001; Heron and Lie, 2002; etc.). 
However, this measure may give inaccurate results since it is likely to be affected by the 
accounting policies used by the firm (Powell and Stark, 2005). Also, this measure is argued 
by other researchers as not being a pure cash flow performance measure, since it doesn’t take 
into consideration changes in working capital (Rahman and Limmack, 2004; Martynova et al., 
2007). 
Therefore, other measures have been employed by the researchers who made an adjustment 
for the accounting accruals such as changes in working capital in order to achieve a ‘pure' 
cash flow measure and to guarantee that the operating performance is not impacted by the 
accounting policies that are used by the firm. 
3.2.1.2 Deflator Choice 
Different deflators have been used in the previous studies. For example, Healy et al. (1992) 
and Ghosh (2001) use the total market value (TMV) as a deflator in their studies. They define 
TMV as the sum of the market value of equity plus the book value of debt plus the book value 
of preferred stock.  
The reason for them to use this market-based measure is that it is not affected directly by the 
accounting policy variations over time and between companies (Powell and Stark, 2005). 
However, the disadvantage of using this measure stems from the fact of being a forward-
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looking measure, which results in reflecting all the assets that the firm is likely to acquire and 
not only the existing assets (Powell and Stark, 2005). 
Therefore, in order to address and solve this issue other deflators have been used in previous 
studies, such as sales, which have been used as an alternative deflator by Ghosh (2001). The 
advantage of using this measure stems from it being a current measure (Powell and Stark, 
2005) and it is appropriately matched with the numerator as both the numerator and the 
denominator of the return measure are extracted from the income statement (Barber and Lyon, 
1996). 
However, using sales as a deflator may not detect the firm’s operational improvements since it 
does not measure the productivity of the assets in a direct way (Powell and Stark, 2005). 
Therefore, using the book value of assets as a deflator as suggested by other researchers may 
be one of the ways to overcome the problems from using the other previous deflators (Powell 
and Stark, 2005).  
3.2.1.3 Performance Benchmark 
Previous literature shows that the operating performance of firms is affected by the takeover 
as well as some other factors. Those factors include the industry trend as well as the asset size 
and pre-acquisition performance. Healy et al., (1992) show that it is essential to adjust for the 
industry trend in order to control for the changes in the industry and economy-wide conditions 
and thus separate the firm specific from industry-specific effects (Powell and Stark, 2005). 
However, recent studies reveal evidence which suggests that acquirers differ from their 
industry peers in terms of size and performance. Acquirers are expected to be larger than 
industry median firms and time their takeovers in the periods of their superior performance. 
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Therefore, it is important to control for the size and pre-acquisition operating performance in 
addition to the industry factor (Ghosh, 2001; Powell and Stark, 2005). 
This control is done by matching the sample of acquirer firms with non-merging firms by 
industry, asset size and a pre-acquisition performance measure in order to check whether 
acquirer firms differ from their non-merging peers before and after the bid. 
Previous literature and especially studies prior to Barber and Lyon (1996) have usually 
employed the industry median performance as a benchmark for evaluating the corporate 
performance of firms engaged in merger and acquisition transactions. The explanation for 
them to use the industry performance measures as a benchmark is that it permits them to 
separate firm-specific from economy- and industry-specific effects (Powell and Stark, 2005). 
However, Barber and Lyon (1996) conclude the importance of comparing the performance of 
combining firms in relation to control firms matched on size and pre-event performance in 
order to achieve well specified and powerful test statistics. This is also related to the presence 
of potential bias when using industry median firms as a benchmark for evaluating 
improvements in operating performance of merging firms. The reason for the bias is the 
existence of differences in the size and performance between acquirer firms and their industry 
peers, since acquirer firms are expected to be larger than industry median firms and time their 
M&A transactions during periods of superior performance (Ghosh, 2001). Therefore, most of 
the recent studies apply the industry, size and pre-event performance based matching 
procedure. 
3.2.2 Review of the Previous Empirical Studies 
Previous literature has presented some of the empirical studies that were conducted to 
examine the operating performance of firms. Most of those previous studies concentrated on 
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the operating performance of acquirer and target combined firms. Only a very few of those 
studies were conducted to examine the operating performance of acquirer firms only. 
Therefore, this section will discuss those few studies carried out to examine the operating 
performance of acquirer firms only. 
Pazarskis et al. (2006) examined the impact of merger and acquisition transactions on the 
operating performance of 50 acquiring firms that were involved in domestic and international 
acquisitions in Greece in the period from 1998 to 2002. They conducted their study by 
examining some of the financial ratios of the companies over a time period of three years pre-
acquisition and three years after the acquisition. The financial ratios which they used are 
classified into three groups which are Profitability ratios (Earnings before taxes/net worth, 
Return on assets, Gross profit margin), Liquidity ratios (Quick ratio, Current ratio), and 
Solvency ratios (Net worth/total assets, total debt/net worth). After comparing the means from 
the sum of each company ratio for the pre-acquisition years and post-acquisition years, the 
results in general show a significant decrease in the profitability and solvency ratios whereas 
there are insignificant changes in the liquidity ratios.  
Pazarskis et al. (2006) used different financial ratios in their examination of the operating 
performance of Greek firms. However, they used the raw firm data only in their examination 
and didn’t use a benchmark or control group in order to compare their results with, which 
might be considered as a weakness in their study.  
Francis et al. (2008) examined a comprehensive sample of large US firms engaged in cross-
border acquisitions during the period from 1990 to 2003. The main objective of their study 
was to check whether there was any significant difference in the abnormal returns and 
operating performance of acquirer firms acquiring targets from segmented financial markets 
in comparison to acquirers acquiring targets from integrated financial markets. They defined 
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Integrated as the country which has a fully integrated financial market. Other markets were all 
defined as Segmented. 
In their examination of the acquiring firms’ operating performance, they used a pre-tax cash 
flow measure scaled by the market value of assets as a measure of firm operating 
performance. They defined the firm’s pre-tax cash flows as “after-tax income before 
extraordinary items plus depreciation and amortization charges, net interest expense (interest 
expense- interest income) and total income taxes” (Francis et al., 2008,p.1534). The deflator 
market value of assets was defined as the sum of the market value of equity, book value of 
preferred stock, book value of long-term debt and book value of current long-term debt.   
In their examination they presented the raw and industry-adjusted operating performance 
changes and used the acquirers’ firm data only in calculating both the pre- and post-merger 
operating cash flows covering the period from one year before the merger until three years 
after the merger. Their results showed significant improvements in the post-acquisition 
industry-adjusted performance of acquirer firms, especially for those acquirers taking over 
segmented-market targets. However, acquirer firms taking over integrated-market targets 
experienced significant decreases in both the firm and industry-adjusted mean performance. 
The study of Francis et al. (2008) was based on large US firms with size value of at least $10 
million, which may make their results not generalizable across other studies that contain a mix 
of firms with different size values. 
Mantravadi and Reddy (2008) studied the effect of mergers on the operating performance of 
acquirer firms involved in domestic mergers in India for a sample of 68 mergers between 
1991 and 2003. The study also undertook to examine whether the type of industry had any 
impact on the operating performance of acquirer firms.  
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They examined three-year pre- and three-year post-merger financial ratios which are : 
Operating Profit Margin ( PBDIT / Net Sales), Gross Profit Margin (PBIT / Net Sales), Net 
Profit Margin ( PAT / Net Sales), Return on Net Worth (PBIT / Net Worth), Return on 
Capital Employed (PAT / Capital Employed), and Debt Equity Ratio (Book Value of Debt / 
Book Value of Equity). 
Their results revealed that all the mergers in the sample showed a decline in the operating 
financial performance after the mergers, since there was a decline both in the profitability 
ratios and returns on net worth and invested capital. Therefore, the full sample showed a 
negative impact of mergers on the performance of acquirer firms in terms of profitability as 
well as returns on investment. 
Furthermore, they found that the type of industry had an impact on the changes in operating 
performance of acquiring companies after the merger, since they found different results for 
merger samples in different industry sectors in terms of their impact on operating 
performance, although some of the differences were not statistically significant. However, 
even though different measures of operating performance have been used in this study, there 
hasn’t been any use of benchmark or control group in the examination similarly to the study 
of Pazarskis et al. (2006). 
Ismail et al. (2011) examined a sample of nine Egyptian companies in the construction and 
technology sectors that were involved in domestic merger and acquisition deals during the 
period 1996 to 2003. The main reason for conducting their study was to check whether there 
was any significant improvement in the operating performance following mergers and 
acquisitions and whether there was an impact from the industry sector on the companies’ 
operating performance. 
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In order to examine the operating performance of firms they compared pre- and post-merger 
performances of merged firms using financial-based measures consisting of 26 ratios 
representing profitability, efficiency, liquidity, solvency and cash flow position. The results 
from comparing the operating performance ratios of the whole sample in the pre- and post-
merger periods didn’t show any significant difference in the average mean of profitability, 
efficiency, solvency and cash flow position. 
When the sector level was examined, empirical results showed that mergers and acquisitions 
in the construction sector have resulted in significant improvements in the firms’ profitability 
whereas there were no significant changes in the efficiency, liquidity, solvency and cash flow 
position. In the technology sector, the results didn’t show any significant improvements 
following mergers. However, this study suffers from the very small sample size and from not 
using any benchmark or control group in the examination. 
Selcuk and Yelmaz (2011) examined the performance of 62 acquirer Turkish companies 
engaged in cross-border and domestic M&As between 2003 and 2007. In order to measure the 
changes in operating performance of acquirer firms, they used three profitability ratios which 
are ROA (Net Income/ Total Assets), ROE (Net Income/ Total Equity) and ROS (Net Income/ 
Net Sales). They also used the change model and the intercept model in order to compute the 
changes in the industry-adjusted performance of acquirer firms over a period of two years 
before and after the acquisition. 
When the change model was used, the results revealed a significant decrease in the 
profitability of firms by 2.01% and 1.64% using the ROA and ROS measures respectively. 
However, when the ROE measure was used, the results showed insignificant changes in the 
performance of acquirer firms. On the other hand, when the intercept model was used, the 
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results showed insignificant difference between post-acquisition and pre-acquisition 
performance of Turkish acquirer firms for all the three measures used. 
However, Selcuk and Yelmaz (2011) conducted their analysis by using accounting measures 
based on the net income instead of pure cash flows, which might be impacted by taxation and 
depreciation methods and can be manipulated by managers as shown by a lot of researchers.  
In general, the previous studies that have been discussed in this section have shown mixed 
results regarding the impact of merger and acquisition transactions on the operating 
performance of acquirer firms. Some of the studies show significant positive improvements in 
the operating performance of acquirers (Francis et al., 2008), some show significant decline in 
the operating performance (Pazarskis et al., 2006; Mantravadi and Reddy, 2008), others show 
insignificant changes in the operating performance of firms (Ismail et al., 2011), whereas the 
rest show mixed results depending on the method and measure used (Selcuk and Yelmaz, 
2011). The difference in the results of the previous studies may have resulted from the 
different performance measures used as well as the different samples and time periods 
covered by the examination. 
However, none of the previous studies has been conducted for examining the operating 
performance of UK acquirer firms. Nor have the previous studies differentiated between 
cross-border and domestic deals or shown any clear evidence about the difference between the 
operating performance of acquirer firms involved in cross-border and domestic M&As. 
Therefore, this chapter will fill this gap and examine the changes in operating performance of 
acquirer firms in general and whether there are any significant differences in them between 
cross-border and domestic deals. 
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3.3 Data Sample and Methodology 
This section describes the sample used in this chapter followed by a detailed description of the 
methodology applied in the analysis of the operating performance of acquirer firms. 
3.3.1 Sample and Data Sources 
The sample used in this chapter includes UK public acquirer firms involved in domestic and 
cross-border M&As. The sample consists of takeovers that were announced and completed 
between January 1, 1996 and December 31, 2003.  
The names of acquirer firms are extracted manually from the Thomson Financial Publication 
Acquisitions Monthly. To be included in the sample, the acquirer firm’s accounting data, such 
as the operating performance measures should be available on the Datastream database for a 
minimum of one year before and one year after the takeover. 
Excluded from the sample are acquisitions for which data necessary for the calculation of 
their performance measures, industry median benchmarks or their matched control firms 
based on industry, size and pre- acquisition performance is not available. 
3.3.2 Sample Selection and Description  
Within the existing sample of 585 acquisitions, the number of acquirer firms that have the 
operating performance data available on the Datasteam database is 555, as shown in Table 3.1 
below. Appendix 3.A provides a list of the names of all the acquirer firms used in this chapter 
with their industry medians and industry, size and pre-acquisition peers. 
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Table 3.1: Sample Selection Procedure 
 Number Percentage 
Completed deals (1996-2003) 585 100% 
Deals where Acquirer firms have at least 1 year 
pre- and 1 year post-acquisition data available 
on Datastream 
555 95% 
 
The analysis in this chapter includes firms that have data for a period of a minimum of one 
year before and one year after the acquisition and a maximum of three years before and three 
years after the acquisition. Therefore, the number of acquisitions using different performance 
measures will differ from one year to the other for the raw, industry-adjusted and industry, 
size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance. Appendix 3.B provides a table which shows 
the minimum and maximum number of acquisitions included for different time periods. 
This chapter examines the operating performance of acquirer firms that have the required data 
available and uses the acquirer firms’ measures in the pre-acquisition period as well as in the 
post-acquisition period. Table 3.2 below provides a description of the sample and breaks 
down the full sample into two parts according to whether the deal is a cross-border or 
domestic acquisition made by UK acquirer firm. 
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Table 3.2: Distribution of Sample M&As by Year and Deal Characteristics 
 
 Cross-border M&A Domestic M&A Total 
 Number % Number % Number % 
Panel A: By Year of M&A 
1996 27 9.44 32 11.90 59 10.63 
1997 30 10.50 45 16.73 75 13.51 
1998 55 19.23 72 26.77 127 22.88 
1999 57 19.93 48 17.84 105 18.92 
2000 50 17.48 28 10.41 78 14.05 
2001 23 8.04 11 4.09 34 6.13 
2002 19 6.64 8 2.97 27 4.87 
2003 25 8.74 25 9.29 50 9.01 
Total 286 100.00 269 100.00 555 100.00 
Panel B: By Deal Characteristics 
Payment Method 
All Cash 101 35.315 102 37.92 203 36.58 
All Shares 11 3.85 12 4.46 23 4.14 
Mix 73 25.52 104 38.66 177 31.89 
Not Available 101 35.315 51 18.96 152 27.39 
Total 286 100.00 269 100.00 555 100.00 
Relatedness 
Same Industry 141 49.30 151 56.13 292 52.61 
Different Industry 136 47.55 93 34.58 229 41.26 
Not Available 9 3.15 25 9.29 34 6.13 
Total 286 100.00 269 100.00 555 100.00 
Relative Size of Target 
Target size < 10% 202 70.63 184 68.40 386 69.54 
Target size 10%-50% 39 13.64 54 20.07 93 16.76 
Target size > 50% 22 7.69 13 4.83 35 6.31 
Not Available 23 8.04 18 6.70 41 7.39 
Total 286 100.00 269 100.00 555 100.00 
 
Panel A of Table 3.2 shows the distribution over time of cross-border, domestic and total 
transactions. Within the existing sample of 555 M&As, 51.53% of them represent cross-
border mergers and acquisitions and 48.47% of them are domestic mergers and acquisitions. 
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Consistent with the previous chapter numbers, the sample shows an increase in the number of 
M&A transactions over the years, then a decrease happens after the millennium followed by 
another increase in subsequent years. 
Panel B of Table 3.2 presents the distribution of the sample over some of the deal 
characteristics which are the payment method, industrial relatedness and the relative size of 
the target to the acquirer firm. With regard to the method of payment, the takeovers here are 
classified into three groups which are pure cash, pure equity and mixed payment. The pure 
cash (equity) offer is the one where the final consideration paid from the bidder to the target 
firm shareholders is 100% cash (equity), whereas the mixed offer is the one where the final 
consideration paid is a mixture of equity, cash or any other form of payment. 
Within the existing sample, it is clear that pure cash is the main method of payment in cross-
border acquisitions whereas the pure equity is the least method of payment. The reason for the 
acquirer firms to use cash as the main method of payment might be caused by the 
unwillingness of foreign target firms to accept foreign equity, which will force the acquirer 
firms to pay with cash (Conn et al., 2005).  
Considering the industrial relatedness, acquisitions are defined as related when acquirer and 
target firms have the same two digit Standard Industrial Classification Code (SIC code).  
Panel B of table 3.2 shows that acquisitions between firms in related industries occur in 
49.30% of the cross-border sample and 56.13% of the domestic sample. 
Finally, the relative size of targets to acquirers, which is calculated by multiplying the deals’ 
value by the market value of acquirer firms, shows that the majority of the sample represent 
small takeovers with 69.54% of the targets are less than 10% of the acquirer’s size. 
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3.3.3 Measuring the Operating Performance of Firms 
In order to identify the adopted methodology in this chapter, it is essential as a first step to 
define the operating performance measures used. Therefore, this section will describe the 
performance measures and benchmarks used in the analysis in this chapter. 
Different operating performance measures are employed in this chapter in order to ensure a 
degree of comparability with other previous studies, to check whether the conclusions are 
different across the various measures as well as to ensure that the assessment of the operating 
performance is not affected by the accounting policies adopted by the firms.Those different 
measures are cash flow performance measures and accrual performance measures.  
The cash flow performance measures are defined firstly as the earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA). The other cash flow measure is defined as the 
earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization adjusted for changes in working 
capital (EBITDA – ΔWC), which is described by some previous studies as a ‘pure’ cash flow 
measure (Powell and Stark, 2005). The adjustment for changes in working capital can 
guarantee that the measure is not affected by the managers’ personal decisions, since working 
capital accruals might be subject to management manipulation (Rahman and Limmack, 2004). 
The accrual performance measure is defined generally as earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) and is similar to the pre-tax performance measure used in previous studies. 
After deciding the operating performance measures to be used, those measures are then 
deflated before and after the takeover in order to construct a cash flow return on assets or 
sales margin that is comparable across firms. 
In this chapter, different deflators are used in order to avoid any bias from using a specific 
deflator over the others. Those deflators are the book value of total assets, total sales, book 
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value of equity and the total market value, which is defined as the book value of assets plus 
the market value of equity less the book value of equity. 
Therefore, when applying those different deflators to the cash flow numerator the result will 
be three cash flow measures, three ‘pure’ cash flow measures of operating performance and 
two accrual performance measures as shown in the following figure : 
Figure 3.1: Performance Measures 
 
3.3.4 Benchmark Construction 
In order to measure changes in operating performance of firms following takeovers, a 
comparison is conducted between the realized performance and the benchmark performance 
that might be generated in case the takeover bid had not taken place. 
In order to have a degree of comparability with previous studies and to check whether the 
choice of the benchmark affects the results, two adjustment methods are employed in this 
chapter which control for the industry trend as well as the industry, asset size and pre-
acquisition performance of firms. 
Operating Performance Measures 
Cash Flow Performance ‘Pure’ Cash Flow Performance Accrual Cash Flow Performance 
EBITDA EBITDA - ΔWC EBIT 
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Also, in order to construct the operating performance benchmark with which will be 
compared with the merging firms’ operating performance, some steps are followed for each 
type of benchmark as follows.  
3.3.4.1 Adjustment for the Industry-median Operating Performance 
Datastream database is used to collect the required data in order to construct industry median 
benchmarks in this chapter. The benchmarks are chosen from the list of all companies on the 
Datastream database that have the same industrial classification as the acquirer firms in the 
sample in the year preceding the acquisition. Industrial classification is identified as the 
Datastream Industrial Classification Code at Level Four (Financial Times All Shares Index) 
as is used in Cosh et al. (2006). 
From those industry groupings, the firm with the median EBITDA-to-Assets ratio in the year 
preceding the acquisition is selected as the industry median peer. Also, care has been taken to 
make sure that peer companies are not engaged in any merger and acquisition activity during 
the period under examination. 
3.3.4.2 Matched Firms Based on Industry, Size and Pre-acquisition Performance      
In order to construct the matching performance benchmark in this chapter, the Datastream 
database is used to identify the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance matched peer 
companies for each of the acquirer firms in the sample. 
Similar to the procedure used to select the industry median benchmarks, those companies that 
have the same Datastream Industrial Classification Code at Level Four as the acquirer firms in 
the year preceding the acquisition are selected. Then, those industry groupings are filtered 
down to those companies that have size values of between 25% and 200% of acquirer firms 
which are represented by total assets in the year prior to the acquisition. From this list, firms 
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with the operating performance closest to the acquirer firms, measured as the EBITDA-to-
Assets ratio in the year prior to the acquisition, are selected as the benchmark firms. Also, 
caution is taken to make sure that benchmark firms selected are not engaged in any merger 
and acquisition activity over the period studied.  
3.3.4.3 Adjusted Cash- flow Performance 
The analysis in this chapter focuses on the changes in operating performance of acquirer firms 
by examining a time period from three years before the acquisition until three years after the 
acquisition (-3 to +3). Consistent with other previous studies, year 0, which is the year of the 
acquisition, is excluded from the analysis in order to avoid any distortions caused by any 
accounting differences and one-time merger costs incurred during that year, that might make 
it difficult to compare with the results of other years (Healy et al., 1992; Kumar and Rajib, 
2007). 
For the pre-acquisition period, the operating performance cash flow measures of acquirer 
firms are constructed for each of the three years (-3 to -1) prior to the takeover, wherever 
available. This measure is deflated or scaled by the acquirer specific deflator. That is, the raw 
pre-acquisition operating performance cash flow of the acquirer firm is calculated as follows: 
                                                                                                                         (3.1) 
Similarly, for the post-acquisition period, the actual or realized operating performance 
reported by the acquirer firm for each of the three years (+1 to +3) after the acquisition is 
scaled by its deflator at the same year. The raw post-acquisition operating performance or 
cash flow of the acquirer firm is calculated as follows: 
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                                                                                                                         (3.2) 
 
The control benchmark operating performance measure is also calculated in each of the three 
years prior and post the acquisition for the acquirer control companies, wherever available. In 
the pre-acquisition period, the performance of the control company is calculated as the 
operating performance of the acquirer’s peer company scaled by its own deflator. The peer 
pre-acquisition operating performance of the acquirer firm is calculated as follows: 
                                                                                                                         (3.3) 
The post-acquisition benchmark is calculated similarly to the pre-acquisition years by scaling 
the operating performance of the acquirer’s peer company by its own deflator. The peer post-
acquisition operating performance of the acquirer firm is calculated as follows: 
                                                                                                            (3.4)                   
The control adjusted operating performance is calculated as the difference between the raw 
performance measures of the acquirer firms and the relevant benchmark operating 
performance measures. The acquirer’s operating performance adjusted for the industry trend 
is calculated as follows: 
                                                                           (3.5) 
 
Also, the acquirer’s operating performance adjusted for the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance is calculated in a similar way as follows: 
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                                            (3.6) 
 
Median annual performance measures are then reported for all the acquirer firms in the pre- 
and post-acquisition years. The median performance measures are also reported for each 
acquirer firm in the pre-acquisition and post-acquisition periods. An assessment of the 
changes in operating performance of acquirer firms caused by the takeover is then conducted 
by using the change and intercept models, which are described below. 
3.3.5 Models to Assess Changes in Performance 
In order to assess the changes in operating performance of acquirer firms caused by the 
takeover, two models are employed in this chapter, which are the change model and the 
intercept model. 
3.3.5.1 Change Model 
In this model, the median operating performance of the acquirer firms is computed for three 
years prior to the takeover, and the median operating performance of the acquirer firms is 
calculated over the three years after the takeover. However, when the operating performance 
data is available for only two years, then the median value for the two years is equal to the 
mean value. If the performance data is available for only one year, then the median value is 
equal to the value of that year. The change in operating performance of each acquirer firm is 
then calculated as the difference between the median operating performance of the years 
subsequent to the merger and the median of the years prior to the acquisition.  
The Wilcoxon signed rank test technique is then used to check whether there is any significant 
difference between the median post-acquisition performance and the median pre-acquisition 
performance of acquirer firms. 
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3.3.5.2 Intercept Model 
In this model, changes in operating performance of acquirer firms are estimated by regressing 
the median post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms on the median pre-acquisition 
performance, as shown in the following regression: 
OPpost= α0 + α1 * OPpre + ε                                                                                                        (3.7) 
OPpost = median post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms.   
OPpre = median pre-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms.  
α0 = represents changes in operating performance of acquirer firms. 
α1 = reflects the relation between pre-acquisition operating performance and post-acquisition 
operating performance of acquirer firms. 
Standard t-test is applied to test for the significance of the changes in operating performance 
of acquirer firms. Figure 3.2 below summarizes the procedure followed in applying the 
methodology. 
   120 
Figure 3.2: Methodology Applied to Measure Changes in Operating Performance of 
Acquirer Firms 
 
 
3.4 Empirical Results 
This section presents the results of the empirical analysis conducted for the whole sample, 
cross-border sample and domestic sample of UK acquirers. Firstly, the change model results 
are reported for the full, cross-border and domestic samples of acquirer firms using different 
operating performance measures and benchmarks. Secondly, the regression-based results 
related to the intercept model are presented for the full, cross-border and domestic samples for 
different performance measures and two different benchmarks. Then, the results of an 
extended version of the intercept model are presented which include the impact of cross-
border acquisitions on changes in operating performance of acquirer firms. This version gives 
Acquirer Firm (A) 
Pre-acquisition 
Acquirer’s Peer * 
Pre-acquisition 
Acquirer Firm (A) 
Post-acquisition 
Acquirer’s Peer * 
Post-acquisition 
Minus Minus 
Pre-acquisition adjusted performance  Post-acquisition adjusted performance  
Median of years -3, -2, -1 Median of years 1, 2, 3 
Median pre-acquisition 
adjusted performance  
Median post-acquisition 
adjusted performance  
t= -3 t= -2 t= -1 t= 1 t= 2 t= 3 t= 0 
Year of 
acquisition 
Changes 
*Peer firms or benchmarks are selected on: (1) Industry median, or (2) Industry, size and pre-acquisition performance. 
 
Source: The idea of the figure is based on Martynova et al. (2007) and Sharma and Ho (2002).  
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a comparison between the operating performance of acquirer firms involved in domestic and 
cross-border acquisitions and whether they are significantly different or not. Thirdly, a 
comparison between the change model and intercept model results is presented. Fourthly, the 
results of a regression analysis are presented to show the impact of some of the deal 
characteristics on the post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms.   
3.4.1 Change Model Results 
This section presents the results of the change model that shows the size of the improvements 
in the acquirer firms’ operating performance measured as the difference between the median 
post-takeover performance and the median pre-takeover performance for the full, cross-border 
and domestic samples of acquirer firms using different measures and benchmarks. 
3.4.1.1 Full Sample 
The empirical results for the change model are shown in Table 3.3 for the full sample of 
acquirers.  
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Table 3.3: Operating Performance Changes of UK Acquirer Firms (Full Sample) 
  Raw Performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs.   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs.   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs.   
Measure 1: 
 
 
       -3 16.44 516 
 
0.44 415 
 
-0.11 403 
 -2 16.57 536 
 
1.98 446 
 
0.12 454 
 -1 17.21 542 
 
2.14 502 
 
0.30 483 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
16.62 542  1.96 502  0.03 483  
1 14.59 542 
 
0.68 502 
 
-0.25 483 
 2 13.61 542 
 
0.22 495 
 
-0.59 475 
 3 12.50 542 
 
-1.09 496 
 
-0.77 480 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
13.62 542  0.06 502  -0.20 483  
          Median difference 7.41*** 542 
 
4.86*** 502 
 
1.71* 483 
           Measure 2: 
                   
-3 14.12 515 
 
-1.45 412 
 
-0.94 403 
 -2 13.45 535 
 
-1.68 444 
 
-1.44 454 
 -1 14.01 544 
 
-1.30 500 
 
-1.60 483 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
13.52 544  -1.07 500  -1.04 483  
1 12.88 544 
 
-2.03 499 
 
-1.82 483 
 2 12.75 544 
 
-1.59 493 
 
-1.75 475 
 3 12.31 544 
 
-3.31 495 
 
-1.92 480 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
12.97 544  -2.03 500  -1.31 483  
          Median difference 1.81* 544 
 
1.17 500 
 
0.24 483 
           Measure 3: 
                   
-3 0.01 510 
 
-0.003 407 
 
-0.0002 383 
 -2 0.01 529 
 
-0.002 437 
 
-0.002 429 
 -1 0.01 543 
 
-0.003 483 
 
-0.002 463 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
0.01 543  -0.002 483  -0.002 465  
1 0.01 543 
 
-0.002 483 
 
-0.001 465 
 2 0.01 543 
 
-0.01 476 
 
-0.001 465 
 3 0.01 543 
 
-0.002 478 
 
-0.001 465 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
0.01 543  -0.01 483  -0.001 462  
          Median difference 4.66*** 543 
 
2.85** 483 
 
2.35** 465 
   
TMV
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
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  Raw Performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs.   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs.   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs.   
Measure 4: 
 
 
       -3 15.58 468 
 
1.93 346 
 
0.73 331 
 -2 15.76 482 
 
2.81 390 
 
-0.88 372 
 -1 16.59 504 
 
2.20 409 
 
1.67 420 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
16.24 504  2.37 409  0.19 420  
1 15.01 504 
 
1.13 409 
 
1.25 420 
 2 13.26 504 
 
-0.19 403 
 
-0.65 415 
 3 12.55 504 
 
1.32 388 
 
-0.14 414 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
13.56 504  1.28 409  -0.04 420  
          Median difference 5.72*** 504 
 
2.01** 409 
 
0.99 420 
 
          Measure 5: 
 
                  
-3 12.49 467 
 
-2.32 345 
 
-0.99 331 
 -2 11.93 480 
 
-1.58 390 
 
-2.49 373 
 -1 12.76 503 
 
-1.73 409 
 
-0.82 420 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
11.95 503  -1.73 409  -1.99 420  
1 13.19 503 
 
-0.43 409 
 
-0.31 420 
 2 11.57 503 
 
-2.38 403 
 
-1.64 414 
 3 11.91 503 
 
0.22 389 
 
0.21 413 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
11.82 503  -1.26 409  0.14 420  
          Median difference 1.31 503 
 
7.61 409 
 
1.16 420 
 
          Measure 6: 
 
                  
-3 0.01 467 
 
-0.004 346 
 
-0.001 317 
 -2 0.01 481 
 
-0.003 387 
 
-0.002 358 
 -1 0.01 503 
 
-0.004 409 
 
-0.003 406 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
0.01 503  -0.002 409  -0.002 406  
1 0.01 503 
 
-0.002 409 
 
0.001 406 
 2 0.01 503 
 
-0.002 403 
 
-0.001 400 
 3 0.01 503 
 
0.001 389 
 
0.0001 398 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
0.01 503  -0.01 409  -0.0002 406  
          Median difference 4.62*** 503 
 
2.07** 409 
 
2.45** 406 
   
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
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  Raw Performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs.   median (%) 
Nr. 
Obs.   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs.   
Measure 7:  
 
 
       -3 11.60 527 
 
0.97 413 
 
-0.09 402 
 -2 12.36 547 
 
1.47 445 
 
-0.40 456 
 -1 12.36 555 
 
1.40 501 
 
0.06 485 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
12.29 555  1.47 501  0.02 485  
1 10.02 555 
 
0.55 501 
 
-0.32 485 
 2 8.74 555 
 
0.19 494 
 
-1.14 478 
 3 8.46 555 
 
-1.15 495 
 
-0.61 483 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
8.99 555  0.09 501  -0.32 485  
          Median difference 9.01*** 555 
 
4.74*** 501 
 
1.87* 485 
           Measure 8:  
 
                  
-3 29.76 524 
 
5.50 415 
 
3.87 402 
 -2 31.29 546 
 
8.65 447 
 
2.08 456 
 -1 33.44 555 
 
8.63 503 
 
3.12 485 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
31.56 555  8.49 503  3.33 485  
1 27.85 555 
 
-0.77 503 
 
2.77 485 
 2 26.33 555 
 
6.64 496 
 
2.71 478 
 3 24.32 555 
 
1.62 498 
 
3.22 483 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
26.43 555  3.12 503  3.01 485  
          Median difference 4.29*** 555 
 
3.13** 503 
 
0.12 485 
 
           
Median difference between the median post- acquisition performance and median pre-acquisition performance 
of acquirer firms is conducted using Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
 
 
The results presented in Table 3.3 for the raw performance of acquirer firms (without 
adjustment) show significant positive changes in operating performance of acquirers for all 
the measures used except measure 5 which is the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by sales. 
The positive significant difference between medians ranges between 1.81% and 9.01%. 
However, the result for measure 5 shows statistically insignificant positive changes in 
operating performance of acquirer firms. 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
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Also, when the acquirer firm performance is adjusted for the industry median performance, 
the results show significant positive changes for all the measures used, except measures 2 and 
5 which are the cash flow measure deflated by sales and the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated 
by sales. Those two measures do not show any significant differences between the median 
post- and median pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms. 
On the other hand, when the control is done for the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance, the results show less significant results with four out of the eight measures 
showing positive significant changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms and the 
other four measures showing statistically insignificant positive differences between the 
median post- and median pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms. The measures which 
show positive significant changes are the cash flow deflated by total assets, the cash flow 
measure deflated by total market value, the ‘pure’ cash flow deflated by total market value 
and the accrual measure deflated by total assets. 
In general, the results for the full sample show significant positive changes in the raw and 
adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms for different performance measures and 
benchmarks used.  
3.4.1.2 Cross-border Sample 
Table 3.4 presents the empirical results from using the change model for the cross-border 
sample of acquirer firms using different performance measures and benchmarks.  
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Table 3.4: Operating Performance Changes of UK Acquirer Firms (Cross-border 
Sample) 
  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 1: 
 
 
       -3 16.62 271 
 
1.06 216 
 
0.03 217 
 -2 16.51 275 
 
1.56 229 
 
-0.43 233 
 -1 17.19 276 
 
2.07 256 
 
0.03 247 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
16.73 276  1.78 256  -0.11 247  
1 14.27 276 
 
0.35 256 
 
-1.50 247 
 2 13.32 276 
 
0.37 252 
 
-1.90 245 
 3 12.20 276 
 
-1.18 255 
 
-1.35 246 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
13.12 276  0.11 256  -1.14 247  
          Median difference 6.41*** 276 
 
3.68*** 256 
 
1.43 247 
           Measure 2: 
 
                  
-3 16.22 271 
 
-0.21 215 
 
-0.21 217 
 -2 15.10 274 
 
-1.31 229 
 
-1.62 233 
 -1 15.78 277 
 
0.12 256 
 
-1.62 247 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
15.31 277  0.22 256  -0.21 247  
1 13.58 277 
 
-1.47 256 
 
-1.68 247 
 2 13.05 277 
 
-0.68 252 
 
-1.39 245 
 3 12.55 277 
 
-2.68 255 
 
-2.19 246 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
13.94 277  -1.11 256  -0.99 247  
          Median difference 1.89* 277 
 
1.06 256 
 
0.66 247 
           Measure 3: 
 
                  
-3 0.01 269 
 
-0.003 214 
 
0.0002 203 
 -2 0.01 273 
 
-0.003 225 
 
-0.001 217 
 -1 0.01 276 
 
-0.004 244 
 
-0.002 234 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
0.01 276  -0.003 244  -0.002 234  
1 0.01 276 
 
-0.003 244 
 
-0.001 234 
 2 0.01 276 
 
-0.002 240 
 
-0.001 232 
 3 0.01 276 
 
-0.002 243 
 
-0.001 233 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
0.01 276  -0.002 244  -0.001 234  
          Median difference 3.08*** 276 
 
2.08** 244 
 
0.72 234 
   
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
TMV
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 4: 
 
 
       -3 16.18 256 
 
2.84 186 
 
0.81 186 
 -2 16.19 259 
 
2.90 213 
 
-1.83 201 
 -1 16.31 262 
 
2.89 216 
 
1.41 221 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
16.31 262  2.53 216  -0.45 221  
1 14.33 262 
 
0.16 216 
 
-1.26 221 
 2 11.78 262 
 
-0.69 213 
 
-2.75 219 
 3 11.83 262 
 
1.28 211 
 
-0.29 220 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
12.58 262  0.57 216  -1.54 221  
          Median difference 5.44*** 262 
 
2.50** 216 
 
0.92 221 
 
          Measure 5: 
 
                  
-3 13.40 255 
 
-1.12 185 
 
-0.22 185 
 -2 13.18 257 
 
-0.95 213 
 
-2.97 201 
 -1 14.38 261 
 
0.26 216 
 
-0.55 220 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
12.81 261  -0.31 216  -2.08 220  
1 13.88 261 
 
0.77 216 
 
-0.72 220 
 2 11.78 261 
 
-2.17 213 
 
-1.95 218 
 3 12.68 261 
 
0.75 211 
 
1.09 219 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
12.15 261  0.60 216  0.75 220  
          Median difference 1.40 261 
 
0.40 216 
 
0.61 220 
 
          Measure 6: 
 
                  
-3 0.01 256 
 
-0.01 187 
 
-0.001 177 
 -2 0.01 259 
 
-0.003 212 
 
-0.004 191 
 -1 0.01 261 
 
-0.003 215 
 
-0.003 211 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
0.01 261  -0.003 215  -0.001 211  
1 0.01 261 
 
-0.004 215 
 
-0.0004 211 
 2 0.01 261 
 
-0.002 212 
 
-0.002 209 
 3 0.01 261 
 
0.001 210 
 
-0.001 209 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
0.01 261  -0.002 215  -0.001 211  
          Median difference 3.39*** 261 
 
1.53 215 
 
1.37 211 
   
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 7:  
 
 
       -3 12.39 280 
 
1.24 218 
 
0.06 217 
 -2 11.90 283 
 
1.08 230 
 
-1.11 233 
 -1 12.26 286 
 
1.38 258 
 
-0.75 248 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
12.26 286  1.33 258  -0.65 248 
 1 9.06 286 
 
0.46 258 
 
-1.32 248 
 2 8.48 286 
 
0.17 254 
 
-1.92 246 
 3 7.14 286 
 
-1.44 257 
 
-1.79 247 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
8.53 286  -0.06 258  -1.33 248 
           Median difference 7.29*** 286 
 
3.37 258 
 
1.51 248 
           Measure 8:  
 
                  
-3 31.46 278 
 
5.07 219 
 
3.77 217 
 -2 33.84 282 
 
7.68 231 
 
1.88 233 
 -1 34.66 286 
 
11.76 259 
 
3.15 248 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 
34.32 286  8.31 259  3.72 248 
 1 28.37 286 
 
-0.46 259 
 
3.12 248 
 2 27.59 286 
 
7.08 259 
 
3.27 246 
 3 25.12 286 
 
3.37 255 
 
3.12 247 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 
27.79 286  3.41 258  3.13 248 
           Median difference 2.32** 286 
 
1.45 259 
 
0.97 248 
 
           
Median difference between the median post- acquisition performance and median pre-acquisition performance 
of acquirer firms is conducted using Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
 
The results presented in Table 3.4 for the raw performance of acquirer firms involved in 
cross-border acquisitions show similar results to the raw performance of acquirers in the full 
sample, with statistically significant positive changes in operating performance of acquirer 
firms for all the performance measures used except measure 5 which is the ‘pure’ cash flow 
measure deflated by sales.  
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
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However, the industry-adjusted performance of the cross-border sample show significant 
positive changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms for three out of the eight 
performance measures used, which are the cash flow measure deflated by total assets, cash 
flow measure deflated by total market value, as well as the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated 
by total assets. The other five measures show insignificant positive changes between the 
median post- and median pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms. 
However, when the control is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance of 
firms, the results reveal insignificant positive differences between the median post- and 
median pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms for all the performance measures used. 
Therefore, the type of the control or benchmark used seems to have a different impact on the 
results. 
In general, the results for the cross-border sample show significant positive changes in the raw 
operating performance of acquirer firms, compared with insignificant changes in the adjusted 
operating performance of acquirer firms for different performance measures and benchmarks.  
3.4.1.3 Domestic Sample 
Table 3.5 presents the empirical results of the change model for acquirer firms involved in 
domestic acquisitions using different performance measures and benchmarks.  
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Table 3.5: Operating Performance Changes of UK Acquirer Firms (Domestic Sample) 
  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 1: 
 
 
       -3 15.39 245 
 
0.14 199 
 
-0.15 186 
 -2 16.61 261 
 
2.43 217 
 
0.55 221 
 -1 17.32 266 
 
2.34 246 
 
0.81 236 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 16.54 266  2.18 246  0.29 236  
1 15.24 266 
 
1.11 246 
 
0.14 236 
 2 13.96 266 
 
-0.11 243 
 
-0.16 230 
 3 13.28 266 
 
-0.86 241 
 
0.05 234 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 14.22 266  -0.06 246  0.34 236  
          Median difference 4.01*** 266 
 
3.15** 246 
 
1.04 236 
           Measure 2: 
 
                  
-3 12.53 244 
 
-3.99 197 
 
-1.37 186 
 -2 12.53 261 
 
-1.70 215 
 
-1.03 221 
 -1 12.78 267 
 
-1.45 244 
 
-1.43 236 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 12.52 267  -1.68 244  -1.33 236  
1 12.58 267 
 
-2.35 244 
 
-1.88 236 
 2 12.57 267 
 
-2.53 241 
 
-3.08 230 
 3 11.97 267 
 
-3.86 240 
 
-1.34 234 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 12.32 267  -3.63 244  -1.31 236  
          Median difference 0.66 267 
 
0.61 244 
 
0.29 236 
           Measure 3: 
 
                  
-3 0.01 241 
 
-0.003 193 
 
-0.001 180 
 -2 0.01 256 
 
-0.002 212 
 
-0.002 212 
 -1 0.01 267 
 
-0.003 239 
 
-0.002 231 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 0.01 267  -0.002 239  -0.002 231  
1 0.01 267 
 
-0.002 239 
 
-0.001 231 
 2 0.01 267 
 
-0.0004 236 
 
-0.0004 224 
 3 0.01 267 
 
-0.001 235 
 
-0.0003 229 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 0.01 267  -0.001 239  -0.004 231  
          Median difference 3.51*** 267 
 
2.01** 239 
 
2.47** 231 
   
TMV
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 4: 
 
 
       -3 15.17 212 
 
0.61 160 
 
0.14 145 
 -2 15.40 223 
 
2.72 177 
 
0.78 171 
 -1 16.90 242 
 
1.67 193 
 
1.67 199 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 16.16 242  1.82 193  1.01 199  
1 16.42 242 
 
2.19 193 
 
2.61 199 
 2 13.77 242 
 
0.76 190 
 
0.12 196 
 3 13.98 242 
 
2.13 177 
 
-0.03 194 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 14.65 242  2.19 193  0.64 199  
          Median difference 2.61** 242 
 
0.27 193 
 
0.48 199 
 
          Measure 5: 
 
                  
-3 11.14 212 
 
-4.15 160 
 
-1.46 146 
 -2 10.77 223 
 
-2.11 177 
 
-1.97 172 
 -1 11.49 242 
 
-2.79 193 
 
-0.94 200 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 11.40 242  -3.08 193  -1.76 200  
1 12.22 242 
 
-1.60 193 
 
0.34 200 
 2 11.25 242 
 
-2.94 190 
 
-1.15 196 
 3 10.97 242 
 
-0.22 178 
 
-0.96 194 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 11.33 242  -2.08 193  -0.44 200  
          Median difference 0.39 242 
 
0.47 193 
 
0.99 200 
 
          Measure 6: 
 
                  
-3 0.01 211 
 
-0.002 159 
 
-0.001 140 
 -2 0.01 222 
 
-0.003 175 
 
-0.002 167 
 -1 0.01 242 
 
-0.01 194 
 
-0.003 195 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 0.01 242  -0.002 194  -0.002 195  
1 0.01 242 
 
-0.001 194 
 
0.001 195 
 2 0.01 242 
 
-0.002 191 
 
-0.001 191 
 3 0.01 242 
 
0.002 179 
 
0.001 189 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 0.01 242  0.0001 194  0.0003 195  
          Median difference 3.18** 242 
 
1.30 194 
 
2.11** 195 
   
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 7:  
 
 
       -3 11.58 247 
 
0.06 195 
 
-0.38 185 
 -2 12.39 264 
 
1.51 215 
 
0.38 223 
 -1 12.82 269 
 
1.41 243 
 
0.43 237 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 12.29 269  1.86 243  0.53 237  
1 10.97 269 
 
0.82 243 
 
0.26 237 
 2 9.39 269 
 
0.23 240 
 
-0.69 232 
 3 9.22 269 
 
-1.04 238 
 
0.11 236 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 9.73 269  0.11 243  0.06 237  
          Median difference 5.36*** 269 
 
3.28*** 243 
 
1.15 237 
           Measure 8:  
 
                  
-3 27.31 246 
 
5.78 196 
 
3.87 185 
 -2 30.97 264 
 
9.85 216 
 
2.64 223 
 -1 31.83 269 
 
6.27 244 
 
3.08 237 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 30.95 269  8.51 244  3.00 237  
1 27.39 269 
 
-0.91 244 
 
2.31 237 
 2 24.54 269 
 
6.11 241 
 
2.11 232 
 3 23.44 269 
 
0.41 240 
 
3.73 236 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 25.39 269  2.56 244  2.62 237  
          Median difference 3.66*** 269 
 
2.99*** 244 
 
1.15 237 
 
           
Median difference between the median post- acquisition performance and median pre-acquisition performance 
of acquirer firms is conducted using Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
 
The results for the domestic sample presented in Table 3.5 show that the changes in the raw 
performance of acquirer firms (without adjustment) is significantly positive for six out of the 
eight measures used and ranges between 2.61% and 5.36%. The other two measures which are 
the cash flow measure deflated by sales and ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by sales show 
insignificant positive changes in operating performance of acquirer firms. 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
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However, when the adjustment is made for the industry median performance, the results for 
the domestic sample show significant positive differences between the median post- and 
median pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms using four out of the eight performance 
measures used, which are the cash flow measure deflated by total assets, the cash flow 
measure deflated by total market value, the accrual measure deflated by total assets and the 
accrual measure deflated by the book value of equity. The other four measures show 
insignificant positive changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms. 
When the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, the 
results reveal significant positive improvements in operating performance of acquirer firms 
for only two out of the eight measures used, which are the cash flow measure and the ‘pure’ 
cash flow measure both deflated by total market value. However, the other measures show 
insignificant positive changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms. 
In general, the results for the domestic sample show significant positive changes in the raw 
performance of acquirer firms, whereas insignificant changes in the industry-adjusted and 
industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance of acquirer firms.  
3.4.2 Intercept Model Results 
The results of the intercept model are presented in Table 3.6 using different performance 
measures with different deflators and two performance benchmarks for UK acquirers using 
the full, cross-border and domestic samples. 
Models 1, 3 and 4 show the results of acquirer firms from the intercept model using an 
industry-adjusted median performance for the full, cross-border and domestic acquisitions 
respectively. Models 5, 7 and 8 show the results for the full, cross-border and domestic 
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samples of acquirer firms respectively from using matched firms based on the industry, size 
and pre-acquisition performance.    
However, models 2 and 6 in Table 3.6 extend the intercept model results by adding the cross-
border dummy for the reason of checking the impact of cross-border acquisitions on the post-
acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms using the industry-adjusted and industry, 
size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance respectively.  
Table 3.6: Regression of Post-takeover-adjusted Performance of Acquirer Firms on Pre-
takeover-adjusted Performance 
Independent 
variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-performance 
adjusted   
 
Full  CB  D  Full  CB  D  
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) (6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 1: 
 
               Intercept 
 
-0.019*** 
(-4.41) 
-0.014** 
(-2.35) 
 
-0.025*** 
(-4.29) 
 
-0.010* 
(-1.70) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.59) 
0.012 
(0.82) 
 
-0.020*** 
(-3.04) 
 
0.016 
(0.85) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.369*** 
(10.39) 
0.367*** 
(10.33) 
 
0.497*** 
(10.26) 
 
0.223*** 
(4.38) 
 
0.146** 
(2.31) 
0.140** 
(2.22) 
 
0.619*** 
(3.08) 
 
0.183* 
(-1.75) 
 Cross-border 
  
-0.009 
(-1.05) 
      
-0.035* 
(-1.73) 
     F-statistic 
 
10.80*** 5.46*** 
 
10.52*** 
 
19.21*** 
 
5.335** 4.18** 
 
17.10*** 
 
3.05* 
 p.value 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.02 0.02 
 
0.00 
 
0.08 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.18 0.18 
 
0.29 
 
0.07 
 
0.009 0.01 
 
0.41 
 
0.01 
                 Measure 2: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.045*** 
(-4.99) 
-0.050*** 
(-3.86) 
 
-0.041*** 
(-3.48) 
 
-0.045*** 
(-3.32) 
 
0.001 
(0.04) 
-0.008 
(-0.17) 
 
0.010 
(0.16) 
 
-0.013 
(-0.92) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.0003 
(0.32) 
0.0003 
(0.34) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
 
0.036*** 
(3.72) 
 
0.077*** 
(3.64) 
0.077*** 
(3.47) 
 
0.078*** 
(3.12) 
 
0.038*** 
(3.98) 
 Cross-border 
  
0.009 
(0.52) 
      
0.018 
(0.28) 
     F-statistic 
 
0.10 0.18 
 
0.01 
 
13.82*** 
 
28.77*** 14.36*** 
 
15.30*** 
 
15.87*** 
 p.value 
 
0.75 0.83 
 
0.99 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.002 -0.003 
 
-0.004 
 
0.05 
 
0.86 0.86 
 
0.86 
 
0.06 
                 Measure 3: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.002** 
(-2.53) 
-0.001 
(-1.22) 
 
-0.003** 
(-2.03) 
 
-0.0001 
(0.41) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.11) 
0.001 
(0.67) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.61) 
 
0.001 
(0.85) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.001 
(0.58) 
0.001 
(0.54) 
 
0.001 
(0.40) 
 
0.411*** 
(3.00) 
 
0.275*** 
(5.22) 
0.27*** 
(5.19) 
 
0.324*** 
(3.09) 
 
0.245*** 
(4.92) 
 Cross-border 
  
-0.001 
(-0.79) 
      
-0.002 
(-1.07) 
     F-statistic 
 
0.33 0.48 
 
0.16 
 
5.69*** 
 
27.27*** 14.21*** 
 
9.57*** 
 
24.17*** 
 p.value 
 
0.56 0.62 
 
0.69 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.002 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.001 -0.002 
 
-0.003 
 
0.19 
 
0.05 0.05 
 
0.04 
 
0.09 
                 
TMV
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
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Independent 
variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-performance 
adjusted   
 
Full  CB  D  Full  CB  D  
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) (6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 4: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.004 
(-0.61) 
0.015 
(1.44) 
 
-0.023** 
(-2.12) 
 
-0.020** 
(2.14) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.11) 
0.012 
(1.14) 
 
-0.011 
(-0.98) 
 
0.013 
(1.40) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.261*** 
(5.41) 
0.254*** 
(5.29) 
 
0.353*** 
(5.25) 
 
0.099 
(1.49) 
 
0.150*** 
(7.16) 
0.150*** 
(7.07) 
 
0.352*** 
(6.33) 
 
0.147*** 
(3.62) 
 Cross-border 
  
-0.037** 
(-2.57) 
      
-0.025* 
(-1.68) 
     F-statistic 
 
29.26*** 18.13*** 
 
27.55*** 
 
2.22 
 
7.38*** 37.18*** 
 
40.08*** 
 
9.99*** 
 p.value 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.14 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.06 0.08 
 
0.11 
 
0.01 
 
0.64 0.64 
 
0.15 
 
0.83 
                 Measure 5: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.041*** 
(-3.38) 
-0.036** 
(-2.03) 
 
-0.046** 
(-2.44) 
 
-0.025* 
(-1.77) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.38) 
-0.028 
(-0.77) 
 
0.007 
(0.35) 
 
-0.028 
(-0.59) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.026*** 
(18.48) 
0.026*** 
(18.42) 
 
0.026*** 
(16.33) 
 
0.241*** 
(5.43) 
 
0.052*** 
(11.16) 
0.052*** 
(11.93) 
 
0.052*** 
(18.41) 
 
0.136* 
(1.68) 
 Cross-border 
  
-0.010 
(-0.41) 
      
0.035 
(0.70) 
     F-statistic 
 
34.15*** 17.05*** 
 
26.68*** 
 
29.50*** 
 
13.03*** 6.51*** 
 
35.50*** 
 
2.49 
 p.value 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.12 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.45 0.45 
 
0.55 
 
0.13 
 
0.97 0.97 
 
0.99 
 
0.01 
                 Measure 6: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.002 
(-1.63) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
 
-0.003* 
(-1.76) 
 
0.001 
(0.53) 
 
0.001 
(0.90) 
0.002 
(1.37) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.05) 
 
0.002 
(1.48) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.0003 
(0.60) 
0.0003 
(0.55) 
 
0.0003 
(0.50) 
 
0.318*** 
(3.81) 
 
0.196*** 
(3.11) 
0.194*** 
(3.18) 
 
0.199* 
(1.74) 
 
0.191*** 
(2.68) 
 Cross-border 
  
-0.002 
(-1.02) 
      
-0.002 
(-1.03) 
     F-statistic 
 
0.36 0.70 
 
0.25 
 
14.53*** 
 
9.69*** 5.38** 
 
3.04* 
 
7.17** 
 p.value 
 
0.55 0.50 
 
0.62 
 
0.00 
 
0.002 0.01 
 
0.08 
 
0.01 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.002 -0.001 
 
-0.004 
 
0.07 
 
0.02 0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.03 
                 Measure 7:  
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.022*** 
(-4.62) 
-0.018*** 
(-2.69) 
 
-0.028*** 
(-4.02) 
 
-0.012** 
(-1.98) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.57) 
0.012 
(0.82) 
 
-0.019** 
(-2.42) 
 
0.017 
(0.94) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.443*** 
(11.29) 
0.440*** 
(11.20) 
 
0.604*** 
(10.61) 
 
0.259*** 
(5.03) 
 
0.041* 
(1.67) 
0.033 
(0.55) 
 
0.582*** 
(9.63) 
 
0.226** 
(-2.48) 
 Cross-border 
  
-0.007 
(-0.74) 
      
-0.035* 
(-1.70) 
     F-statistic 
 
12.75*** 63.98*** 
 
11.26*** 
 
25.28*** 
 
0.45 1.67 
 
9.28*** 
 
6.13** 
 p.value 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.50 0.19 
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.20 0.20 
 
0.30 
 
0.09 
 
-0.11 0.003 
 
0.27 
 
0.02 
                 Measure 8: 
                               
Intercept 
 
0.073** 
(2.29) 
0.009 
(0.20) 
 
0.133** 
(2.45) 
 
0.009 
(0.28) 
 
0.070* 
(1.92) 
-0.022 
(-0.43) 
 
0.158*** 
(2.63) 
 
-0.022 
(-0.54) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.041 
(1.54) 
0.043 
(1.60) 
 
0.037 
(0.79) 
 
0.048* 
(1.86) 
 
0.037 
(1.31) 
0.040 
(1.43) 
 
0.036 
(0.79) 
 
0.045 
(1.42) 
 Cross-border 
  
0.124* 
(1.95) 
      
0.181** 
(2.51) 
     F-statistic 
 
2.37 3.09* 
 
0.62 
 
3.45* 
 
1.72 4.03** 
 
0.62 
 
2.00 
 p.value 
 
0.12 0.05 
 
0.43 
 
0.06 
 
0.19 0.02 
 
0.43 
 
0.16 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.003 0.01 
 
-0.001 
 
0.01 
 
0.001 0.01 
 
-0.002 
 
0.004 
                               ***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
AssetsTotal
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𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
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3.4.2.1 Full Sample 
The results for model (1), which represents the full sample, show contradictory results for 
different performance measures. For example, measures 1, 2, 3, 5 and 7 which are all the cash 
flow measures whatever the deflator is, the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by sales and the 
accrual measure deflated by total assets show significant negative differences between the 
post-acquisition and pre-acquisition industry-adjusted performance of acquirer firms. 
Measures 4 and 6 which are the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by total assets and by total 
market value show insignificant changes in the industry-adjusted performance. However, 
measure 8, which is the accrual measure deflated by the book value of equity, shows 
significant positive changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms.  
When the control is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance of firms, the 
results for the full sample shown by model (5) yield no significant changes in the operating 
performance of acquirer firms between the post- and pre-acquisition adjusted performance for 
seven out of the eight measures used. However, measure 8 which is the accrual performance 
measure deflated by the book value of equity, shows positive changes in the operating 
performance of acquirer firms. 
In general, the results for the full sample show significant negative changes in the industry-
adjusted performance of acquirer firms, compared with insignificant changes in the industry, 
size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance of acquirer firms.  
The use of different benchmarks seems to impact greatly on the results of the analysis in 
terms of the existence and size of the changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms. 
For example, the results have shown that the use of industry benchmarks achieves lower 
changes in the operating performance of acquirers in comparison with industry, size and pre-
performance benchmarks. 
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Also, the reason for the contradictory results may be the use of different performance 
measures in conducting the analysis. For example, the significant decrease in the industry-
adjusted performance of acquirer firms is mostly supported by the use of cash flow measures. 
Moreover, the deflator used may also affect the results, since the book value of equity scale 
has shown higher estimates than other deflators as evidenced by the significant positive 
changes in the operating performance of acquirers using the accrual measure deflated by the 
book value of equity.  
3.4.2.2 Cross-border Sample 
The examination of the cross-border sample presented by model (3) shows significant 
negative changes in the industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms for seven 
out of the eight measures used. However, measure 8, which is the accrual measure deflated by 
the book value of equity, shows significant positive changes in the industry-adjusted 
performance of acquirer firms.  
However, the results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance give 
mixed results with insignificant changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms for 
five out of the eight measures used, significant negative changes in operating performance of 
acquirer firms for measures 1 and 7 which are the cash flow measure deflated by total assets 
and the accrual measure deflated by total assets, whereas there are significant positive 
changes in operating performance of acquirer firms using the accrual measure deflated by the 
book value of equity. 
In general, the results for the cross-border sample show similar results to the full sample with 
significant negative changes in the industry-adjusted performance of acquirer firms, whereas 
there are insignificant changes in the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance 
of acquirer firms.  
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3.4.2.3 Domestic Sample 
When the adjustment is made for the industry median performance, the results show 
significant negative changes between the post-acquisition and pre-acquisition performance of 
acquirer firms for measures 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7, which are the cash flow measure deflated by total 
assets and by sales, ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by total assets and sales and the accrual 
measure deflated by total assets. However, measures 3, 6 and 8 show insignificant changes in 
the operating performance of acquirer firms.   
However, when the control is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance in 
model (8) the results show insignificant changes in the operating performance of acquirer 
firms for all the eight performance measures used. 
In general, the results for the domestic sample show significant negative changes in the 
industry-adjusted performance of acquirer firms, whereas there are insignificant changes in 
the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance of acquirer firms.  
The overall results show that when the adjustment is made for the industry median 
performance, the majority of the results show significant negative changes between the post- 
acquisition and pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms for the full, cross-border and 
domestic samples, which suggests a decrease in the operating performance of acquirer firms. 
Alternatively, when a matching benchmark that controls for the industry, size and pre-
acquisition performance of firms is used, most of the results show insignificant changes in the 
operating performance of acquirer firms for the full, cross-border and domestic samples of 
acquirer firms. This implies that the type of benchmark used in the analysis may have an 
impact on the results.  
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3.4.2.4 Cross-border Effect 
When the examination is conducted for the impact of cross-border M&As on the post-
acquisition performance of acquirer firms using model (2), the industry-adjusted operating 
performance of acquirer firms shows insignificant impact of cross-border deals on post-
acquisition performance of acquirer firms for six out of the eight measures used. However, 
measure 4, which is the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by total assets, shows a significant 
negative impact of cross-border deals on post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms, 
whereas measure 8, which is the accrual measure deflated by the book value of equity, shows 
a significant positive impact of cross-border deals on post- acquisition performance of 
acquirer firms.  
When the matching is conducted on the basis of the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance of firms as shown in model (6), the results show significant negative impact of 
cross-border acquisitions on post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms using 
measures 1, 4 and 7, which are the cash flow, the ‘pure’ cash flow and the accrual measure all 
deflated by the book value of total assets. Measure 8, which is the accrual measure deflated by 
the book value of equity, shows a significant positive impact of cross-border acquisitions on 
post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms, whereas measures 2, 3, 5 and 6 
show insignificant impact. 
The results of the industry-adjusted performance as well as the industry, size and pre-
acquisition adjusted performance show insignificant impact of cross-border acquisitions on 
the post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms. This means that there is no significant 
difference between the impacts of cross-border and domestic acquisitions on the operating 
performance of acquirer firms.   
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3.4.2.5 The Relationship between Pre- and Post-acquisition Performance 
The pre-performance shown in Table 3.6, which is the slope coefficient, shows the 
relationship between the post-acquisition adjusted performance and pre-acquisition adjusted 
performance of acquirer firms. Some of those slope coefficients are significant which suggests 
a relationship between the post- and pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms.  
When the adjustment of the operating performance is made only by industry, the results for 
the full and cross-border samples show that four out of the eight measures used have a 
significant positive relationship between the pre- and post-acquisition performance of acquirer 
firms. Those measures are the cash flow, the ‘pure’ cash flow and the accrual measure 
deflated all by total assets, as well as the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by sales. 
However, the other four measures show an insignificant relationship between the post-
acquisition adjusted performance and pre-acquisition adjusted performance of acquirer firms.   
The results for the domestic sample show that all the measures have positive significant 
relationships between the pre- and post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms except 
measure 4 which shows an insignificant relationship. The positive significant relationship 
suggests that high pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms is associated with higher 
post-acquisition performance.  
When the adjustment is made on the basis of industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, 
the results for the full, cross-border and domestic samples show a positive relationship 
between the pre- and post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms for all the measures used 
except measure 8, which is the accrual measure scaled by book value of equity, which shows 
an insignificant relationship.  
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The difference in the results between the two performance benchmarks highlights the 
importance of the adjustment approach and may help in explaining the contradictory results 
across many of the previous studies.  
3.4.3 Change Model vs. Intercept Model Results 
Table 3.7 compares the results of the change and intercept models in order to check whether 
or not the intercept model yields conclusions different from the change model. 
Table 3.7: Change Model vs. Intercept Model 
Measure 
Industry adjusted   Industry, Size and Performance adjusted   
Change model   Intercept model   Change model   Intercept model   
Full CB D   Full CB D   Full CB D   Full CB D   
Measure 1  
 
  +4.9*** +3.7*** +3.2**   -1.9*** -2.5*** -1.0*   +1.7* +1.4 +1.0   -0.6 -2.0*** +1.6   
Measure 2 
 
  +1.2 +1.1 +0.6   -4.5*** -4.1*** -4.5***   +0.2 +0.7 +0.3   +0.1 +1.0 -1.3   
Measure 3     +2.9** +2.1** +2.0**   -0.2** -0.3** -0.01   +2.4** +0.7 +2.5**   -0.01 -0.1 +0.1   
Measure 4     +2.0** +2.5** +0.3   -0.4 -2.3** +2.0**   +1.0 +0.9 +0.5   -0.1 -1.1 +1.3   
Measure 5     +7.6 +0.4 +0.5   -4.1*** -4.6** -2.5*   +1.2 +0.6 +1.0   -0.9 +0.7 -2.8   
Measure 6     +2.1** +1.5 +1.3   -0.2 -0.3* +0.1   +2.5** +1.4 +2.1**   +0.1 -0.01 +0.2   
Measure 7     +4.7*** +3.4 +3.3***   -2.2*** -2.8*** -1.2**   +1.9* +1.5 +1.2   -0.6 -1.9** +1.7   
 Measure 8      +3.1**  +1.5  +3.0***    +7.3**  +13.3**  +0.9    +0.1  +1.0  +1.2    +7.0*  +15.8***  -2.2   
                    
The results presented in Table 3.7 show that the change model gives higher estimates of 
improvements in the industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms than the 
intercept model for the full, cross-border and domestic samples for the majority of the 
measures used. However, measure 8 for the full and cross-border samples which is the accrual 
measure deflated by the book value of equity, shows higher improvements using the intercept 
model over the change model. Meanwhile, measure 4 for the domestic sample, which is the 
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‘pure’ cash flow deflated by the book value of total assets, shows higher improvements using 
the intercept model compared to the change model. 
When the matching is done on the basis of the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, 
mixed results are revealed regarding whether the estimates of operating performance 
improvements are higher when the change model is used versus the intercept model. In 
general, most of the measures show higher estimates of performance improvements for the 
change model in comparison with the intercept model. However, measure 8 for the full 
sample, measures 2, 5 and 8 for the cross-border sample and measures 1, 4 and 7 for the 
domestic sample, show higher estimates of performance improvements for the intercept 
model in comparison with the change model. 
The results from comparing the changes in operating performance of acquirer firms between 
the change model and the intercept model show higher estimates of operating performance 
improvements for the change model in comparison with the intercept model for most of the 
measures used when the adjustment is made for the industry median as well as on the basis of 
the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance.  
3.4.4 Regression Analysis 
The results of the regression tests are presented in Table 3.8 which is conducted using 
different performance measures and benchmarks for the full, cross-border and domestic 
samples of UK acquirers. It investigates whether the post-acquisition performance of acquirer 
firms can be explained by some of the deals’ characteristics using a multiple regression 
analysis. Therefore, the dependent variable is the post-acquisition operating performance of 
acquirer firms adjusted for the industry trends and industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance respectively. The independent variables include some of the deals’ 
characteristics such as the method of payment, industrial relatedness, relative size of target to 
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acquirer firm and whether the acquisition is cross-border or domestic deal. The results are 
summarised in the following table. 
Table 3.8: Regression Analysis of Determinants of Post-acquisition Performance of 
Acquirer Firms 
 
Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
performance adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) 
 
(2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
(6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 1:  
 
                 Intercept 
 
-0.025*** 
(-2.77) 
 
-0.012 
(-1.13) 
 
-0.015 
(-1.29) 
 
-0.029** 
(-2.16) 
 
-0.016 
(-0.71) 
 
0.016 
(0.62) 
 
0.001 
(0.06) 
 
-0.028 
(-0.58) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.352*** 
(9.45) 
 
0.189***
(3.61) 
 
0.511 
(0.98) 
 
0.184*** 
(3.62) 
 
0.104 
(1.51) 
 
-0.214*** 
(-2.62) 
 
0.662 
(1.25) 
 
-0.213* 
(-1.94) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
-0.018** 
(-2.06) 
       
-0.041* 
(-1.96) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
0.316***
(4.36) 
       
0.881*** 
(6.43) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.015 
(1.38) 
 
0.011 
(1.04) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.24) 
 
0.032** 
(2.05) 
 
0.012 
(0.45) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.15) 
 
-0.019 
(-1.17) 
 
0.026 
(0.49) 
   Mix Payment 
 
0.001 
(0.12) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.35) 
 
-0.032** 
(-2.07) 
 
-0.029* 
(1.89) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.20) 
 
-0.019 
(-0.71) 
 
-0.068***
(-3.93) 
 
0.038 
(0.71) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.001 
(0.14) 
 
0.001 
(0.17) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.22) 
 
0.002 
(0.19) 
 
0.019 
(0.89) 
 
0.022 
(1.07) 
 
0.008 
(0.55) 
 
0.039 
(0.99) 
 Relative Size 
 
-0.001 
(-1.27) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.42) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.13) 
 
-0.026 
(-1.60) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.70) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.12) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.070) 
 F-statistic 
 
20.01*** 
 
17.77*** 
 
2.10*** 
 
4.65*** 
 
0.77 
 
6.98*** 
 
3.55*** 
 
1.04 
 p.value 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.001 
 
0.57 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.39 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.17 
 
0.20 
 
0.29 
 
0.07 
 
-0.003 
 
0.08 
 
0.43 
 
0.001 
 
                  Measure 2: 
                                
Intercept 
 
-0.030* 
(-1.74) 
 
-0.025 
(-1.40) 
 
-0.012 
(-0.79) 
 
-0.016 
(-0.55) 
 
-0.007 
(-0.36) 
 
0.004 
(0.16) 
 
-0.018 
(-0.73) 
 
0.019 
(0.58) 
 
Pre-performance 
 
0.031*** 
(3.69) 
 
0.016** 
(2.21) 
 
0.60* 
(1.72) 
 
0.016* 
(1.78) 
 
0.064 
(1.46) 
 
0.023** 
(2.55) 
 
0.065 
(1.52) 
 
0.023** 
(2.47) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
0.020 
(1.37) 
       
-0.013 
(-0.67) 
     
  Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
0.585***
(12.44) 
       
0.041*** 
(4.52) 
     
  Cash Payment 
 
0.006 
(0.30) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.28) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.54) 
 
0.008 
(0.25) 
 
0.013 
(0.54) 
 
0.009 
(0.39) 
 
0.017 
(0.58) 
 
0.005 
(0.13) 
 
  Mix Payment 
 
-0.007 
(-0.35) 
 
-0.016 
(-0.86) 
 
-0.035* 
(-1.79) 
 
0.009 
(0.27) 
 
-0.015 
(-0.63) 
 
-0.025 
(-1.04) 
 
-0.041 
(-1.28) 
 
-0.007 
(-0.18) 
 
  Industrial Relatedness 
 
-0.018 
(-1.06) 
 
-0.021 
(-1.47) 
 
0.007 
(0.47) 
 
-0.054** 
(-2.17) 
 
-0.011 
(-0.59) 
 
-0.015 
(-0.81) 
 
0.006 
(0.23) 
 
-0.038 
(-1.39) 
 
Relative Size 
 
-0.001 
(-0.01) 
 
0.007 
(0.04) 
 
0.001 
(0.14) 
 
-0.036 
(-1.06) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.22) 
 
-0.0003 
(-0.14) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.03) 
 
-0.062* 
(-1.69) 
 F-statistic 
 
3.23** 
 
25.18*** 
 
5.98*** 
 
1.86 
 
4.29*** 
 
3201.37*** 
 
4.69*** 
 
2.34** 
 p.value 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.10 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.04 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.02 
 
0.26 
 
0.55 
 
0.02 
 
0.98 
 
0.98 
 
0.99 
 
0.03 
 
                  
                  
Sales
EBITDA
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
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Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
performance adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) 
 
(2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
(6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 3: 
                                
Intercept 
 
-0.005*** 
(-2.62) 
 
-0.003 
(-1.27) 
 
-0.001** 
(-2.39) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.24) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.42) 
 
0.0003 
(0.14) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.79) 
 
0.001 
(0.55) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.001 
(0.42) 
 
0.406***
(5.44) 
 
0.0002 
(0.21) 
 
0.418*** 
(7.64) 
 
0.298***
(5.10) 
 
0.288*** 
(3.76) 
 
0.299*** 
(2.74) 
 
0.29*** 
(5.08) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
-0.002 
(-1.08) 
       
-0.002 
(-0.89) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
-0.405*** 
(-5.43) 
       
0.021 
(0.18) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.002 
(0.81) 
 
0.001 
(0.59) 
 
0.002 
(0.67) 
 
0.001 
(0.52) 
 
0.001 
(0.07) 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.07) 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.001) 
 
0.001 
(0.14) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.001 
(-0.64) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.50) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.53) 
 
0.001 
(0.06) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.73) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.90) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.79) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.38) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.004** 
(2.51) 
 
0.004** 
(2.14) 
 
0.001***
(2.69) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
 
0.002 
(1.19) 
 
0.002 
(1.13) 
 
0.005 
(1.47) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.25) 
 Relative Size 
 
0.0001 
(0.41) 
 
0.0001 
(0.47) 
 
0.001 
(0.36) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.65) 
 
0.0001 
(0.29) 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.25) 
 
0.0001 
(0.29) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.55) 
 F-statistic 
 
1.71 
 
5.52 
 
1.63 
 
12.40*** 
 
5.94*** 
 
6.88*** 
 
2.27** 
 
5.52*** 
 p.value 
 
0.13 
 
0.00 
 
0.15 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.05 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.01 
 
0.06 
 
0.01 
 
0.20 
 
0.05 
 
0.10 
 
0.03 
 
0.09 
 
                  Measure 4: 
                                
Intercept 
 
-0.005 
(-0.33) 
 
0.030 
(1.56) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.35) 
 
0.023 
(1.01) 
 
0.009 
(0.55) 
 
0.036* 
(1.79) 
 
0.003 
(0.13) 
 
0.038 
(1.49) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.260*** 
(4.95) 
 
0.074 
(0.92) 
 
0.363***
(4.92) 
 
0.084 
(1.18) 
 
0.151***
(2.69) 
 
0.149*** 
(26.89) 
 
0.375*** 
(6.34) 
 
0.148*** 
(3.10) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
-0.048*** 
(-3.06) 
       
-0.033** 
(-2.12) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
0.296***
(2.86) 
       
0.229*** 
(4.29) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.015 
(0.78) 
 
0.009 
(0.48) 
 
0.018 
(0.66) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.23) 
 
0.017 
(0.89) 
 
0.008 
(0.40) 
 
0.020 
(0.74) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.19) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.019 
(-0.99) 
 
-0.031 
(-1.59) 
 
-0.048* 
(-1.67) 
 
-0.018 
(-0.69) 
 
-0.037* 
(-1.85) 
 
-0.047** 
(-2.34) 
 
-0.063** 
(-2.15) 
 
-0.033 
(-1.22) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.001 
(0.07) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.20) 
 
-0.022 
(-0.94) 
 
0.017 
(0.89) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.54) 
 
-0.013 
(-0.84) 
 
-0.012 
(-0.53) 
 
-0.011 
(-0.55) 
 Relative Size 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.27) 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.25) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.02) 
 
-0.031 
(-1.33) 
 
0.0004 
(0.27) 
 
0.005 
(0.03) 
 
0.0003 
(0.15) 
 
-0.022 
(-0.92) 
 F-statistic 
 
6.46*** 
 
6.88*** 
 
6.95*** 
 
1.10 
 
1.45*** 
 
112.65*** 
 
10.23*** 
 
19.33*** 
 p.value 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.36 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.07 
 
0.10 
 
0.13 
 
0.003 
 
0.65 
 
0.67 
 
0.18 
 
0.84 
 
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
TMV
EBITDA
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Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
performance adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) 
 
(2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
(6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 5: 
                                
Intercept 
 
-0.008 
(-0.33) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.21) 
 
0.011 
(0.35) 
 
-0.026 
(-0.73) 
 
0.093 
(1.62) 
 
0.087 
(1.23) 
 
0.048 
(1.11) 
 
0.193 
(1.46) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.293 
(1.08) 
 
0.216***
(4.18) 
 
0.321***
(9.34) 
 
0.218*** 
(4.56) 
 
0.052 
(1.12) 
 
0.123* 
(1.77) 
 
0.052* 
(1.83) 
 
0.123 
(1.35) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
0.002 
(0.08) 
       
0.011 
(0.20) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
0.106* 
(1.75) 
       
-0.071 
(-1.03) 
       Cash Payment 
 
-0.008 
(-0.28) 
 
-0.010 
(-0.35) 
 
-0.013 
(-0.34) 
 
0.002 
(0.04) 
 
-0.013 
(-0.19) 
 
-0.013 
(-0.19) 
 
0.029 
(0.55) 
 
-0.088 
(-0.62) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.025 
(-0.87) 
 
-0.028 
(-0.98) 
 
-0.071* 
(-1.70) 
 
0.020 
(0.50) 
 
-0.138* 
(-2.04) 
 
-0.137* 
(-1.96) 
 
-0.068 
(-1.19) 
 
-0.224 
(-1.58) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
-0.015 
(-0.68) 
 
-0.018 
(-0.79) 
 
-0.024 
(-0.73) 
 
-0.014 
(-0.47) 
 
-0.103 
(-1.95) 
 
-0.102 
(-1.92) 
 
-0.068 
(-1.54) 
 
-0.144 
(-1.42) 
 Relative Size 
 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.09) 
 
0.0002 
(0.09) 
 
-0.038 
(-1.04) 
 
0.002 
(0.39) 
 
0.002 
(0.37) 
 
0.002 
(0.56) 
 
-0.098 
(-0.76) 
 F-statistic 
 
23.89*** 
 
17.56*** 
 
18.51*** 
 
4.83*** 
 
2.50*** 
 
1782.61*** 
 
6.81*** 
 
1.53 
 p.value 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.18 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.23 
 
0.23 
 
0.30 
 
0.09 
 
0.97 
 
0.97 
 
0.99 
 
0.01 
 
                  Measure 6: 
                                
Intercept 
 
-0.001 
(-1.41) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
 
-0.001** 
(-2.13) 
 
0.001 
(1.06) 
 
0.001 
(0.35) 
 
0.003 
(0.97) 
 
-0.003 
(-1.03) 
 
0.001** 
(2.45) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.0003 
(0.52) 
 
0.340***
(2.96) 
 
0.0002 
(0.31) 
 
0.319*** 
(3.16) 
 
0.191***
(2.90) 
 
0.208** 
(2.52) 
 
0.157 
(1.32) 
 
0.218*** 
(2.88) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
-0.003 
(-1.35) 
       
-0.003 
(-1.20) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
-0.339*** 
(-2.96) 
       
-0.053 
(-0.38) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.001 
(0.48) 
 
0.001 
(0.54) 
 
0.001 
(1.27) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.84) 
 
0.002 
(0.62) 
 
0.002 
(0.41) 
 
0.001 
(1.34) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.23) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.003 
(-0.92) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.89) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.33) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.24) 
 
-0.004 
(-1.51) 
 
-0.005* 
(-1.75) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.59) 
 
-0.001** 
(-2.38) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.004 
(1.62) 
 
0.003 
(1.48) 
 
0.001* 
(1.69) 
 
0.001 
(0.28) 
 
0.006 
(0.29) 
 
0.0004 
(0.20) 
 
0.001 
(0.89) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.73) 
 Relative Size 
 
0.002 
(0.66) 
 
0.0002 
(0.73) 
 
0.002 
(0.67) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.24) 
 
0.002 
(0.92) 
 
0.0002 
(1.02) 
 
0.001 
(0.91) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.94) 
 F-statistic 
 
1.03 
 
2.12** 
 
1.11 
 
3.02** 
 
3.09** 
 
2.41** 
 
1.38 
 
3.26** 
 p.value 
 
0.40 
 
0.04 
 
0.36 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.02 
 
0.24 
 
0.01 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.0003 
 
0.02 
 
0.003 
 
0.05 
 
0.03 
 
0.03 
 
0.01 
 
0.06 
 
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
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Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
performance adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) 
 
(2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
(6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 7: 
                                
Intercept 
 
-0.027*** 
(-2.68) 
 
-0.012 
(-1.03) 
 
-0.011 
(-0.81) 
 
-0.042*** 
(-2.89) 
 
-0.017 
(-0.76) 
 
0.013 
(0.49) 
 
0.002 
(0.15) 
 
-0.039 
(-0.82) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.427 
(1.04) 
 
0.225***
(3.89) 
 
0.616 
(1.02) 
 
0.227*** 
(4.42) 
 
0.009 
(0.13) 
 
-0.247*** 
(-3.38) 
 
0.662*** 
(9.72) 
 
-0.253*** 
(-2.65) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
-0.019* 
(-1.90) 
       
-0.040* 
(-1.92) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
0.385***
(4.80) 
       
0.916*** 
(6.53) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.021* 
(1.73) 
 
0.015 
(1.30) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.38) 
 
0.050*** 
(3.15) 
 
0.016 
(0.59) 
 
0.001 
(0.06) 
 
-0.019 
(-0.98) 
 
0.040 
(0.77) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.003 
(-0.21) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.63) 
 
-0.051*** 
(-2.83) 
 
-0.045***
(2.84) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.29) 
 
-0.016 
(-0.61) 
 
-0.076***
(-3.65) 
 
0.053 
(1.04) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
-0.002 
(-0.18) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.10) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.16) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.28) 
 
0.022 
(1.02) 
 
0.026 
(1.25) 
 
0.012 
(0.72) 
 
0.042 
(1.09) 
 Relative Size 
 
-0.001 
(-1.23) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.33) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.93) 
 
-0.027* 
(-1.67) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.35) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.61) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.74) 
 
-0.007 
(-0.13) 
 F-statistic 
 
24.39*** 
 
21.62*** 
 
23.91*** 
 
7.01*** 
 
0.39 
 
6.86*** 
 
22.45*** 
 
1.78 
 p.value 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.85 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.12 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.20 
 
0.23 
 
0.32 
 
0.12 
 
-0.01 
 
0.08 
 
0.32 
 
0.02 
 
                  Measure 8: 
                                
Intercept 
 
0.168** 
(2.40) 
 
0.096 
(1.15) 
 
0.334*** 
(3.08) 
 
-0.086 
(-1.05) 
 
0.157 
(1.94) 
 
0.051 
(0.51) 
 
0.317** 
(2.64) 
 
-0.109 
(-1.01) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.047* 
(1.71) 
 
0.052 
(1.35) 
 
0.042 
(0.87) 
 
0.039 
(1.44) 
 
0.048* 
(1.66) 
 
0.050 
(1.18) 
 
0.041 
(0.85) 
 
0.036 
(1.07) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
0.107 
(1.57) 
       
0.156** 
(1.99) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
-0.009 
(-0.16) 
       
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
       Cash Payment 
 
-0.030 
(-0.36) 
 
-0.016 
(-0.19) 
 
-0.139 
(-1.04) 
 
0.148 
(1.62) 
 
-0.023 
(-0.25) 
 
0.002 
(0.02) 
 
-0.134 
(-0.90) 
 
0.169 
(1.43) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.089 
(-1.05) 
 
-0.068 
(-0.79) 
 
-0.181 
(-1.26) 
 
0.092 
(1.01) 
 
-0.132 
(-1.36) 
 
-0.095 
(-0.95) 
 
-0.113 
(-0.71) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.07) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
-0.099 
(-1.48) 
 
-0.09 
(-1.35) 
 
-0.209 
(-1.82) 
 
0.019 
(0.28) 
 
-0.059 
(-0.77) 
 
-0.048 
(-0.63) 
 
-0.168 
(-1.33) 
 
0.059 
(0.69) 
 Relative Size 
 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.27) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
 
-0.048 
(-0.53) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.05) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.19) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.13) 
 
-0.021 
(-0.18) 
 F-statistic 
 
1.26 
 
1.26 
 
1.24 
 
1.25 
 
1.07 
 
1.35 
 
0.75 
 
1.32 
 p.value 
 
0.28 
 
0.27 
 
0.29 
 
0.29 
 
0.38 
 
0.23 
 
0.59 
 
0.26 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.003 
 
0.004 
 
0.01 
 
0.01 
 
0.001 
 
0.01 
 
-0.01 
 
0.01 
                                  
 
Values between brackets are t-statistics.  
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
CB: Cross-border sample  
D: Domestic sample 
 
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
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3.4.4.1 Full Sample 
Models (1) and (5) in Table 3.8 present the results of the impact of some of the deal 
characteristics on the post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms for the full 
sample using different performance measures and two benchmarks that control for the 
industry and industry, size and pre-acquisition performance respectively. 
Models (2) and (6) expand the examination conducted by models (1) and (5) by including a 
cross-border dummy variable and another variable which is a cross-border dummy variable 
multiplied by the pre-acquisition adjusted performance which examines whether there is any 
significant difference between the impact of pre-acquisition adjusted performance on post-
acquisition adjusted performance between domestic mergers and acquisitions and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions.  
The results for the industry-adjusted performance shown by model (1) show significant 
positive impact from industrial relatedness for measure 3, which is the cash flow measure 
deflated by total market value, and positive impact from the cash payment method using 
measures 7, which is the accrual measure deflated by total assets. However, other measures 
didn’t show any significant impact of the deal characteristics on the post-acquisition adjusted 
performance of acquirer firms.  
Moreover, model (2) shows a significant negative impact of cross-border acquisitions on the 
post-acquisition performance of firms using measures 1, 4 and 7, which are the cash flow 
measure deflated by total assets, the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by total assets and the 
accrual measure deflated by total assets.  
Also, the difference between the impact of pre-acquisition performance on post-acquisition 
performance between cross-border and domestic acquirers presented in model (2) shows a 
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positive significant impact for five out of the eight measures used, insignificant impact for 
measure 8, whereas there is significant negative impact for measures 3 and 6, which are the 
cash flow and ‘pure’ cash flow measures deflated both by total market value. 
The results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance presented by model 
(5) show significant negative impact from the mixed payment method on the post-acquisition 
performance of acquirer firms using measures 4 and 5, which are the ‘pure’ cash flow 
measure deflated by total assets and sales respectively.  
The results for model (6) also show significant negative impact of cross-border acquisition on 
post-acquisition performance using measures 1, 4 and 7, which are the cash flow, ‘pure’ cash 
flow and accrual measures all deflated by total assets. However, measure 8, which is the 
accrual measure deflated by the book value of equity, shows positive impact of cross-border 
acquisitions on post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms. The results for the difference 
between the impacts of pre-acquisition performance on post-acquisition performance of 
acquirer firms for cross-border and domestic acquisitions show significant positive impacts 
using four out of the eight measures used, which are the cash flow measures deflated by total 
assets and sales, the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by total assets and the accrual measure 
deflated by total assets. However, the other measures show insignificant results.  
3.4.4.2 Cross-border Sample 
Models (3) and (7) in Table 3.8 examine the impact of some of the deal characteristics on the 
post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms involved in the cross-border M&As 
using different performance measures and two benchmarks that control for the industry and 
industry, size and pre-acquisition performance respectively. 
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The results for the industry-adjusted performance shown by model (3) show significant 
negative impact from the mixed payment method on the post-acquisition performance of 
acquirer firms for measures 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7. Meanwhile, measures 3 and 6, which are the cash 
flow and ‘pure’ cash flow measures deflated by total market value, show a significant positive 
impact from the industrial relatedness on post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms.  
However, the results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance presented 
by model (7) show a significant negative impact from the mixed payment method on the post-
acquisition performance of firms using measures 1, 4 and 7, which are the cash flow, the 
‘pure’ cash flow and the accrual measure all deflated by total assets.  
3.4.4.3 Domestic Sample 
Models (4) and (8) in Table 3.8 examine the impact of some of the deal characteristics on the 
post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms involved in domestic acquisitions 
using different performance measures and two benchmarks that control for the industry and 
industry, size and pre-acquisition performance respectively. 
When the adjustment is made for the industry, the results presented in model (4) show a 
positive impact of the cash payment method and a significant negative impact of the mixed 
payment method using measures 1 and 7, which are the cash flow and the accrual measure 
both deflated by total assets. Also, measures 2 and 7, which are the cash flow measure 
deflated by sales and the accrual measure deflated by total assets, show a significant negative 
impact from the industrial relatedness and the relative size respectively on the post acquisition 
performance of acquirer firms. 
When the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance as shown 
in model (8), the results show a significant negative impact from the relative size of targets to 
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acquirers for measure 2, which is the cash flow deflated by sales. Measure 6, which is the 
‘pure’ cash flow deflated by total market value, shows a significant negative impact from the 
mixed payment method on the post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms. However, other 
measures don’t show any significant impact of the deal characteristics on the post-acquisition 
performance of acquirer firms. 
The overall results of the regression analysis show a negative impact of cross-border 
acquisitions on the post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms when the book value of 
total assets is used as a deflator. However, the other measures do not show any significant 
difference between the impacts of cross-border and domestic acquisitions on the operating 
performance of acquirer firms.  
The results show an impact of the payment method on the post-acquisition performance of 
acquirer firms being positive for the cash method of payment and negative for other means of 
payment, especially when the industry benchmark is used. However, the remaining results 
have provided little evidence about the ability of any of the other deal characteristics to 
explain the post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms across all the different performance 
measures, deflators and benchmarks used. 
3.5 Summary of the Results and Conclusions  
This chapter examines the changes in operating performance of acquirer firms using a sample 
of 555 acquirer firms in the period 1996-2003 with the main emphasis on testing whether the 
type of acquisition being domestic or cross-border has a different impact on the acquirer 
firms’ performance. The pre- and post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms is 
examined using cash flow, ‘pure’ cash flow and accrual performance measures relative to 
benchmarks which control for the industry as well as the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance. Two models have been used in assessing changes in operating performance for 
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the full, cross-border and domestic samples of acquirer firms, which are the change model and 
the intercept model. 
The results from the examination of the operating performance of 555 acquirer firms show 
insignificant differences between the impacts of domestic and cross-border acquisitions on the 
operating performance of acquirer firms for most of the measures used.  
Considering the changes in operating performance of acquirer firms, the results show that 
when the adjustment is made for the industry median performance, the change model shows 
significant improvements in the operating performance of acquirer firms for the full and 
domestic samples compared with insignificant changes for the cross-border sample. When the 
intercept model is used, the results show the opposite with significant decrease in the 
operating performance of acquirer firms in the full, domestic and cross-border samples. 
However, when the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, 
most of the results for the change model and the intercept model show insignificant changes 
in the operating performance of acquirer firms in the full, cross-border and domestic samples.  
The results show that the type of acquisition being domestic or cross-border does make a 
difference in the variations between the operating performance of companies, since cross-
border acquisitions show either a negative impact on the post-acquisition operating 
performance of acquirer firms or an insignificant impact depending on the performance 
measure and deflator used. However, most of the measures do not show any significant 
differences between the impacts of cross-border and domestic acquisitions on the operating 
performance of acquirer firms.  
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The results for the regression analysis show some significant results for the payment method 
on the post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms being significantly positive 
for the cash method of payment and significantly negative for the mixed payment method for 
most of the measures used, whereas the other characteristics have shown little impact on the 
post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms. Therefore, the significant impact of the 
payment method on the post-acquisition performance of firms supports the Myers and 
Majluf’s hypothesis (1984) who considered that the method of payment represents an 
information signal to the market.  
The results in this chapter show some differences with the previous literature such as 
Pazarskis et al. (2006), Mantravadi and Reddy (2008) and Ismail et al. (2011) since they do 
not adjust for the impacts of the industry median or the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance in their analysis and they examine non-UK acquirers which may affect the 
results.  
Also, the results for the industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms in the full 
sample contradict with those of Selcuk and Yelmaz (2011). Their results show significant 
decrease in the industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms using the change 
model, whereas insignificant changes using the intercept model. On the other hand, the results 
for the full sample of acquirers presented in this chapter show significant increase in the 
industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirers using the change model, whereas 
significant decrease in the operating performance using the intercept model. 
The potential reason for the contradictory results stems from the difference in the performance 
measures used as well as the country of the acquirer, since Selcuk and Yelmaz (2011) 
examine Turkish acquirer firms whereas this study examines acquirer firms from the UK, 
which may impact the results. 
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In general, the differences in the results show that the type of the benchmark as well as the 
model used in the analysis, whether being the change model or the intercept model, has 
different impacts on the results, which may help to explain the contradictory results of the 
previous studies. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE IMPACTS OF CROSS-BORDER 
AND DOMESTIC MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS ON THE 
OPERATING PERFORMANCE OF COMBINED FIRMS 
 
4.1. Introduction 
Within the increased levels of globalisation in the world’s economies nowadays, the need for 
improving the competitiveness and the competitive advantage for the corporates worldwide 
has become an important issue so as to grow profitably. Building these new competencies 
may be achieved by entering new markets and geographies and by gaining greater market 
share through mergers and acquisitions which represent important corporate strategy actions 
(Ramakrishnan, 2008).  
Therefore, it is important to understand the possible consequences of merger and acquisition 
deals and whether or not they have resulted in better performance, since only this 
improvement makes the use of mergers reasonable as a corporate strategy (Ramakrishnan, 
2008). 
Few studies have been conducted to examine the operating performance of firms following 
M&A transactions (Sudarsanam, 2010), especially those involved in cross-border M&As. 
Moreover, those studies haven’t given a clear idea as to whether takeovers result in operating 
performance improvements or not (Powell and Stark, 2005) and whether M&A transactions 
affect the operating performance of firms involved in cross-border deals differently than 
domestic M&As. 
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Healy et al. (1992) reported significant improvements in the post-takeover industry adjusted 
operating performance of US firms involved in domestic acquisitions between 1979 and 1984. 
They measured the operating performance using the intercept model by regressing the post-
takeover industry-adjusted performance on the pre-takeover adjusted performance of the 
combined acquirer and target firms. Other studies have followed Healy et al. (1992) by using 
the industry benchmarks such as Linn and Switzer (2001) but using a different methodology, 
which is the change model, in order to estimate improvements in the performance of firms 
reflected by the differences between the post-acquisition adjusted performance and the 
combined acquirer and target pre-acquisition adjusted performance. Their results have shown 
significant improvements in the industry-adjusted operating performance of firms similarly to 
Healy et al. (1992). 
Other studies have adopted the same procedures and documented improvements in the 
industry-adjusted operating performance of firms. The existence of such improvements has 
been questioned by Ghosh (2001) who argued that using industry benchmarks in the 
examination caused a bias in the results because industry benchmarks have no control for the 
firm size and pre-acquisition performance. 
Ghosh (2001) examined a sample of US domestic M&As by using the change model and 
controlled for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance with results showing no 
significant changes between post- and pre-acquisition performance of firms, which contradicts 
with the previous studies results. 
Previous studies which were conducted to examine the operating performance of combined 
firms have shown mixed results regarding changes in operating performance of firms 
following M&As. Some of them document significant improvements in the post-acquisition 
performance of firms (Healy et al., 1992; Powell and Stark, 2005), others report significant 
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decreases in the operating performance of firms (Dickerson et al., 1997), whereas the others 
show insignificant changes in performance of firms (Ghosh, 2001; Sharma and Ho, 2002). 
Those previous studies haven’t differentiated between domestic and cross-border M&As in 
their examinations and haven’t provided any clear idea about whether there is any difference 
between the impacts of cross-border and domestic M&As on the operating performance of 
combined firms, which makes it a major gap in the literature that needs to be filled.   
The previous chapter has dealt with the issue of the operating performance of acquirer firms 
only and whether there is any significant difference in those operating performances between 
cross-border and domestic acquisitions. The examination has been conducted using different 
performance measures and techniques with the results in general showing insignificant 
differences between the impacts of domestic and cross-border acquisitions on the operating 
performance of acquirer firms for most of the measures used. 
The examination in the previous chapter concerns the changes in the operating performance of 
acquirer firms only. However, this chapter will include both the acquirer and target firms in 
order to examine the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the operating performance of the 
combined firms. The examination is conducted by using some pre- acquisition and post-
acquisition operating performance measures to check whether there is any difference in the 
changes in operating performance of combined firms engaged in domestic and foreign 
acquisitions.  
More specifically, the aims and purposes of this chapter are as follows: 
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• Firstly, to examine whether there are any significant differences between the impacts of 
domestic and cross-border M&As on the operating performances of UK acquirers and 
targets combined.  
• Secondly, to find out whether the impacts of domestic and cross-border M&As on the 
operating performance of UK acquirers only are different from their impacts on the 
operating performance of UK acquirers and targets combined. 
• Thirdly, is to investigate whether there is any significant impact of some of the deal 
characteristics such as the method of payment, relative size and industrial relatedness on 
the post-acquisition operating performance of combined firms.  
In order to achieve the objectives of this chapter, the examination will be based on two types 
of analyses. Analysis (A) examines the operating performance of acquirer and target firms 
that have operating performance data available on the Datastream database for at least one 
year before and one year after the acquisition. The sample for this analysis is based on 98 
pairs of acquirer and target firms comprising 59 pairs engaged in domestic mergers and 
acquisitions and 39 pairs involved in cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
Analysis (B) examines the operating performance of acquirer firms only that have been 
included in the examination in analysis (A) for the main reason of checking whether or not 
excluding the target firms from the analysis has any impact on the results, especially with all 
the related complicated and time consuming issues from including the target firms and their 
peers in the analysis. The sample for this analysis is based on 98 acquirer firms comprising 59 
acquirers engaged in domestic mergers and acquisitions and 39 acquirers involved in cross-
border mergers and acquisitions. 
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The reason for splitting the sample and carrying out Analysis (A) and Analysis (B) in this 
chapter is to check whether adding the data of the targets to the data of acquirers would make 
a difference to the results that will be obtained with the data of the acquirers only. The 
comparison is conducted in order to find out whether the impacts of domestic and cross-
border M&As on the operating performance of UK acquirers only are qualitatively different 
from their impacts on the operating performance of UK acquirers and targets combined. 
The chapter is organised as follows: Section 4.2 discusses the previous empirical literature on 
the operating performance of combined firms involved in domestic and cross-border mergers 
and acquisitions. Section 4.3 describes the data sample selection procedure and methodology 
used to measure changes in the operating performance of combined firms. Section 4.4 
presents the main empirical results for both analysis (A) and analysis (B) regarding changes in 
the operating performance of firms. Section 4.5, which is the final section, summarizes the 
key findings and results of the chapter. 
4.2. Literature Review 
Since the theories discussed in chapter two also apply to this chapter, this section will include 
only an overview of the previous empirical studies conducted on the operating performance of 
combined firms following corporate acquisitions. 
The assessment of the performance of mergers and acquisitions has been conducted using 
different measures and methods in the previous studies. It has been done through either the 
examination of some market-based financial measures, such as stock returns, or through the 
examination of some accounting measures, such as cash flow returns and other financial ratios 
(Ramakrishnan, 2008).  
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Very few studies have examined changes in operating performance post-mergers, taking into 
consideration that Healy et al. (1992) had perhaps conducted the most notable study in 
examining the changes in operating performance around the acquisition (Ghosh, 2001). 
The reason why a number of previous researches which used share price data in studying the 
takeover performance of firms exceeded that which used accounting data measures may be 
related to a number of reasons. Tuch and O’Sullivan (2007) mentioned two such suggested 
reasons, which are the difficulty of comparing the accounting performance measures and the 
sensitivity of accounting information measures which could be easily influenced by any 
managerial manipulation and any changes in the accounting policies. 
However, a number of other researchers argue that the firm’s accounting records will reflect 
any benefit resulting from the takeover activity and therefore prefer the use of accounting 
information in measuring long-term effect of acquisition on the operating performance of 
firms (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). Studies which are conducted using accounting 
performance measures use statutory accounting returns. Thus, the minimum period used is 
twelve months after the bid and, in some studies, performance is tracked up to seven years 
after that (Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). 
Previous studies have been carried out to examine the performance of the merged firms and 
whether their performance has enhanced or deteriorated after the announcement or completion 
of the merger deals as compared to before the event. However, those studies haven’t 
differentiated between the impacts of domestic and cross-border M&As on the operating 
performance of combined firms. Therefore, the results of those previous studies which yielded 
different conclusions for different countries will be discussed below for the US, Europe, other 
countries and the UK.  
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4.2.1 Performance of US Mergers and Acquisitions 
Some studies have been conducted to check the impact of takeovers on the operating 
performance of firms in the US. However, the previous studies on post-takeover performance 
for US corporates show contradictory results (Martynova et al., 2007). Earlier studies in the 
US, such as those conducted by Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987) and Herman and Lowenstein 
(1988), didn’t show any operating performance enhancement following M&A transactions. 
However, the most recent US studies conducted for bidding and target firms show either 
significant improvements in the profitability (Heron and Lie, 2002; Linn and Switzer, 2001) 
or insignificant changes in the operating performance of bidding and target firms (Ghosh, 
2001; Moeller and Schlingemann, 2005).  
Healy et al. (1992) argued that those earlier studies that didn’t show improvements in 
operating performance following mergers had some methodological problems that made their 
results difficult to interpret. In order to avoid those various problems, Healy et al. (1992) used 
a different research design than earlier studies and concluded that there was a significant 
improvement in the operating performance of merging firms. 
Healy et al. (1992) examined the post-acquisition performance of 50 US domestic mergers for 
the period between 1979 and mid-1984. In their examination, they used pre-tax operating cash 
flow returns on assets in order to measure operating performance improvements. They defined 
the operating cash flow as “sales, minus cost of goods sold and selling and administrative 
expenses, plus depreciation and goodwill expenses” (Healy et al., 1992, p.139). They deflated 
the cash flow measure by the market value of assets and focused in their analysis on the 
median values for the five years pre- and five years post-acquisition. They regressed the post-
acquisition industry-adjusted cash flow of merging firms on the adjusted pre-acquisition cash 
flow and estimated cash flow performance improvements as the intercept of this regression. 
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Using this methodology, their results showed that merged firms had an increase in post-
acquisition cash flow performance in comparison with their industries by 2.8%. 
Healy et al. (1992) also examined the impact of the payment method on changes in operating 
performance of the merging firms using a sample that included 13 mergers out of 50 which 
involved cash offers. Their results didn’t show any relation between the method of payment 
and the changes in performance. However, their results might be affected by the small and 
selective sample that they examined (Linn and Switzer, 2001).  
Linn and Switzer (2001) examined the change in operating performance of merging firms and 
the relationship between this change and whether the acquiring firms offered cash or stock as 
a payment method. They used in their examination a sample which included 413 
combinations occurring between 1967 and 1987 in the US. 
As a measure of operating performance they used a pre-tax cash flow return on assets which 
was defined as “after tax income before extraordinary items, plus depreciation and 
amortization charges, net interest expense (interest expense – interest income) and total 
income taxes” (Linn and Switzer, 2001, p.1118). This cash flow measure was also scaled by 
the market value of assets to create the cash flow return on assets.  
They used the change model to estimate improvements in the operating performance of firms 
for two overlapping samples. One of them was when the bidder and target firms had operating 
performance data for at least one common year of the five years preceding the merger, and for 
which the merged firm had operating data available for at least one of the five years following 
the merger. The other sample contained bidders and targets that had operating data over the 
five consecutive years prior the merger and where the merged firm had operating data for 
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each of the five consecutive years following the combination. However, Linn and Switzer 
(2001) showed that this latter sample comes at a cost of some ‘‘potential selection bias’’. 
Their results generally showed significant improvements in the industry-adjusted operating 
cash flows by 1.8 % per year with the change in operating performance of merging firms 
being significantly higher for deals in which the acquiring firm offered cash (3.145%) in 
comparison to stock offers (0.77%). Also, Linn and Switzer (2001) showed better 
performance from acquiring large targets than the acquisition of small targets. 
However, the results which showed improvements in operating performance of firms 
following mergers, especially those measured relative to industry benchmarks, were 
questioned by Ghosh (2001) who argued that these results might be biased because of the 
existence of some permanent and temporary factors over the pre-acquisition years that may 
cause merging firms to outperform industry-median firms. The argument for this is that 
acquiring firms in general tend to be larger than their industry counterparts in size and they try 
to time their takeover strategy during periods of superior performance which will affect the 
results. 
The arguments of Ghosh (2001) are very similar to the previous suggestions of Barber and 
Lyon (1996) who concluded on the importance of choosing control firms matched on pre-
event performance and size in order to achieve powerful and well specified test statistics. 
Ghosh (2001) examined a sample of 315 pairs of domestic target and acquiring firms in the 
United States for mergers completed during the period 1981 and 1995. In order to examine 
the operating performance of merging firms, he used an operating cash flow measure defined 
in a similar way as the one used in Healy et al. (1992), which is “sales minus cost of goods 
sold, minus selling and administrative expenses, plus depreciation and goodwill amortization 
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expenses” (Ghosh, 2001, p.154). Also, he deflated the cash flow measure by the market value 
of assets and sales and used a benchmark of control firms matched on similar operating cash 
flow performance and total asset size before the acquisition in order to compare the pre- and 
post-acquisition performance of merging firms. 
The results of the examination didn’t show any evidence of operating performance 
improvements following acquisitions, which contrasts Healy et al. (1992) results. Therefore, 
Ghosh (2001) concluded the importance of the adjustment for the size and pre-acquisition 
performance in the examination in order to avoid drawing biased results. 
Ghosh (2001) also analyzed whether the method of payment used in the acquisition had any 
impact on the performance of merging firms. He found significant increases in operating 
performance of merging firms following cash acquisitions, whereas there were decreases in 
cash flows for stock acquisitions. 
Heron and Lie (2002) examined a sample of US takeovers comprising 859 acquisitions made 
by 657 different acquirers between January 1985 and December 1997. Their main 
consideration was to investigate the relationship between the operating performance of firms 
and the method of payment in acquisitions. 
They measured operating performance as operating income scaled by sales and compare the 
operating performance of their sample firms with two benchmarks that control for the industry 
and the industry and pre-event performance. They used a change model to examine a time 
period of three years before and three years after the acquisition. The results suggested that 
acquiring firms significantly outperform industry-median firms and control firms matched on 
industry and pre-event performance following the acquisition.  
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Considering the method of payment, the results didn’t show any significant difference in the 
operating performance of firms across the different payment methods whether being cash, 
mixed or stock payments, which contradicts other previous studies that reported operating 
performance improvements for firms using cash payment methods in comparison with firms 
paying in stock. 
Ramaswamy and Waegelein (2003) examined the long-term post-merger financial 
performance of US combined firms by using a sample of 162 publicly traded firms involved 
in domestic acquisitions between 1975 and 1990. Their study also aimed to determine the 
factors which may affect the performance of firms by examining whether there was any 
difference in the post-merger financial performance of the combined firms across different 
methods of payment, relative size of target to acquirer firm, industrial relatedness, 
compensation plans, hostile acquisitions, and time.  
In their examination, they covered a five-year pre-merger and five-year post-merger period 
and used cash flow returns on market value of assets as a measure of operating performance. 
They defined operating cash flows as “sales revenues minus cost of goods sold and selling, 
general and administration expenses. This operating cash flow is arrived at before deducting 
depreciation, interest expense, income taxes and extraordinary losses as well as before adding 
extraordinary gains, interest income and non-operating revenues” (Ramaswamy and 
Waegelein, 2003, p. 119). The market value of assets was computed as the sum of the market 
value of common stock, the book value of debt and the preferred stock. 
After using the industry median values as a benchmark, the results showed positive significant 
improvements in the post-merger performance of the full sample of firms as in Healy et al. 
(1992). Also, they found a negative significant relationship between the relative size of targets 
to acquirers, from industrial relatedness of acquirer and target firms and from the merger year 
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on the post-merger performance of firms. However, they found a significant positive impact 
on the post-merger performance of firms from the existence of long-term incentive 
compensation plans for managers, whereas there was no significant impact from the method 
of payment and the hostile acquisitions on the post-merger performance. Ramaswamy and 
Waegelein (2003) concluded that their results might have been affected by the operating 
performance measure used in their analysis. 
4.2.2 Performance of European Mergers and Acquisitions  
Martynova et al. (2007) examined the long-term profitability of a sample of 155 pairs of 
acquirer and target firms involved in intra-European domestic and cross-border M&As 
between 1997 and 2001. 
In their examination they applied four measures of operating performance which were 
EBITDA and EBITDA adjusted for changes in working capital, each scaled by the book value 
of total assets and by sales as follows: EBITDA / BVassets, EBITDA / Sales, (EBITDA – ΔWC 
) / BV assets & (EBITDA – ΔWC ) / Sales. 
They employed the change model and the intercept model to assess the changes in the 
operating performance of the combined firm. Their results showed an outperformance of both 
acquiring and target firms over their industry median peers in the pre-takeover period, 
whereas a significant decrease in the profitability of combined firms following the takeover. 
However, when the control is done on the basis of the industry, size and pre-event 
performance, the decrease in the operating performance became insignificant.  
When the examination was carried out for the impact of deal characteristics, Martynova et al. 
(2007) found insignificant differences in the profitability of firms that employed different 
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methods of payment and insignificant difference in the post-merger profitability of related and 
unrelated acquisitions. 
Considering the relative size of acquirers to targets, Martynova et al., (2007) have results 
which show significant outperformance of relatively large takeovers over smaller peers. 
However, although there is an increase in the post-merger profitability with the size, the 
increase is not linear since they find that the very large acquisitions are less profitable than the 
medium-sized acquisitions whereas the smallest acquisitions have a significant negative 
impact on the operating performance of the combined firms. 
They explain the lower results for the very large mergers and acquisitions by the idea that 
managing a very large newly created firm might have problems that outweigh the benefits of 
the takeover and thus worsen the profitability of the combined firm.  
4.2.3 Performance of Mergers and Acquisitions in Other Countries 
Sharma and Ho (2002) examined the operating performance of a sample of 36 Australian 
public companies which occurred during the period 1986 to 1991. They used operating cash 
flow before tax as the primary measure of performance which was represented by four accrual 
(earnings based) performance measures and four cash flow operating performance measures. 
The accrual measures were Return on Total Assets (ROA), Return on Ordinary Shareholders' 
Equity (ROE), Profit Margin (PM) and Earnings Per Share (EPS).The cash flow measures are 
Cash Flow Return on Assets (CFFO/TA), Cash Flow Return from Sales (CFFO/SALES), 
Cash Flow Return on Average Ordinary Shareholders' Equity (CFFO/AOSE) and (Cash Flow 
from Operations Minus Preference Dividends) on Number of Ordinary Shares (CFFO/NOS). 
They made an observation over three years prior and three years after the acquisition and used 
control firms matched on industry and asset size. The results were uniform across both accrual 
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and cash flow performance measures since they didn’t show any improvement in corporate 
operating performance for the sample and period examined.  
Kumar and Rajib (2007) examined a sample of 57 large mergers in India which took place in 
the period 1995-2002. They conducted their study by comparing the pre- and post-acquisition 
cash flow performance of merging firms with that of matched firms and used the pre- 
acquisition performance and asset size as the basis for their matching.  
As a performance measure, they used cash flow measure deflated by the market value of 
assets, book value of assets and sales value. Their results showed performance improvements 
following mergers using measures based on book value of assets and sales whereas the market 
value of assets-based measure didn’t show any improvement in operating performance after 
mergers. 
Ramakrishnan (2008) examined the impact of mergers and acquisitions on the operating 
performance of 87 pairs of acquirer and target firms who were involved in domestic mergers 
and acquisitions in India between 1993 and 2005. In their examination, they used the 
operating cash flow measure scaled by the operating assets over a period of three years before 
and three years after the acquisition.  
After adjusting for the median industry operating performance, their results showed that in 
general, there was an improvement in the long-term post-acquisition operating performance of 
Indian firms reflected in the significant positive mean difference of 2.8% between the post-
acquisition and pre-acquisition industry-adjusted cash flows.  
Yen and Andre (2010) examined the impact of concentrated ownership on corporate 
performance of firms using a sample of 69 deals made by 46 acquiring firms over the time 
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period 1998-2004. The sample included acquiring firms from thirteen emerging market 
countries which were Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Philippines, Russian Fed, South Africa, Taiwan and Thailand. 
As a measure of operating performance, they used pre-tax operating cash flow which was 
defined as “operating income after depreciation plus depreciation and goodwill amortization, 
i.e. EBITDA” (Yen and Andre, 2010, p.222). They divided the cash flow measure by the 
market value of assets then computed operating cash flow returns for each company up to 
three years pre- and three years after the acquisition event and used a benchmark with controls 
for the industry, size and pre-performance. 
The results showed that firms with controlling shareholders (especially holding ownership 
between 25%-30%) experienced improvements in post-acquisition operating performance 
over the three year period after the acquisition, whereas holders of less than 25% or more than 
30% ownership experienced insignificant changes in operating performance. 
4.2.4 Performance of UK Mergers and Acquisitions 
Very few studies have been conducted for the UK companies and they have shown more 
contradictory results than those conducted for the US with some results showing a significant 
decrease in the post-acquisition performance, such as Dickerson et al. (1997), and others 
showing a significant growth, such as Powell and Stark (2005). 
Meeks (1977) made one of the earliest studies on the accounting performance of 233 UK 
acquirers who were engaged in mergers and acquisitions between 1964 and 1972. His study 
was on the post-bid accounting performance over the period 0 to +7 years after the bid. He 
found significant positive abnormal profits of 0.114% in the year of the takeover which 
reflected an increase in the profitability. However, the results showed a decrease in the 
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profitability over the years +1 to +5 with significant abnormal losses between -0.035% and -
0.109% and insignificant returns over the years 6 and 7 following the bid. 
Dickerson et al. (1997) examined the performance of UK companies using a comprehensive 
sample of acquisitions which took place between 1948 and 1977. They studied the post-bid 
performance of acquirers over the period 0 to +18 years. They found that on average, a firm’s 
profitability decreased by approximately 2.04% per year in the post-bid period. Also, they 
found that acquirer firms underperformed non-acquirers and had significant lower returns.  
Powell and Stark (2005) examined the post-acquisition operating performance of a sample of 
191 takeovers made by UK acquirers over the period January 1985 to July 1993 for the 
purpose of comparing between the different performance measures and benchmarks. 
In their examination they used two performance measures which were a pre-depreciation 
profit and a pre-depreciation profit corrected for changes in working capital. As a deflator for 
those measures, they employed four different deflators, which were total market value, total 
market value adjusted for market reaction to the takeover, total sales and book value of total 
assets.   
Two performance benchmarks were used, which were an industry median benchmark and 
another benchmark with controls for industry, size and prior operating performance. Also, two 
models have been used in examining changes in operating performance which are the Healy 
et al. (1992) regression-based model as well as the change model. 
In general, their results show significant improvements in the operating performance of firms 
with improvements being higher for the regression-based method in comparison with the 
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change model. Also, they concluded that their results were sensitive to the performance 
measures, deflators, methodologies and models of expected performance used. 
Previous empirical studies which examined changes in operating performance following 
corporate acquisitions have yielded contradictory results, with findings ranging from slightly 
positive (Healy et al., 1992; Powell and Stark, 2005) to significantly negative impact on 
operating performance of combined firms following mergers (Dickerson, 1997), and others 
showing insignificant changes in operating performance of firms (Ghosh, 2001; Martynova et 
al., 2007). 
Martynova et al. (2007) argued that the main reason for the contradictory results in previous 
studies lay in the different methodologies used in comparing pre- and post-acquisition 
operating performance. 
Furthermore, after their review of some of the previous empirical studies, Sharma and Ho 
(2002) and Martynova and Renneboog (2008) concluded that the results observed in those 
studies depended on the operating performance measures used. For example, they showed that 
studies which employed earnings-based measures in their measurement of operating 
performance showed losses in their results, whereas studies using cash flow based 
performance measures showed gains. 
Previous studies have been conducted for examining M&A transactions whether being 
domestic, cross-border or both of them together. However, those previous studies didn’t 
provide any empirical evidence on the difference between the impacts of cross-border and 
domestic M&As on the operating performance of combined firms, which is the main focus of 
this chapter in order to fill this gap in the literature. 
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4.3 Data Sample and Methodology 
This section describes the sample used in this chapter followed by a brief description of the 
methodology applied in the analysis of the operating performance of combined firms. 
4.3.1 Sample and Data Sources 
The sample used in this chapter includes acquirer and target firms involved in domestic and 
cross-border M&As during the period January 1, 1996 to December 31, 2003. The names of 
the acquirer and target companies are extracted manually from the Thomson Financial 
Publication Acquisitions Monthly. To be included in the sample, both acquirer and target 
accounting data, such as the operating performance measures should be held on the 
Datastream database for a minimum of one, two or three years before the takeover and one, 
two or three years after the takeover. Also, to be included in the sample, data necessary for the 
calculation of the industry median benchmarks or the matched control firms based on 
industry, size and pre-acquisition performance should be available. 
4.3.2 Sample Selection and Description  
Within the existing sample of 585 acquisitions, most of the targets are foreign or private 
targets. Therefore, due to the limitation of the financial information of those targets on the 
Datastream database, there is inability to find the required data for most of them which 
reduces the number of acquirers and targets in the sample to 98 pairs as shown in Table 4.1. 
Also, Appendix 4.A provides a list of the names of acquirer and target firms with their 
benchmarks. 
In order to avoid any survivorship bias in collecting the data of target firms, the search for the 
financial data has been conducted using the lists of both “live” and “dead” firms on the 
Datastream database in order to guarantee that they are all included in the sample. Also, in 
order to check for the existence of any sample selection bias in the final sample of 98 M&As, 
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a comparison has been conducted between the main characteristics of the 98 M&As with the 
characteristics of the other firms that haven’t got data for their targets on the Datastream 
database, which represent 487 M&As. The characteristics which were checked are the size of 
acquirer firms and the industrial relatedness between acquirer and target firms. 
In terms of the size of acquirer firms which is measured as the market value of equity (in 
millions of sterling), the results show that the mean value of equity for the 98 M&As is 
2790.68 whereas for the 487 M&As being 4309.54. The median value of equity for the 98 
M&As is 689.92 whereas being 713.41 for the 487 M&A deals. To test for the significance of 
differences between means and medians of the two samples, t-tests are used for equality in 
means and a Wilcoxon/Mann-Witney test is used for equality of medians. The results have 
shown no significant differences in means and medians of the two samples of M&As. 
In relation to the industrial relatedness which is defined as the same two-digit  standard 
industrial trade classification code (SIC code), the two samples of M&As  have shown that 
the majority of M&A transactions occur between firms in related acquisitions. For example, 
the 98 M&A sample show that acquisitions between firms in related industries occur in 48% 
of the sample whereas 43% occur in different industries. Similarly, the sample of 487 M&As 
show that acquisitions in the same industry occur in 56% of the sample whereas 41% occur in 
different industries. 
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Table 4.1: Sample Selection Procedure 
 Number Percentage 
Completed deals (1996-2003) 585 Deals 100% 
Analysis (A) : 
Number of deals where Acquirers and Targets 
have at least 1 year pre- and combined firms 
have at least 1 year post-acquisition data 
available on Datastream    
 
                                                                        
98 Pairs 17% 
Analysis (B) :                                                                                            
Acquirer firms that were used in analysis (A) 
98 Acquirers 17% 
 
As shown in Table 4.1, analysis (A), which is the main analysis in this chapter, examines the 
operating performance of acquirer and target combined firms that have data for at least one 
year pre- and one year after the acquisition. On the other hand, analysis (B) examines the 
operating performance of acquirer firms only which were used as part of analysis (A).  
The examination in this chapter includes firms that have operating performance data available 
on the Datastream database for a period of a minimum of one year before and one year after 
the acquisition and a maximum of three years before and three years after the acquisition. 
Therefore, the minimum and maximum number of acquisitions will differ from one year to 
the other for the raw and adjusted performance of firms in the sample. Appendix 4.B provides 
a table showing the minimum and maximum number of acquisitions within different time 
periods.  
The analysis in this chapter examines the operating performance of the acquirers and targets 
that have the required data available and use their measures in the pre-acquisition period with 
the combined firm data for the post-acquisition period.  
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A description of the sample is provided in Table 4.2, which highlights the main features of the 
sample and breaks down the full sample into two parts according to whether the deal is a 
cross-border or domestic acquisition made by a UK acquirer. 
Panel A of Table 4.2 shows the distribution over time of the cross-border, domestic and total 
transactions. Consistent with the previous chapters, the sample shows that the number of 
merger and acquisition transactions increases over the years then a decrease happens after the 
millennium followed by another increase again. 
Panel B of Table 4.2 presents the distribution of the sample over some of the deal 
characteristics, which are the payment method, industrial relatedness and the relative size of 
the target to the acquirer. With regard to the method of payment, the takeovers here are 
classified into three groups which are pure cash, pure equity and mixed payment. 
It is clear that cash is the main method of payment in cross-border and domestic acquisitions 
whereas equity is the least method of payment. The preference of the cash payments may 
indicate that acquirer firms felt that their shares are undervalued and that they are worth more 
than their current market price, which made them prefer to pay for the M&A deals with cash 
instead of equity. This may have a positive impact on the performance of firms according to 
the signalling hypothesis of Myers and Majluf (1984), since cash bids may be viewed by the 
market as a signal that the management of the acquiring firm is expecting an increase in the 
value of the firm over the post-acquisition period.  
Considering the industrial relatedness, acquisitions are defined as related when acquirer and 
target firms have the same Datastream Industrial Classification Code at Level Four, which is 
similar to the classification used by Powell and Stark (2005) and Cosh et al. (2006). Within 
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the existing sample, acquisitions between firms in related industries occur in 38.46% of the 
cross-border sample and 61.37% of the domestic sample. 
Finally, the majority of the sample represent significant takeovers with 59.18% of the targets 
are at least 50% of the acquirer’s size (total assets). 
Table 4.2: Distribution of Sample M&As by Year and Deal Characteristics 
 
 CB M&A Domestic M&A Total 
 N % N % N % 
Panel A: By Year of M&A 
1996 1 2.56 5 8.48 6 6.12 
1997 1 2.56 5 8.48 6 6.12 
1998 2 5.13 7 11.86 9 9.18 
1999 7 17.95 17 28.81 24 24.50 
2000 12 30.77 9 15.25 21 21.43 
2001 6 15.385 5 8.48 11 11.22 
2002 4 10.26 4 6.78 8 8.16 
2003 6 15.385 7 11.86 13 13.27 
Total 39 100.00 59 100.00 98 100.00 
Panel B: By Deal Characteristics 
Payment Method 
All Cash 12 30.77 31 52.54 43 43.88 
All Shares 3 7.69 3 5.08 6 6.12 
Mix 8 20.51 16 27.12 24 24.49 
Not Available 16 41.03 9 15.26 25 25.51 
Total 39 100.00 59 100.00 98 100.00 
Relatedness 
Same Industry 15 38.46 34 61.37 49 50 
Different Industry 22 56.41 25 38.63 47 47.96 
Not Available 2 5.13 0 0 2 2.04 
Total 39 100.00 59 100.00 98 100.00 
Relative Size of Target 
Target size < 10% 7 17.95 7 11.86 14 14.29 
Target size 10%-50% 3 7.69 10 16.96 13 13.265 
Target size > 50% 21 53.85 37 62.71 58 59.18 
Not Available 8 20.51 5 8.47 13 13.265 
Total 39 100.00 59 100.00 98 100.00 
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4.3.3 Methodology 
The operating performance measures applied in this chapter are the same as the ones applied 
in the previous chapter which include the cash flow, pure cash flow and accrual measures of 
operating performance. Also, the same benchmarks that adjust for the industry as well as the 
industry, size and pre-acquisition performance are used in this chapter in order to have a 
degree of comparability with the previous chapter as well as the other previous studies and to 
check whether the choice of the benchmark affects the results. Therefore, only a brief 
description is provided for the methods applied. 
4.3.3.1 Benchmark Construction 
In order to construct the operating performance benchmarks with which will be compared 
with the combined firms’ operating performance, some steps are followed for each type of 
benchmark as follows.  
The benchmarks are chosen from the pool of all companies on the Datastream database that 
have the same industrial classification as the acquirer and target firms in the sample in the 
year prior to the acquisition and is identified as the Datastream Industrial Classification Code 
at Level Four (Financial Times All Shares Index) as is used in Powell and Stark (2005). From 
those industry groupings, the firm with the median EBITDA-to-Assets ratio in the year prior 
to the acquisition is selected as the industry median peer.  
Similarly, in order to choose matched firms based on industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance, industry groupings are filtered down to those companies that have a size of 
between 25% and 200% of acquirer and target firms, which is represented by total assets in 
the year before the acquisition. From this list, firms with the closest operating performance of 
the acquirer and target firms measured as the EBITDA-to-Assets ratio in the year prior to the 
acquisition are selected as the benchmark firms. Also, care is taken to select benchmark firms 
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from the same country as the acquirer and target firms and are not involved in merger and 
acquisition activities over the period studied.  
4.3.3.2 Adjusted Cash-flow Performance 
The analysis in this chapter differs from the previous chapter since it concentrates on 
examining the changes in the operating performance of acquirer and target combined firms 
and not only acquirer firms. Following Martynova et al. (2007), the operating performance 
cash flow measure of acquirer and target firms is used for each of the three years (-3 to -1) 
prior the takeover wherever available in the pre-acquisition period. This measure is weighted 
or scaled by the sum of the acquirer and target specific deflator. That is, the raw pre-
acquisition operating performance cash flow of the combined firm is calculated as follows: 
                                                                                                                 (4.1) 
For the post-acquisition period, the actual or realized operating performance reported by the 
combined firm for each of the three years (+1 to +3) after the acquisition is scaled by its 
deflator at the same year. That is, the raw post-acquisition operating performance or cash flow 
of the combined firm is calculated as follows: 
                                                                                                                              (4.2)                                           
Following Martynova et al. (2007), the control benchmark operating performance measure is 
also calculated in each of the three years prior and post the acquisition for each pair of control 
companies, wherever available. In the pre-acquisition period, the control company 
performance is calculated as a weighted average of the operating performance of the 
acquirer’s and target’s peer companies where the weights being the relative size of the 
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acquirer’s and target’s deflator. That is, the peer pre-acquisition operating performance of the 
combined firm is calculated as follows: 
                                   (4.3)                                                                  
The post-acquisition combined benchmark is calculated similarly to the pre-acquisition years 
by weighting the average performance measure of the acquirer’s and target’s peers. However, 
the weights for the post-acquisition period are the relative size of the acquirer and target firms 
at the end of the year prior to the acquisition (year -1). That is, the peer post-acquisition 
operating performance of the combined firm is calculated as follows: 
                                        (4.4) 
The control adjusted operating performance is calculated as the difference between the raw 
performance measures of the acquirers and targets and the relevant benchmark operating 
performance measures. That is, the company’s operating performance adjusted for the 
industry trend is calculated as follows: 
                                                                                (4.5) 
The firm’s operating performance adjusted for the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance is calculated in a similar way as follows: 
                                                  (4.6) 
   179 
Median annual performance measures are then reported for all the firms in the pre- and post- 
acquisition years. Also, the median performance measures are reported for each firm in the 
pre-acquisition and post-acquisition periods. Then, an assessment of the changes in operating 
performance of combined firms caused by the takeover is conducted by using the change 
model and the intercept model which are explained in the previous chapter. Figure 4.1 
summarizes the procedure followed in applying the methodology. 
Figure 4.1: Methodology Applied to Measure Changes in Operating Performance of 
Combined Firms 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
This section presents the results of the empirical tests conducted for both analysis (A) and (B) 
respectively for the whole, cross-border and domestic samples of UK acquisitions. All the 
results are presented for analysis (A) first followed by the results of analysis (B). Firstly, the 
Firms (A+T) 
Pre-acquisition 
Peers (A+T)  
Pre-acquisition 
 Firm (AT) 
Post-acquisition 
Peers (A+T)  
Post-acquisition 
Minus Minus 
Pre-acquisition adjusted performance  Post-acquisition adjusted performance  
Median of years -3, -2, -1 Median of years 1, 2, 3 
Median pre-acquisition 
adjusted performance  
Median post-acquisition 
adjusted performance  
t= -3 t= -2 t= -1 t= 1 t= 2 t= 3 t= 0 
Year of 
acquisition 
Changes 
A: Acquirer firm, T: Target firm, AT: Combined firm 
 
Peer firms or benchmarks are selected on the basis of: (1) Industry median, or (2) Industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance. 
 
Source: The idea of the figure is based on Martynova et al. (2007) and Sharma and Ho (2002).  
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change model results are reported for the full, cross-border and domestic samples of 
acquisitions using different operating performance measures and benchmarks. Secondly, the 
intercept model results are presented for the full, cross-border and domestic samples for 
different performance measures and two different benchmarks. The results of the impact of 
cross-border acquisitions on changes in operating performance of combined firms are also 
presented. Thirdly, a comparison between the change model results and the intercept model 
results is presented. Fourthly, the results of a regression analysis are presented to show the 
impact of some of the deal characteristics on the post-acquisition performance of combined 
firms.   
4.4.1 Results of Analysis (A) 
The results of analysis (A) are presented below which contains the examination of the 
operating performance of a sample of 98 pairs of acquirer and target firms using different 
models and benchmarks.   
4.4.1.1 Change Model Results 
This section presents the results of the change model that shows the size of the improvements 
in the firms’ operating performance measured as the difference between the median post-
takeover performance and the median pre-takeover performance for the full, cross-border and 
domestic samples using different measures and benchmarks. 
4.4.1.1.1 Full Sample  
The empirical results for the change model are shown in Table 4.3 for the full sample of 
acquisitions.  
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Table 4.3: Analysis (A) Operating Performance Changes of Combined Firms (Full 
Sample) 
  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 1: 
 
 
       -3 13.61 81 
 
1.65 57 
 
-0.48 59 
 -2 12.63 85 
 
-0.06 62 
 
-0.92 62 
 -1 12.76 92 
 
-0.10 75 
 
-1.23 72 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 13.52 92  0.37 75  -0.96 72  
1 13.11 92 
 
-0.24 75 
 
-1.47 72 
 2 10.74 92 
 
-0.50 73 
 
-1.33 71 
 3 10.78 92 
 
-1.41 73 
 
-1.58 71 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 11.67 92  0.07 75  -1.37 72  
          Median difference 1.71 * 92 
 
0.98 75 
 
0.28 72 
           Measure 2: 
                   
-3 14.86 81 
 
0.88 57 
 
-2.39 59 
 -2 14.91 85 
 
-1.64 62 
 
-3.99 62 
 -1 14.00 93 
 
-0.34 75 
 
-4.87 72 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 14.86 93  -0.09 75  -3.17 72  
1 12.75 93 
 
0.47 75 
 
-0.05 72 
 2 13.04 93 
 
1.76 72 
 
0.16 71 
 3 12.69 93 
 
-0.22 71 
 
1.09 71 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 13.31 93  2.24 75  0.94 72  
          Median difference 0.85 93 
 
0.97 75 
 
1.74 * 72 
           Measure 3: 
                   
-3 0.01 76 
 
-0.00 52 
 
-0.00 55 
 -2 0.01 82 
 
-12.54 57 
 
-0.00 57 
 -1 0.02 92 
 
-0.00 72 
 
-0.00 71 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 0.01 92  -0.01 72  -0.00 71  
1 0.02 92 
 
-0.00 72 
 
-0.00 71 
 2 0.02 92 
 
-12.73 70 
 
-0.00 70 
 3 0.02 92 
 
0.00 70 
 
-0.00 70 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 0.02 92  -0.01 72  -0.00 71  
          Median difference 0.86 92 
 
0.23 72 
 
1.1 71 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
         
  
 
       
  
 
       
  
 
       
TMV
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 4: 
 
 
       -3 14.30 66 
 
5.66 43 
 
1.78 40 
 -2 14.67 73 
 
1.69 48 
 
-3.93 50 
 -1 11.81 78 
 
1.12 52 
 
-4.97 58 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 12.95 78  1.15 52  -3.08 58  
1 11.89 78 
 
3.26 52 
 
0.88 58 
 2 10.89 78 
 
-2.15 50 
 
0.36 58 
 3 11.76 78 
 
0.57 47 
 
-0.92 58 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 11.79 78  1.13 52  0.01 58  
          Median difference 1.75 * 78 
 
0.46 52 
 
1.47 58 
 
          Measure 5: 
 
                  
-3 15.57 68 
 
1.33 42 
 
-3.34 40 
 -2 12.71 74 
 
0.58 47 
 
-3.28 50 
 -1 14.03 80 
 
0.69 53 
 
-6.23 58 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 13.03 80  0.69 53  -5.69 58  
1 12.84 80 
 
1.65 53 
 
1.67 58 
 2 11.45 80 
 
1.64 51 
 
5.15 57 
 3 12.39 80 
 
-1.89 49 
 
2.61 57 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 12.02 80  1.41 53  2.28 58  
          Median difference 1.03 80 
 
0.23 53 
 
2.54 ** 58 
 
          Measure 6: 
 
                  
-3 0.01 67 
 
0.01 40 
 
-0.00 38 
 -2 0.02 72 
 
-0.05 43 
 
-0.00 45 
 -1 0.02 78 
 
-0.01 51 
 
-0.01 56 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 0.01 78  -0.01 51  -0.01 56  
1 0.02 78 
 
0.00 51 
 
0.00 56 
 2 0.02 78 
 
-0.05 49 
 
0.00 55 
 3 0.02 78 
 
0.00 47 
 
-0.01 55 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 0.02 78  -0.01 51  0.00 56  
          Median difference 0.34 78 
 
0.39 51 
 
2.11 ** 56 
 
  
 
       
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 7:  
 
 
       -3 8.87 85 
 
0.58 57 
 
-0.76 58 
 -2 8.27 91 
 
0.09 62 
 
-0.76 62 
 -1 8.37 98 
 
0.07 75 
 
-1.32 72 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 8.73 98  0.33 75  -0.76 72  
1 8.06 98 
 
0.62 75 
 
-1.52 72 
 2 6.40 98 
 
-0.04 73 
 
-2.07 71 
 3 6.98 98 
 
-1.80 70 
 
-0.89 71 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 7.20 98  0.22 75  -0.99 72  
          Median difference 1.79 * 98 
 
1.08 75 
 
0.09 72 
           
Measure 8:  
                   
-3 25.16 86 
 
2.04 56 
 
-5.39 58 
 -2 24.89 90 
 
0.57 62 
 
-1.65 62 
 -1 23.90 98 
 
-3.28 75 
 
0.16 72 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 25.59 98  0.49 75  -1.48 72  
1 23.82 98 
 
-19.02 75 
 
-4.09 72 
 2 22.63 98 
 
-2.87 73 
 
-1.00 71 
 3 22.12 98 
 
-8.89 73 
 
-1.42 71 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 24.49 98  -5.7 75  -0.67 72  
          Median difference 1.27 98 
 
1.77 * 75 
 
0.53 72 
 
           
Median difference between the median post- acquisition performance and median pre-acquisition performance 
of combined firms is conducted using Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
 
 
The raw performance of the firms (without adjustment) show significant positive changes in 
operating performance ranging within 1.71% and 1.79% when the book value of total assets is 
used as a deflator whatever the performance measure is. However, the results for the other 
five measures show statistically insignificant positive changes in operating performance. 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
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When the firm performance is adjusted for the industry median performance, the results in 
general didn’t show any significant differences between the median post- and median pre- 
acquisition performance for all the measures used except measure 8 which is the accrual 
measure (EBIT) deflated by the book value of equity which shows a significant increase in 
operating performance by 1.77%. 
When the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance is controlled for, the results reveal 
statistically insignificant positive differences between the median post- and median pre-
acquisition performance for five out of the eight performance measures used, whereas there is 
a positive significant increase of 1.74%, 2.54% and 2.11% for measures 2, 5 and 6 
respectively. 
The majority of the results for the raw, industry-adjusted and industry, size and pre-
acquisition adjusted performance for the full sample show insignificant positive changes in 
the operating performance of combined firms which is similar to the results of Ghosh (2001). 
4.4.1.1.2 Cross-border Sample  
Table 4.4 presents the empirical results of the change model from the examination of the 
cross-border sample of acquisitions using different performance measures and benchmarks.  
  
   185 
Table 4.4: Analysis (A) Operating Performance Changes of Combined Firms (Cross-
border Sample) 
  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 1: 
 
 
       -3 12.43 30 
 
2.85 18 
 
0.19 18 
 -2 12.63 33 
 
-1.33 22 
 
-0.38 20 
 -1 13.70 36 
 
1.48 26 
 
1.07 24 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 13.62 36  1.34 26  0.51 24  
1 14.31 36 
 
-0.14 26 
 
-0.36 24 
 2 11.26 36 
 
-0.12 26 
 
-0.38 24 
 3 8.40 36 
 
-0.22 25 
 
0.06 24 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 11.44 36  0.49 26  0.11 24  
          Median difference 1.14 36 
 
1.22 26 
 
0.79 24 
           Measure 2: 
 
                  
-3 18.17 30 
 
6.54 17 
 
0.63 18 
 -2 18.55 33 
 
0.74 22 
 
-0.68 20 
 -1 20.15 36 
 
4.43 26 
 
4.57 24 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 19.53 36  2.36 26  2.34 24  
1 13.15 36 
 
3.49 26 
 
1.90 24 
 2 13.04 36 
 
2.10 25 
 
-0.93 24 
 3 13.31 36 
 
1.18 24 
 
1.79 24 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 13.30 36  3.02 26  0.76 24  
          Median difference 0.94 36 
 
0.10 26 
 
0.22 24 
           Measure 3: 
 
                  
-3 0.01 26 
 
-0.003 14 
 
-0.003 16 
 -2 0.02 31 
 
-17.19 19 
 
-0.01 18 
 -1 0.01 35 
 
-0.01 23 
 
-0.01 23 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 0.02 35  -0.01 23  -0.01 23  
1 0.02 35 
 
-0.01 23 
 
-0.01 23 
 2 0.02 35 
 
-18.84 23 
 
-0.01 23 
 3 0.01 35 
 
-0.003 22 
 
-0.004 23 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 0.02 35  -0.01 23  -0.004 23  
          Median difference 0.32 35 
 
0.73 23 
 
0.31 23 
 
          
TMV
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
 
Measure 4: 
 
 
       -3 14.08 25 
 
7.79 14 
 
3.29 12 
 -2 15.00 28 
 
7.67 19 
 
-0.23 16 
 -1 12.67 30 
 
-0.29 20 
 
-3.49 18 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 13.99 30  1.40 20  0.30 18  
1 13.62 30 
 
6.28 20 
 
3.70 18 
 2 11.74 30 
 
-5.98 20 
 
-1.67 18 
 3 11.19 30 
 
1.35 19 
 
-2.31 18 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 11.87 30  2.83 20  -1.67 18  
          Median difference 1.26 30 
 
0.80 20 
 
1.05 18 
 
          
Measure 5: 
                   
-3 17.22 27 
 
5.75 13 
 
11.63 12 
 -2 17.93 29 
 
3.81 18 
 
-0.68 16 
 -1 20.11 31 
 
5.14 20 
 
-2.36 18 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 16.99 31  2.86 20  2.25 18  
1 12.95 31 
 
9.16 20 
 
8.89 18 
 2 11.65 31 
 
1.54 20 
 
2.98 18 
 3 11.99 31 
 
-0.66 20 
 
3.32 18 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 12.27 31  3.00 20  4.31 18  
          Median difference 1.09 31 
 
0.28 20 
 
0.24 18 
 
          Measure 6: 
                   
-3 0.02 26 
 
-0.004 12 
 
0.002 12 
 -2 0.02 27 
 
-0.30 16 
 
-0.01 15 
 -1 0.02 30 
 
-0.01 18 
 
-0.01 17 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 0.02 30  -0.01 18  -0.01 17  
1 0.02 30 
 
0.01 18 
 
-0.01 17 
 2 0.02 30 
 
-0.85 18 
 
-0.01 17 
 3 0.01 30 
 
0.001 18 
 
-0.01 17 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 0.02 30  -0.002 18  -0.01 17  
          Median difference 0.02 30 
 
0.68 18 
 
0.76 17 
 
  
 
       
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
   187 
  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 7:  
 
 
       -3 8.43 32 
 
4.02 19 
 
1.15 17 
 -2 7.30 36 
 
-2.27 23 
 
-1.05 20 
 -1 9.24 39 
 
1.88 26 
 
1.18 24 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 8.49 39  2.88 26  0.82 24  
1 8.30 39 
 
1.48 26 
 
-1.98 24 
 2 8.61 39 
 
1.77 26 
 
-2.38 24 
 3 4.59 39 
 
-1.09 26 
 
-0.41 24 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 7.40 39  1.36 26  0.02 24  
          Median difference 1.10 39 
 
1.13 26 
 
0.98 24 
           
Measure 8:  
                   
-3 26.85 31 
 
2.36 17 
 
-5.68 17 
 -2 31.70 35 
 
0.54 22 
 
3.55 20 
 -1 34.71 39 
 
4.09 26 
 
2.17 24 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 32.49 39  6.70 26  2.92 24  
1 25.52 39 
 
-20.67 26 
 
-5.63 24 
 2 24.94 39 
 
-16.15 26 
 
-6.52 24 
 3 19.84 39 
 
-14.24 25 
 
-8.51 24 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 27.08 39  -17.96 26  -5.84 24  
          Median difference 1.04 39 
 
3.14 *** 26 
 
1.62 24 
 
           
Median difference between the median post- acquisition performance and median pre-acquisition performance 
of combined firms is conducted using Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
 
 
The raw performance of the firms (without adjustment) show statistically insignificant 
positive changes in the operating performance of combined firms for all the performance 
measures and benchmarks used. 
Similar to the results of the industry-adjusted performance for the full sample, the results for 
the cross-border sample didn’t show any significant differences between the median post- and 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
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median pre-acquisition performance for all the measures used except measure 8 which shows 
a significant increase in operating performance by 3.14%. 
When the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, the 
results reveal insignificant positive differences between the median post- and median pre-
acquisition performance for all the performance measures used. 
The results for the cross-border sample whether being raw, industry-adjusted or industry, size 
and pre-acquisition adjusted performance show insignificant positive changes in the operating 
performance of combined firms. 
4.4.1.1.3 Domestic Sample  
Table 4.5 presents the empirical results of the change model for the domestic sample of 
acquisitions using different performance measures and benchmarks.  
Table 4.5: Analysis (A) Operating Performance Changes of Combined Firms (Domestic 
Sample) 
  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 1: 
 
 
       -3 13.65 52 
 
0.21 40 
 
-2.12 42 
 -2 12.60 53 
 
0.30 41 
 
-1.28 43 
 -1 11.70 57 
 
-0.82 50 
 
-3.41 49 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 13.02 57  0.21 50  -2.02 49  
1 11.81 57 
 
-0.24 50 
 
-1.85 49 
 2 10.22 57 
 
-0.50 48 
 
-1.81 48 
 3 11.38 57 
 
-1.45 49 
 
-1.84 48 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 11.70 57  -0.50 50  -1.69 49  
          Median difference 1.15 57 
 
0.33 50 
 
0.96 49 
           
          
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 2: 
 
                  
-3 13.82 52 
 
-1.87 40 
 
-7.12 42 
 -2 12.65 53 
 
-3.26 41 
 
-6.23 43 
 -1 12.29 58 
 
-2.89 50 
 
-5.85 49 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 12.83 58  -2.06 50  -6.45 49  
1 11.98 58 
 
-0.06 50 
 
-1.68 49 
 2 12.66 58 
 
1.43 48 
 
1.41 48 
 3 11.55 58 
 
-0.22 48 
 
1.03 48 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 13.31 58  1.66 50  1.11 49  
          Median difference 0.27 58 
 
1.32 50 
 
2.32 ** 49 
           Measure 3: 
 
                  
-3 0.01 51 
 
-0.003 39 
 
-0.002 40 
 -2 0.01 52 
 
-7.13 39 
 
-0.002 40 
 -1 0.01 58 
 
-0.01 50 
 
-0.002 49 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 0.01 58  -0.01 50  -0.001 49  
1 0.02 58 
 
-0.001 50 
 
-0.001 49 
 2 0.01 58 
 
-10.19 47 
 
0.001 48 
 3 0.02 58 
 
0.002 48 
 
0.001 48 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 0.02 58  -0.01 50  0.001 49  
          Median difference 0.90 58 
 
0.20 50 
 
1.59 49 
 Measure 4: 
 
 
       -3 14.72 42 
 
4.92 30 
 
-3.79 29 
 -2 13.86 45 
 
-1.47 30 
 
-5.61 35 
 -1 11.45 48 
 
1.19 33 
 
-5.22 41 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 12.24 48  1.13 33  -4.55 41  
1 11.39 48 
 
-1.60 33 
 
0.77 41 
 2 10.65 48 
 
-1.45 31 
 
0.79 40 
 3 12.25 48 
 
-0.05 29 
 
-0.54 40 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 11.60 48  -0.05 33  0.48 41  
          Median difference 1.38 48 
 
0.06 33 
 
2.50 ** 41 
 
          
          
TMV
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 5: 
                   
-3 13.28 43 
 
-3.56 -30 
 
-8.13 29 
 -2 10.91 46 
 
-1.71 30 
 
-7.17 35 
 -1 12.18 49 
 
-3.29 34 
 
-6.23 41 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 11.54 49  -5.15 34  -7.30 41  
1 12.15 48 
 
0.74 34 
 
1.41 40 
 2 11.45 49 
 
1.75 32 
 
5.15 40 
 3 12.85 49 
 
-1.89 30 
 
0.64 40 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 11.74 49  0.74 34  1.81 41  
          Median difference 0.55 49 
 
0.37 34 
 
3.24 *** 41 
 
          Measure 6: 
                   
-3 0.01 43 
 
0.01 29 
 
-0.001 27 
 -2 0.01 46 
 
-0.01 28 
 
-0.002 31 
 -1 0.02 49 
 
-0.002 34 
 
-0.01 40 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 0.01 49  -0.001 34  -0.01 40  
1 0.02 48 
 
-0.002 34 
 
0.003 40 
 2 0.02 49 
 
-0.01 32 
 
0.004 39 
 3 0.02 49 
 
-0.01 30 
 
0.01 39 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 0.02 49  -0.002 34  0.003 40  
          Median difference 0.46 49 
 
0.03 34 
 
2.99 *** 40 
 
Measure 7:  
 
 
       -3 9.25 54 
 
-0.08 40 
 
-1.39 42 
 -2 8.58 56 
 
0.80 41 
 
-0.65 43 
 -1 7.58 60 
 
-0.82 50 
 
-2.60 49 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 9.02 60  -0.06 50  -1.07 49  
1 7.63 60 
 
0.22 50 
 
-1.32 49 
 2 6.02 60 
 
-0.20 48 
 
-1.57 48 
 3 7.45 60 
 
-2.87 46 
 
-0.97 48 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 6.98 60  -0.76 50  -1.27 49  
          Median difference 1.37 60 
 
0.64 50 
 
0.82 49 
           
          
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
 
   191 
  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 8: 
                   
-3 24.83 54 
 
1.73 40 
 
-5.10 42 
 -2 22.61 56 
 
0.57 41 
 
-2.21 43 
 -1 19.60 60 
 
-4.01 50 
 
-6.02 49 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 23.74 60  -3.92 50  -2.75 49  
1 19.09 60 
 
-11.05 50 
 
-3.85 49 
 2 20.42 60 
 
1.87 48 
 
1.69 48 
 3 22.39 60 
 
-0.48 48 
 
0.13 48 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 23.48 60  0.37 50  3.30 49  
          Median difference 0.53 60 
 
0.28 50 
 
1.99 ** 49 
 
           
Median difference between the median post- acquisition performance and median pre-acquisition performance 
of combined firms is conducted using Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
 
 
The results for the domestic sample show that the changes in the raw performance of firms 
(without adjustment) is not significant for all the performance measures used, similarly to the 
results of cross-border sample.  
Also, when the adjustment is made for the industry median performance, the results for the 
domestic sample do not show any significant differences between the median post- and 
median pre-acquisition performance of combined firms for all the performance measures 
used.  
However, when the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance 
the results reveal significant positive improvements in the operating performance of combined 
firms for five out of the eight measures used including all the three ‘pure’ cash flow measures. 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
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The results of the change model are of great similarity to the results presented by Powell and 
Stark (2005) since they found that UK takeovers generate significant as well as insignificant 
improvements in operating performance of firms. However, their results as well as the results 
presented previously in Tables 4.3, 4.4 and 4.5 show some sensitivity to the performance 
measures, performance benchmarks and deflators used. 
The results show that the use of a ‘pure’ cash flow measure of performance, which adjusts for 
changes in working capital, results in larger improvements in post-takeover performance than 
other accrual and cash flow measures. Also, the performance benchmark used seems to have a 
significant impact on the results. For example, using a benchmark of matched firms that 
controls for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance usually gives higher 
improvements in the estimated performance relative to benchmarks which control for the 
industry performance only. 
The results for the domestic sample show more significant improvements in the operating 
performance of combined firms than cross-border sample, especially when the adjustment is 
made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance. This suggests that cross-border 
acquisitions yield less cash flow and operating performance than domestic acquisitions.  
4.4.1.2 Intercept Model Results 
Table 4.6 presents the results of the intercept model using different performance measures 
with different deflators and two performance benchmarks for the full, cross-border and 
domestic samples. 
Models 1, 3 and 4 show the results of the intercept model using an industry-adjusted median 
performance for the full, cross-border and domestic acquisitions respectively. Models 5, 7 and 
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8 show the results for the full, cross-border and domestic samples respectively from using a 
matched group based on the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance.    
Models 2 and 6 in Table 4.6 extend the intercept model results by adding the cross-border 
dummy in order to check the impact of cross-border acquisitions on the changes in operating 
performance of firms for the industry-adjusted and industry, size and pre-acquisition-adjusted 
performance respectively. 
Table 4.6: Regression of Post-takeover-adjusted Performance of Combined Firms on 
Pre-takeover-adjusted Performance/ Analysis (A) 
Independent variables   
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
acquisition performance 
adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
   (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) (6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 1: 
 
               Intercept 
 
-0.022* 
(-1.86) 
-0.014 
(-0.96) 
 
-0.039 
(-1.53) 
 
-0.013 
(-1.07) 
 
-0.010 
(-1.14) 
0.002 
(0.22) 
 
-0.030* 
(-1.65) 
 
0.007 
(0.82) 
 
Pre-acquisition  performance 
 
0.203* 
(1.67) 
0.204* 
(1.68) 
 
0.126 
(0.55) 
 
0.269** 
(1.96) 
 
0.398*** 
(6.09) 
0.429*** 
(6.51) 
 
0.329*** 
(3.02) 
 
0.566*** 
(6.78) 
 
Cross-border 
  
-0.022 
(-0.97) 
      
-0.033** 
(-1.97) 
     F-statistic 
 
2.79 1.86 
 
0.30 
 
3.85** 
 
37.09*** 21.25*** 
 
9.12** 
 
45.95*** 
 p.value 
 
0.10 0.16 
 
0.59 
 
0.06 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.02 0.02 
 
-0.03 
 
0.06 
 
0.34 0.36 
 
0.26 
 
0.49 
 
                Measure 2: 
                               
Intercept 
 
0.033 
(1.16) 
0.047 
(1.33) 
 
0.011 
(0.16) 
 
0.053** 
(2.10) 
 
0.020 
(0.79) 
0.032 
(1.08) 
 
-0.007 
(-0.13) 
 
0.083*** 
(3.57) 
 
Pre-acquisition performance 
 
0.163*** 
(3.06) 
0.161***
(2.98) 
 
0.129* 
(1.67) 
 
0.506***
(3.89) 
 
0.052* 
(1.81) 
0.056* 
(1.92) 
 
0.043 
(1.24) 
 
1.001*** 
(5.76) 
 
Cross-border 
  
-0.038 
(-0.67) 
      
-0.038 
(-0.76) 
     F-statistic 
 
9.33*** 4.85** 
 
2.80 
 
15.11*** 
 
3.29* 1.92 
 
1.53 
 
33.22*** 
 p.value 
 
0.00 0.01 
 
0.11 
 
0.00 
 
0.07 0.15 
 
0.23 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.101 0.09 
 
0.07 
 
0.23 
 
0.03 0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.41 
                 Measure 3: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.002 
(-0.75) 
-0.003 
(-1.08) 
 
0.001 
(0.36) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.64) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.94) 
0.002 
(0.58) 
 
-0.002 
(-1.61) 
 
0.003 
(1.63) 
 
Pre-acquisition performance 
 
0.260*** 
(3.80) 
0.28*** 
(4.11) 
 
0.278***
(4.80) 
 
16.30 
(1.28) 
 
-0.002** 
(-2.20) 
-0.002** 
(-2.07) 
 
-0.044 
(-0.12) 
 
-0.002***
(-4.55) 
 
Cross-border 
  
-0.004 
(0.84) 
      
-0.0002**
(-2.47) 
     F-statistic 
 
16.52*** 8.58*** 
 
23.09*** 
 
1.63 
 
4.81** 5.62** 
 
0.02 
 
20.71*** 
 p.value 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.21 
 
0.03 0.01 
 
0.90 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.18 0.18 
 
0.50 
 
0.01 
 
0.05 0.12 
 
-0.05 
 
0.30 
 
                
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
TMV
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
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Independent variables   
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
acquisition performance 
adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
   (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) (6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 4: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.007 
(-0.40) 
0.001 
(0.04) 
 
-0.020 
(-0.57) 
 
0.001 
(0.07) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
0.016 
(1.03) 
 
-0.024 
(-1.01) 
 
0.026* 
(1.68) 
 
Pre-acquisition performance 
 
-0.129 
(-1.05) 
-0.128 
(-1.04) 
 
-0.106 
(-0.38) 
 
-0.137 
(-1.12) 
 
0.161* 
(1.69) 
0.222** 
(2.24) 
 
-0.029 
(-0.21) 
 
0.43*** 
(3.36) 
 
Cross-border 
  
-0.021 
(-0.58) 
      
-0.048* 
(-1.80) 
     F-statistic 
 
1.11 0.71 
 
0.15 
 
1.25 
 
0.55 3.10* 
 
0.04 
 
11.26*** 
 p.value 
 
0.30 0.49 
 
0.71 
 
0.27 
 
53.05 0.05 
 
0.84 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.002 -0.01 
 
-0.05 
 
0.01 
 
0.03 0.07 
 
-0.06 
 
0.21 
 
                Measure 5: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.021 
(-0.45) 
0.020 
(0.35) 
 
-0.081 
(-0.93) 
 
0.006 
(0.12) 
 
0.017 
(0.57) 
0.022 
(0.62) 
 
0.004 
(0.06) 
 
0.112*** 
(3.87) 
 
Pre-acquisition performance 
 
1.062*** 
(12.72) 
1.05*** 
(12.58) 
 
1.112***
(10.86) 
 
0.384* 
(1.67) 
 
-0.423*** 
(-8.65) 
-0.420***
(-8.27) 
 
-0.451***
(-8.20) 
 
1.034*** 
(4.39) 
 
Cross-border 
  
-0.109 
(-1.16) 
      
-0.016 
(-0.26) 
     F-statistic 
 
16.17*** 8.21*** 
 
11.79*** 
 
2.79 
 
7.48*** 36.83*** 
 
6.72*** 
 
19.31*** 
 p.value 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.10 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.76 0.76 
 
0.86 
 
0.05 
 
0.56 0.56 
 
0.80 
 
0.32 
 
                Measure 6: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.002* 
(-1.81) 
-0.004 
(-0.27) 
 
-0.001* 
(-1.73) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.79) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.60) 
-0.004 
(0.91) 
 
-0.002** 
(-2.17) 
 
0.005 
(1.54) 
 
Pre-acquisition performance 
 
-0.002 
(-0.39) 
-0.005 
(-0.95) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.57) 
 
0.365 
(1.51) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.55) 
-0.001 
(-0.34) 
 
0.065 
(0.82) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.45) 
 
Cross-border 
  
-0.001** 
(-2.21) 
      
-0.002***
(-2.66) 
     F-statistic 
 
0.15 2.51* 
 
0.32 
 
2.29 
 
0.31 3.70** 
 
0.67 
 
0.20 
 p.value 
 
0.70 0.09 
 
0.58 
 
0.14 
 
0.58 0.03 
 
0.42 
 
0.66 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.02 0.06 
 
-0.04 
 
0.04 
 
-0.01 0.09 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
                Measure 7:  
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.020* 
(-1.72) 
-0.013 
(-0.92) 
 
-0.036 
(-1.31) 
 
-0.013 
(-1.09) 
 
-0.010 
(-1.10) 
0.002 
(0.18) 
 
-0.027 
(-1.50) 
 
0.009 
(0.96) 
 
Pre-acquisition performance 
 
0.324*** 
(2.68) 
0.331*** 
(2.73) 
 
0.332 
(1.42) 
 
0.328** 
(2.48) 
 
0.304*** 
(4.25) 
0.335*** 
(4.64) 
 
0.183* 
(1.72) 
 
0.596*** 
(6.03) 
 
Cross-border 
  
-0.020 
(-0.86) 
      
-0.034* 
(-1.88) 
     F-statistic 
 
7.19** 3.95** 
 
2.02 
 
6.16** 
 
18.03*** 11.11*** 
 
2.97* 
 
36.40*** 
 p.value 
 
0.01 0.02 
 
0.17 
 
0.02 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.09 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.08 0.07 
 
0.04 
 
0.10 
 
0.19 0.22 
 
0.08 
 
0.43 
 
                
                               
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
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Independent variables   
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
acquisition performance 
adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
   (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) (6)   (7)   (8)   
 
Measure 8:  
 
Intercept 
 
-0.036 
(-0.57) 
0.033 
(0.43) 
 
-0.196 
(-1.20) 
 
0.029 
(0.56) 
 
0.021 
(0.47) 
0.078 
(1.44) 
 
-0.098 
(-1.11) 
 
0.086 
(1.64) 
 
Pre-acquisition performance 
 
0.376* 
(1.93) 
0.464** 
(2.31) 
 
0.598 
(1.52) 
 
0.294 
(1.50) 
 
0.074 
(0.89) 
0.100 
(1.20) 
 
0.101 
(0.54) 
 
0.112 
(1.23) 
 
Cross-border 
  
-0.197 
(0.13) 
      
-0.159* 
(-1.80) 
     F-statistic 
 
3.73* 3.09* 
 
2.30 
 
2.24 
 
0.79 2.02 
 
0.29 
 
1.52 
 p.value 
 
0.06 0.05 
 
0.14 
 
0.14 
 
0.38 0.14 
 
0.59 
 
0.22 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.04 0.05 
 
0.05 
 
0.03 
 
-0.003 0.03 
 
-0.03 
 
0.01 
                                 
 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
 
 
4.4.1.2.1 Full Sample  
The results for the full sample presented by model (1) show no significant changes between 
the post- and pre-acquisition industry-adjusted performance of firms for five out of the eight 
measures used. However, measures 1, 6 and 7, which are the cash flow measure deflated by 
total assets, the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by the total market value and the accrual 
measure deflated by total assets, show negative changes in performance that are statistically 
significant at the 10% level. 
Moreover, when controlling for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance of firms 
the results for the full sample shown by model (5) yield no significant changes in the 
operating performance of combined firms between the post- and pre-acquisition adjusted 
performance for all the eight performance measures used whether being cash flow, ‘pure’ 
cash flow or accrual measures. Those insignificant results are different from the results of 
Powell and Stark (2005) that show some significant improvements in the operating 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
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performance of combined firms evidenced by some positive intercepts, but are similar to the 
results of Ghosh (2001). 
4.4.1.2.2 Cross-border Sample  
The results for the examination of the cross-border sample show insignificant changes in the 
industry-adjusted operating performance of combined firms for all the measures used except 
measure 6, which is the ‘pure’ cash flow deflated by total market value, which shows 
significant negative changes in the operating performance of combined firms as shown in 
model (3). When the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance, the results show insignificant changes in the operating performance of 
combined firms except for measures 1 and 6, which are the cash flow deflated by total assets 
and the ‘pure’ cash flow deflated by total market value, that show negative changes in the 
operating performance of combined firms. 
4.4.1.2.3 Domestic Sample  
The results for the domestic sample presented in model (4) also show insignificant changes 
between the post- and pre-acquisition industry-adjusted performance of firms for all the 
performance measures used except measure 2, which is the cash flow deflated by sales, that 
shows significant positive changes in the operating performance of combined firms. However, 
when the control is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance of firms, the 
results show insignificant changes in the operating performance of combined firms for five 
out of the eight measures used as shown in model (8). The other three measures, which are the 
cash flow measure deflated by sales and the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by total assets 
and sales, respectively show statistically significant positive improvements in operating 
performance of combined firms.  
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4.4.1.2.4 Cross-border Effect 
The examination of the impact of cross-border M&As on changes in operating performance of 
combined firms is presented by models (2) and (6) for the industry and industry, size and pre-
acquisition adjusted performance of combined firms respectively. When the adjustment is 
made for the industry median performance, the results do not show any significant impact of 
cross-border deals on post-acquisition adjusted performance of combined firms for all the 
measures used except measure 6, which is the ‘pure’ cash flow scaled by total market value, 
that shows a significant negative impact of cross-border acquisitions on post-acquisition 
performance of combined firms. 
On the other hand, when the matching is done by the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance of firms, the results have shown significant negative impact of cross-border 
acquisitions on post-acquisition performance of combined firms for all the measures used 
except the cash flow and ‘pure’ cash flow measures scaled by sales, which show a statistically 
insignificant negative impact. 
The results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance show more 
significant negative impacts for the cross-border acquisitions on the post-acquisition 
performance of combined firms than the industry-adjusted performance results. Also, the 
results of the intercept model show that combined firms involved in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions have a significantly lower operating performance than combined firms involved 
in domestic mergers and acquisitions, especially when the benchmark controls for the 
industry, size and pre-acquisition performance of firms. 
4.4.1.2.5 The Relationship between Post- and Pre-acquisition Performance 
The slope coefficients presented by the pre-acquisition performance in Table 4.6 show the 
relationship between the post-acquisition adjusted performance and pre-acquisition adjusted 
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performance of combined firms. The majority of those slope coefficients are significant, 
which suggests a relationship between the post- and pre-acquisition performance.  
When the adjustment of the operating performance is made only by industry, the results of the 
measures for the full, cross-border and domestic samples show either insignificant 
relationships between the post- and pre-acquisition performance of firms or a significant 
positive relationship, which suggests that high pre-acquisition performance of acquirer and 
target firms is associated with higher post-acquisition performance for combined firms.  
When the adjustment is made on the basis of industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, 
the results for the full, cross-border and domestic samples are mixed with some of them being 
significantly positive, other being significantly negative whereas the others show an 
insignificant relationship between post-and pre-acquisition performance of firms. 
The difference in the performance benchmark used may explain the contradictory results 
across many of the previous studies and highlights the importance of the adjustment approach.   
 4.4.1.3 Change Model vs. Intercept Model Results 
Table 4.7 compares between the results of the change model and the intercept model in order 
to check whether or not the intercept model yields conclusions different from the change 
model. 
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Table 4.7: Change Model vs. Intercept Model 
    Analysis A: Median change in operating performance (%) 
Measure 
Industry adjusted   Industry, Size and Performance adjusted   
Change model   Intercept model   Change model   Intercept model   
Full CB D   Full CB D   Full CB D   Full CB D   
Measure 1 
 
  +1 +1.2 +0.3   -2.2* -3.9 -1.3   +0.3 +0.8 +1.0   -1 -3* +0.7   
Measure 2     +1 +0.1 +1.3   +3.3 +1.1 +5.3**   +1.7* +0.2 +2.3**   +2.0 -0.7 +8.3***   
Measure 3  
 
  +0.2 +0.7 +0.2   -0.2 +0.1 -0.2   +1.1 +0.3 +1.6   -0.3 -0.02 +0.3   
Measure 4     +0.5 +0.8 +0.1   -0.7 -2 +0.1   +1.5 +1.1 +2.5**   -0.1 -2.4 +2.6*   
Measure 5     +0.2 +0.3 +0.4   -2.1 -8.1 +0.6   +2.5** +0.2 +3.2***   +1.7 +0.4 +11.2***   
Measure 6     +0.4 +0.7 +0.0   -0.02* -0.1* -0.3   +2.1** +0.8 +3.0***   -0.2 -0.02** +0.5   
Measure 7  
 
  +1.1 +1.1 +0.6   -2.0* -3.6 -1.3   +0.1 +1.0 +0.8   -1 -2.7 +0.9   
 Measure 8     +1.8* +3.1*** +0.3   -3.6 -19.6 +2.9   +0.5 +1.6 +2.0**   +2.1 -9.8  +8.6   
 
The results presented in Table 4.7 show that the change model gives higher estimates of 
improvements in the industry-adjusted operating performance of firms than the intercept 
model for the full, cross-border and domestic samples for most of the measures used. 
However, measure 2, which is the cash flow measure deflated by sales, shows higher 
improvements for the full, cross-border and domestic samples using the intercept model over 
the change model even though the results are not significant. Also, measures 5 and 8, which 
are the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by sales and the accrual measure deflated by the 
book value of equity, respectively show higher improvements for the domestic sample using 
the intercept model.  
When the adjustment is made on the basis of the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance, the change model also shows higher estimates of operating performance 
improvements than the intercept model for the full, cross-border and domestic samples for 
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most of the measures used. However, measures 2 and 5, which are the cash flow and ‘pure’ 
cash flow measures scaled by sales for the domestic sample, show higher significant estimates 
of performance improvements using the intercept model over the change model. 
The comparison of the changes in adjusted-operating performance of combined firms between 
the change model and intercept model results show higher estimates of operating performance 
improvements when the change model is used in comparison with the intercept model. This 
differs from the results of Powell and Stark (2005) and Martynova et al. (2007) who show 
higher estimates of operating performance from the intercept model in comparison with the 
change model. Those contradictory results may be related to the different samples and 
different time periods examined. 
4.4.1.4 Regression Analysis 
Table 4.8 presents the results of the regression analysis tests conducted for different 
performance measures and benchmarks for the whole, cross-border and domestic samples. It 
investigates whether any improvements in the performance of combined firms can be 
explained by some of the deals’ characteristics using a multiple regression analysis. The 
variables which are examined are: whether the merger is a domestic or cross-border, the 
payment method, relative size and the industrial relatedness.  
The dependent variable is the median post-acquisition operating performance of combined 
firms adjusted for the industry and industry, size and pre-acquisition performance for the full, 
cross-border and domestic samples using eight different measures of operating performance. 
The independent variables (explanatory variables) are as follows: 
Cross-border = dummy variable equal to one, if target is cross-border, zero if domestic  
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Cross-border*Pre-performance = cross-border dummy multiplied by the pre-acquisition 
adjusted performance (shows whether there is a significant difference between the effect of 
pre-acquisition adjusted performance on post-acquisition adjusted performance for domestic 
mergers and acquisitions and cross-border mergers and acquisitions) 
Cash Payment = dummy variable equal to one, if payment is made with cash, zero if not 
Mixed Payment = dummy variable equal to one if payment is made with a mix of cash, shares 
or other payments, zero if not 
Related = dummy variable equal to one if the acquirer and target firms are from the same 
industrial group ( Datastream Industrial Classification Level 4) in year -1, zero if not 
Relative Size = the relative size of the target to the acquirer, which is the ratio of the total 
assets of the target in year -1 to the total assets of acquirer in year -1. 
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Table 4.8: Regression Analysis of Determinants of Post-acquisition 
Performance/Analysis (A) 
  
Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
acquisition adjusted 
performance   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) (6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 1:  
 
               Intercept 
 
-0.044* 
(-1.66) 
-0.026 
(-0.80) 
 
-0.046 
(-0.98) 
 
-0.032 
(-0.95) 
 
-0.026 
(-1.40) 
0.006 
(0.27) 
 
-0.012 
(-0.41) 
 
-0.017 
(-0.77) 
 Pre-acquisition adj. performance 
 
0.256* 
(1.83) 
0.355* 
(1.88) 
 
0.272 
(0.85) 
 
0.336** 
(2.14) 
 
0.415*** 
(6.46) 
0.606*** 
(6.23) 
 
0.290***
(2.83) 
 
0.581*** 
(6.88) 
 Controls 
                 Cross-border 
  
-0.028 
(-1.02) 
      
-0.037** 
(-2.10) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance  
 
-0.164 
(-0.58) 
      
-0.283** 
(-2.16) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.032 
(1.06) 
0.024 
(0.74) 
 
0.009 
(0.10) 
 
0.027 
(0.80) 
 
0.029 
(1.42) 
0.011 
(0.57) 
 
-0.024 
(-0.56) 
 
0.033 
(1.46) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.006 
(-0.17) 
-0.013 
(-0.37) 
 
-0.079 
(-1.07) 
 
0.025 
(0.66) 
 
-0.016 
(-0.72) 
-0.034 
(-1.57) 
 
-0.092** 
(-2.38) 
 
0.014 
(0.57) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.015 
(0.60) 
0.009 
(0.34) 
 
0.030 
(0.51) 
 
-0.007 
(-0.25) 
 
0.012 
(0.70) 
0.009 
(0.57) 
 
0.024 
(0.69) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.16) 
   Relative Size 
 
0.007 
(1.03) 
0.007 
(1.12) 
 
0.006 
(0.68) 
 
0.0005 
(1.30) 
 
0.006 
(1.39) 
0.007* 
(1.68) 
 
0.006 
(1.11) 
 
0.0005* 
(1.94) 
 F-statistic 
 
1.37 1.21 
 
0.63 
 
1.61 
 
9.20*** 8.53*** 
 
3.91 
 
11.74*** 
 p.value 
 
0.25 0.31 
 
0.68 
 
0.18 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.01 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.03 0.02 
 
-0.09 
 
0.06 
 
0.37 0.43 
 
0.39 
 
0.53 
 
                Measure 2: 
                               
Intercept 
 
0.041 
(0.70) 
0.100 
(1.50) 
 
0.029 
(0.28) 
 
0.057 
(0.84) 
 
-0.038 
(-0.70) 
0.021 
(0.35) 
 
-0.012 
(-0.14) 
 
0.023 
(0.38) 
 Pre-acquisition adj. performance 
 
0.177*** 
(3.46) 
0.524*** 
(3.11) 
 
0.162** 
(2.18) 
 
0.556***
(4.25) 
 
0.050* 
(1.74) 
0.887*** 
(3.00) 
 
0.034 
(1.01) 
 
1.020*** 
(5.51) 
 Controls 
                 Cross-border 
  
-0.105* 
(-1.86) 
      
-0.057 
(-1.16) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
 
-0.385** 
(-2.18) 
      
-0.846***
(-3.84) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.019 
(0.29) 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
 
-0.065 
(-0.38) 
 
0.073 
(1.05) 
 
0.067 
(1.13) 
0.043 
(0.76) 
 
0.080 
(0.65) 
 
0.060 
(0.99) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.090 
(-1.22) 
-0.088 
(-1.21) 
 
-0.257* 
(-1.65) 
 
0.039 
(0.52) 
 
-0.042 
(-0.65) 
-0.023 
(-0.38) 
 
-0.194* 
(-1.74) 
 
0.095 
(1.47) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
-0.002 
(-0.04) 
-0.017 
(-0.31) 
 
0.040 
(0.29) 
 
-0.055 
(-1.06) 
 
0.065 
(1.31) 
0.059 
(1.28) 
 
0.074 
(0.73) 
 
0.012 
(0.27) 
   Relative Size 
 
0.0001 
(0.74) 
0.0001 
(0.99) 
 
0.0001 
(0.67) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.97) 
 
0.0002 
(1.43) 
0.0002 
(1.58) 
 
0.0002 
(1.28) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.74) 
 F-statistic 
 
3.17** 3.54*** 
 
1.53 
 
4.21*** 
 
2.03* 3.90*** 
 
1.91 
 
7.05*** 
 p.value 
 
0.01 0.00 
 
0.23 
 
0.00 
 
0.09 0.00 
 
0.14 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.13 0.20 
 
0.10 
 
0.26 
 
0.07 0.22 
 
0.17 
 
0.39 
 
                
                
                
                
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
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Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
acquisition adjusted 
performance   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) (6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 3: 
                               
Intercept 
 
0.002 
(0.47) 
0.002 
(0.28) 
 
0.001 
(0.26) 
 
0.004 
(0.55) 
 
-0.010 
(-1.26) 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.77) 
 
0.0005 
(0.09) 
 Pre-acquisition adj. performance 
 
0.269*** 
(3.95) 
 
15.785 
(1.23) 
 
0.279*** 
(4.47) 
 
16.894 
(1.24) 
 
-0.002** 
(-2.28) 
-0.002** 
(-2.20) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.02) 
 
-0.002*** 
(-4.16) 
 Controls 
                 Cross-border 
  
0.001 
(0.22) 
      
-0.0001* 
(-1.87) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
 
-15.507 
(-1.21) 
      
-0.028 
(-0.13) 
       Cash Payment 
 
-0.004 
(-0.72) 
-0.003 
(-0.49) 
 
0.009 
(0.99) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.89) 
 
0.008 
(0.97) 
0.003 
(0.35) 
 
0.0001 
(0.56) 
 
0.001 
(0.24) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.003 
(-0.54) 
-0.002 
(-0.39) 
 
-0.009 
(-1.15) 
 
0.0004 
(0.05) 
 
-0.007 
(-0.80) 
-0.0001 
(-1.14) 
 
-0.0004 
(-1.41) 
 
0.003 
(0.55) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
-0.003 
(-0.63) 
-0.002 
(-0.50) 
 
0.001 
(0.17) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.87) 
 
0.0001 
(1.50) 
0.009 
(1.16) 
 
0.0001 
(0.56) 
 
0.001 
(0.23) 
   Relative Size 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.07) 
-0.0001 
(-0.09) 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.23) 
 
0.005 
(0.62) 
 
-0.00002 
(-0.84) 
-0.000 
(-0.53) 
 
-0.00001 
(-0.36) 
 
0.00004 
(0.74) 
 F-statistic 
 
3.32** 2.58** 
 
5.17** 
 
0.71 
 
2.32* 2.20* 
 
0.85 
 
4.05*** 
 p.value 
 
0.01 0.02 
 
0.01 
 
0.62 
 
0.05 0.05 
 
0.54 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.15 0.14 
 
0.50 
 
-0.03 
 
0.09 0.11 
 
-0.04 
 
0.24 
 
                Measure 4: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.035 
(-0.97) 
-0.033 
(-0.65) 
 
-0.043 
(-0.62) 
 
-0.065 
(-1.37) 
 
-0.010 
(-0.33) 
0.023 
(0.67) 
 
0.033 
(1.05) 
 
0.007 
(0.15) 
 Pre-acquisition adj. performance 
 
-0.111 
(-0.80) 
-0.109 
(-0.67) 
 
0.497 
(0.74) 
 
-0.058 
(-0.46) 
 
0.152 
(1.56) 
0.405*** 
(3.13) 
 
-0.186 
(-1.46) 
 
0.407** 
(2.84) 
 Controls 
                 Cross-border 
  
-0.004 
(-0.07) 
      
-0.029 
(-0.95) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
 
0.002 
(0.01) 
      
-0.432** 
(-2.39) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.059 
(1.37) 
0.057 
(1.05) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.02) 
 
0.089* 
(1.87) 
 
0.016 
(0.49) 
-0.004 
(-0.12) 
 
0.015 
(0.28) 
 
0.003 
(0.06) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.010 
(-0.21) 
-0.012 
(-0.20) 
 
-0.211 
(-1.50) 
 
0.079 
(1.44) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.14) 
-0.035 
(-0.97) 
 
-0.148*** 
(-3.12) 
 
0.007 
(0.13) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.028 
(0.74) 
0.028 
(0.69) 
 
0.071 
(0.74) 
 
0.024 
(0.65) 
 
0.013 
(0.49) 
0.023 
(0.87) 
 
-0.020 
(-0.54) 
 
0.030 
(0.95) 
   Relative Size 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.86) 
-0.0004 
(-0.78) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.15) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.39) 
 
-0.0003 
(-1.07) 
-0.0002 
(-0.81) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.16) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.87) 
 F-statistic 
 
0.80 0.55 
 
0.68 
 
1.09 
 
0.94 1.88 
 
2.39 
 
2.47* 
 p.value 
 
0.56 0.79 
 
0.65 
 
0.39 
 
0.47 0.09 
 
0.10 
 
0.05 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.02 -0.07 
 
-0.10 
 
0.02 
 
-0.01 0.10 
 
0.29 
 
0.16 
 
                
                
                
                
                
                
TMV
EBITDA
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
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Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
acquisition adjusted 
performance   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) (6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 5: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.093 
(-0.97) 
0.005 
(0.04) 
 
-0.038 
(-0.27) 
 
-0.107 
(-0.81) 
 
0.011 
(0.16) 
0.036 
(0.53) 
 
0.046 
(0.477) 
 
0.063 
(0.85) 
 Pre-acquisition adj. performance 
 
1.097*** 
(12.51) 
0.440 
(1.52) 
 
1.182***
(11.12) 
 
0.477* 
(1.87) 
 
-0.458 
(-0.56) 
0.598** 
(2.19) 
 
-0.480*** 
(-8.57) 
 
0.895*** 
(3.62) 
 Controls 
                 Cross-border 
  
-0.109 
(-0.99) 
      
-0.010 
(-0.17) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
 
-0.707** 
(2.35) 
      
-1.074***
(-3.92) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.080 
(0.70) 
-0.0003 
(-0.003) 
 
-0.053 
(-0.18) 
 
0.128 
(0.97) 
 
-0.038 
(-0.53) 
0.006 
(0.09) 
 
0.001 
(0.01) 
 
0.003 
(0.04) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.139 
(-1.05) 
-0.198 
(-1.54) 
 
-0.507* 
(-2.24) 
 
0.057 
(0.37) 
 
-0.190** 
(-2.42) 
-0.124* 
(-1.66) 
 
-0.281** 
(-1.99) 
 
-0.050 
(-0.61) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.142 
(1.43) 
0.097 
(1.00) 
 
0.117 
(0.64) 
 
0.090 
(0.85) 
 
0.136** 
(2.31) 
0.122** 
(2.32) 
 
0.072 
(0.61) 
 
0.101* 
(1.87) 
   Relative Size 
 
-0.001 
(-1.002) 
-0.001 
(-0.60) 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.22) 
 
-0.002 
(-1.09) 
 
-0.010 
(-0.19) 
-0.0003 
(-0.60) 
 
0.0002 
(0.32) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.35) 
 F-statistic 
 
32.93*** 27.14*** 
 
26.12*** 
 
1.01 
 
19.40*** 19.62*** 
 
15.54*** 
 
5.01*** 
 p.value 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.43 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.77 0.79 
 
0.88 
 
0.002 
 
0.62 0.70 
 
0.81 
 
0.34 
 
                Measure 6: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.0005* 
(-1.82) 
-0.007 
(-0.23) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.15) 
 
0.005 
(0.42) 
 
-0.0001 
(-1.59) 
-0.000 
(-0.01) 
 
-0.0002 
(-1.39) 
 
0.005 
(0.48) 
 Pre-acquisition adj. performance 
 
-0.003 
(-0.53) 
0.464 
(0.56) 
 
-0.007 
(-0.59) 
 
0.477* 
(1.87) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.60) 
-0.001 
(-0.50) 
 
0.044 
(0.40) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.36) 
 Controls 
                 Cross-border 
  
-0.001* 
(-1.85) 
      
-0.0002**
(-2.38) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
 
-0.470 
(-0.57) 
      
0.071 
(1.20) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.0004 
(1.37) 
0.0002 
(0.47) 
 
0.001 
(0.59) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.46) 
 
0.0001 
(1.16) 
-0.002 
(-0.15) 
 
0.010 
(0.26) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.33) 
   Mix Payment 
 
0.0003 
(0.88) 
0.0002 
(0.57) 
 
0.0004 
(0.43) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.47) 
-0.0001 
(-1.29) 
 
-0.0004 
(-1.55) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.45) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
-0.0001 
(-0.46) 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.46) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.26) 
 
0.0001* 
(1.88) 
0.0001* 
(1.85) 
 
0.0002 
(0.79) 
 
0.006 
(0.86) 
   Relative Size 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.14) 
0.00002 
(0.07) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.08) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.74) 
 
-0.0001 
(-1.07) 
-0.000 
(-0.26) 
 
0.00002 
(0.20) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.51) 
 F-statistic 
 
0.43 0.84 
 
0.17 
 
0.82 
 
1.69 2.16* 
 
1.17 
 
0.27 
 p.value 
 
0.82 0.56 
 
0.97 
 
0.54 
 
0.15 0.06 
 
0.38 
 
0.93 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.06 -0.02 
 
-0.35 
 
-0.03 
 
0.06 0.13 
 
0.05 
 
-0.11 
 
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
                
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
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Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
acquisition adjusted 
performance   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) (2)   (3)   (4)   (5) (6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 7:  
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.040 
(-1.54) 
-0.018 
(-0.55) 
 
-0.044 
(-0.88) 
 
-0.033 
(-1.06) 
 
-0.027 
(-1.34) 
0.013 
(0.60) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.06) 
 
-0.017 
(-0.67) 
 Pre-acquisition adj. performance 
 
0.410** 
(3.02) 
0.423** 
(2.32) 
 
0.578* 
(1.66) 
 
0.408***
(2.84) 
 
0.318*** 
(4.38) 
0.639*** 
(5.56) 
 
0.147 
(1.44) 
 
0.589*** 
(5.55) 
 Controls 
                 Cross-border 
  
-0.036 
(-1.23) 
      
-0.041** 
(-2.21) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
 
0.069 
(0.24) 
      
-0.459***
(-3.14) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.032 
(1.09) 
0.016 
(0.50) 
 
-0.029 
(-0.31) 
 
0.037 
(1.18) 
 
0.024 
(1.10) 
0.002 
(0.11) 
 
-0.031 
(-0.71) 
 
0.031 
(1.22) 
   Mix Payment 
 
0.003 
(0.08) 
-0.008 
(-0.23) 
 
-0.062 
(-0.82) 
 
0.031 
(0.89) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.13) 
-0.030 
(-1.28) 
 
-0.094** 
(-2.39) 
 
0.025 
(0.89) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.006 
(0.25) 
0.003 
(0.10) 
 
0.022 
(0.35) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.34) 
 
0.010 
(0.55) 
0.006 
(0.37) 
 
0.012 
(0.34) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
   Relative Size 
 
0.005 
(0.76) 
0.006 
(0.94) 
 
0.006 
(0.62) 
 
0.0001 
(0.43) 
 
0.005 
(1.18) 
0.006 
(1.46) 
 
0.005 
(0.96) 
 
0.0003 
(1.04) 
 F-statistic 
 
2.28* 1.84* 
 
0.78 
 
2.17* 
 
4.24*** 5.57*** 
 
2.22 
 
7.84*** 
 p.value 
 
0.06 0.09 
 
0.58 
 
0.08 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.10 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.08 0.08 
 
-0.05 
 
0.11 
 
0.19 0.31 
 
0.21 
 
0.42 
 
                Measure 8:  
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.165 
(-1.46) 
0.030 
(0.22) 
 
-0.138 
(-0.77) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.02) 
 
-0.112 
(-1.15) 
-0.037 
(-0.30) 
 
-0.079 
(-0.52) 
 
-0.094 
(-0.67) 
 Pre-acquisition adj. performance 
 
0.148 
(0.88) 
0.280 
(1.19) 
 
0.537 
(1.55) 
 
0.378* 
(1.87) 
 
0.051 
(0.629) 
0.076 
(0.76) 
 
0.124 
(0.66) 
 
0.045 
(0.48) 
 Controls 
                 Cross-border 
  
-0.289** 
(-2.25) 
      
-0.114 
(-1.15) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
 
0.074 
(0.22) 
      
-0.005 
(-0.03) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.214* 
(1.68) 
0.084 
(0.61) 
 
0.241 
(0.80) 
 
0.069 
(0.49) 
 
0.259** 
(2.44) 
0.215* 
(1.84) 
 
0.362 
(1.62) 
 
0.261* 
(1.83) 
   Mix Payment 
 
0.186 
(1.30) 
0.086 
(0.57) 
 
-0.408 
(-1.33) 
 
-0.298* 
(1.94) 
 
-0.216* 
(1.88) 
0.191 
(1.61) 
 
-0.080 
(-0.39) 
 
-0.362** 
(2.47) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
-0.070 
(-0.66) 
-0.111 
(-1.05) 
 
-0.299 
(-1.31) 
 
-0.119 
(-1.10) 
 
-0.070 
(-0.79) 
-0.089 
(-0.98) 
 
-0.186 
(-1.02) 
 
-0.091 
(-0.90) 
   Relative Size 
 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
0.0001 
(0.38) 
 
0.008 
(0.24) 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.001) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.28) 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.09) 
 
-0.002 
(-1.06) 
 F-statistic 
 
0.98 1.52 
 
1.26 
 
1.68 
 
1.62 1.34 
 
0.95 
 
1.84 
 p.value 
 
0.44 0.18 
 
0.32 
 
0.16 
 
0.17 0.24 
 
0.47 
 
0.13 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.002 0.05 
 
0.05 
 
0.07 
 
0.04 0.03 
 
-0.01 
 
0.08 
                                 
Values between brackets are t-statistics.  
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
CB: Cross-border sample  
D: Domestic sample 
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4.4.1.4.1 Full Sample 
Models (1) and (5) in Table 4.8 examine the impact of some of the deal characteristics on the 
post-acquisition operating performance of combined firms for the full sample using different 
performance measures and two benchmarks that control for the industry and industry, size and 
pre-acquisition performance respectively. 
Models (2) and (6) extend the examination conducted by models (1) and (5) by adding a 
cross-border dummy and another variable (cross-border*pre-performance) in order to 
examine the impact of cross-border acquisition on the post-acquisition adjusted performance 
of firms, as well as to check whether there is a significant difference between the effect of 
pre-acquisition adjusted performance on post-acquisition adjusted performance for domestic 
mergers and acquisitions and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. 
The results for the industry-adjusted performance model (1) do not show any significant 
impact for the deal characteristics on the post-acquisition adjusted performance of combined 
firms for all the measures used except measure 8, which is the accrual measure deflated by the 
book value of equity, which shows a positive impact from the cash method of payment on 
operating performance, which is significant at the 10% level.  
On the other hand, model (2) shows a significant negative impact of cross-border acquisitions 
on the post-acquisition performance of firms in three out of the eight measures used, which 
are measures 2, 6 and 8. The results also show a negative impact from the pre-acquisition 
performance of cross-border deals on the post-acquisition performance of combined firms in 
comparison with domestic acquisitions using two performance measures, which are the cash 
flow and ‘pure’ cash flow measures scaled by sales. 
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The results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance presented by model 
(5) show a significant positive impact from the industrial relatedness on the post-acquisition 
performance of combined firms for measures 5 and 6, which are the ‘pure’ cash flow 
measures deflated by sales and total market value respectively. Also, measures 5 and 8 show a 
significant negative impact from the mixed payment method on the post-acquisition 
performance of combined firms. Moreover, measure 8 shows a significant positive impact of 
the cash payment method on post-acquisition performance of combined firms.   
On the other hand, model (6) shows a significant negative impact of cross-border acquisitions 
on the post-acquisition performance of firms for four out of the eight measures used, which 
are measures 1, 3, 6 and 7. The results also show a negative impact from the pre-acquisition 
adjusted performance of cross-border deals on the post-acquisition adjusted performance of 
combined firms in comparison with domestic acquisitions using five performance measures, 
which are measures 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7. 
4.4.1.4.2 Cross-border Sample 
Models (3) and (7) in Table 4.8 examine the impact of some of the deal characteristics on the 
post-acquisition operating performance of combined firms who are involved in cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions using different performance measures and two benchmarks that 
control for the industry and industry, size and pre-acquisition performance respectively. 
When the adjustment is made on the basis of the industry median performance, the results 
show insignificant impact of the deal characteristics on the post-acquisition adjusted 
performance of firms for all the measures used except measures 2 and 5, which are the cash 
flow and ‘pure’ cash flow measures scaled by sales that show significant negative impacts 
from the mixed method of payment on the post-acquisition performance of combined firms. 
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However, the results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance presented 
by model (7) show significant negative impacts from the mixed payment method on the post-
acquisition performance of combined firms for five out of the eight measures used, which are 
the cash flow measures deflated by total assets and sales, the ‘pure’ cash flow measure scaled 
by total assets and sales and the accrual measure deflated by total assets. Those negative 
results from the mixed payment method on the post-acquisition adjusted performance support 
the arguments in the previous literature which suggest better results for takeovers financed by 
cash payments than takeovers involving equity or mixed payment methods (Ghosh, 2001 and 
Martynova et al., 2007). 
4.4.1.4.3 Domestic Sample 
Models (4) and (8) in Table 4.8 show the impact of some of the deal characteristics on the 
post-acquisition operating performance of combined firms involved in domestic M&As using 
different performance measures and two benchmarks that control for the industry and 
industry, size and pre-acquisition performance respectively. 
The results for the industry-adjusted performance model (4) show an insignificant impact of 
the deal characteristics on the post-acquisition adjusted performance of firms for six out of the 
eight measures used. However, measure 4, which is the ‘pure’ cash flow measure scaled by 
total assets, shows a positive impact from the cash method of payment on the post-acquisition 
performance of combined firms and measure 8, which is the accrual measure deflated by the 
book value of equity, shows a significant negative impact of the mixed payment method. 
The results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance presented by model 
(8) show a significant positive impact from the relative size of targets to acquirers on the post-
acquisition performance of combined firms using the cash flow measure deflated by total 
assets, significant positive impact from the industrial relatedness between acquirer and target 
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firms using the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by sales and a significant impact of the 
payment method using the accrual measure deflated by the book value of equity being 
positive for the cash and negative for the mixed payment method. 
Most of the results show a significant positive impact of the cash payment method, a negative 
significant impact from the mixed payment method and a significant negative impact of cross-
border acquisitions on the post-acquisition performance of combined firms. 
However, the overall results of the regression analysis have provided little evidence about the 
ability of the other deal characteristics to explain the post-acquisition performance of 
combined firms across most of the performance measures, deflators and benchmarks used. 
4.4.1.5 Summary of Analysis (A) Results 
Analysis (A) examines the changes in the operating performance of acquirer and target firms 
combined using a sample of 98 pairs of acquirers and targets. The results for the full, cross-
border and domestic samples are mixed, with some of them being significantly positive, 
others being significantly negative, whereas others are insignificant. Those inconsistencies in 
the results might be related to the different performance measures, benchmarks and methods 
used in the analysis. However, the majority of those results show insignificant changes in the 
operating performance of acquirer and target firms combined. 
More specifically, when the adjustment is made for the industry median performance, the 
change model results show insignificant positive changes in the industry-adjusted operating 
performance of combined firms for all the measures used in the full, cross-border and 
domestic samples. However, measure 8, which is the accrual measure deflated by the book 
value of equity, shows significant positive changes in the operating performance of combined 
firms in the full and cross-border samples. 
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When the intercept model is used, the results show insignificant changes in the industry-
adjusted operating performance of combined firms for most of the measures used for the full, 
cross-border and domestic samples. More specifically, the results for the full sample show 
insignificant changes in the operating performance of firms for five out of the eight measures 
used. However, measures 1, 6 and 7, which are the cash flow deflated by the book value of 
assets, the ‘pure’ cash flow deflated by total market value and the accrual measure deflated by 
the book value of total assets, show significant negative changes in the operating performance 
of combined firms. 
For the cross-border sample, the results show insignificant changes for all the measures used 
except measure 6, which is the ‘pure’ cash flow deflated by total market value, which shows 
significant negative changes in the operating performance of firms. However, the domestic 
sample show insignificant changes for all the measures used except measure 2, which is the 
cash flow deflated by sales, which shows significant positive changes in the operating 
performance of combined firms. 
When the control is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, most of the 
change model results show either insignificant or significant positive changes in the operating 
performance of combined firms. The results for the full sample show insignificant positive 
changes in the operating performance of acquirers for five out of the eight measures used. 
However, measures 2, 5 and 6, which are the cash flow and ‘pure’ cash flow measures both 
deflated by sales and the ‘pure’ cash flow deflated by total market value, show significant 
positive changes. The cross-border sample shows insignificant positive changes in the 
operating performance of combined firms for all the measures used. On the other hand, the 
domestic sample show significant positive changes in the operating performance of firms for 
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five out of the eight measures used, which are measures 2, 4, 5, 6 and 8, whereas there are 
insignificant changes for the other measures.  
When the intercept model is used, the results of the different measures are contradictory with 
insignificant changes in the operating performance of firms for the full sample, insignificant 
negative changes in the operating performance of firms for the cross-border sample whereas 
there are insignificant positive changes in the operating performance of combined firms for 
the domestic sample. 
The results for the change and intercept models suggest lower operating performance 
improvements for combined firms involved in cross-border M&As in comparison with 
domestic M&As and being significant when the adjustment is made on the basis of industry, 
size and pre-acquisition performance. 
4.4.2 Results of Analysis (B) 
This section presents the results of analysis (B) which contains the examination of the 
operating performance of 98 UK acquirer firms that are included in Analysis (A) in order to 
check whether or not the results from examining acquirer firms only are different from those 
of acquirer and target firms combined. Similar to the previous analysis, several measures, 
models and benchmarks were used in conducting the tests.   
4.4.2.1 Change Model Results 
The results of the change model show the difference between the median post-takeover 
performance and the median pre-takeover performance of UK acquirers for the full, cross-
border and domestic samples using eight different measures and two performance 
benchmarks. 
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4.4.2.1.1 Full Sample  
The empirical results for the change model are shown in Table 4.9 for the full sample of 
acquisitions.  
Table 4.9: Analysis (B) Operating Performance Changes of UK Acquirer Firms (Full 
Sample) 
  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 1: 
 
 
       -3 15.80 81 
 
2.29 57 
 
-1.45 59 
 -2 15.66 85 
 
2.29 62 
 
-1.36 62 
 -1 14.28 92 
 
1.07 75 
 
-1.55 72 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 15.68 92  1.89 75  -1.20 72  
1 13.11 92 
 
0.04 75 
 
-1.87 72 
 2 10.74 92 
 
0.01 73 
 
-3.47 71 
 3 10.78 92 
 
-0.78 73 
 
-2.16 71 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 11.67 92  0.37 75  -1.73 72  
Median difference 3.10 ** 92 
 
2.00 * 75 
 
0.63 72 
 Measure 2: 
                   
-3 15.69 81 
 
1.25 57 
 
-2.52 59 
 -2 14.87 85 
 
1.59 62 
 
-1.23 62 
 -1 15.61 93 
 
0.07 75 
 
-2.24 72 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 14.91 93  1.10 75  -1.53 72  
1 12.75 93 
 
-0.58 75 
 
-1.57 72 
 2 13.04 93 
 
1.40 72 
 
-0.35 71 
 3 12.69 93 
 
-0.71 71 
 
-1.01 71 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 13.31 93  0.63 75  -0.004 72  
Median difference 1.16 93 
 
0.06 75 
 
0.08 72 
 Measure 3: 
                   
-3 0.01 76 
 
-0.001 52 
 
0.001 55 
 -2 0.01 82 
 
-24.50 57 
 
0.001 57 
 -1 0.01 92 
 
-0.003 72 
 
-0.004 71 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 0.01 92  -0.01 72  -0.002 71  
1 0.02 92 
 
-0.001 72 
 
-0.001 71 
 2 0.02 92 
 
-22.56 70 
 
-0.001 70 
 3 0.02 92 
 
0.001 70 
 
-0.001 70 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 0.02 92  -0.004 72  -0.001 71  
Median difference 2.68 ** 92 
 
1.01 72 
 
1.51 71 
 
  
 
       
  
 
       
  
 
       
TMV
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 4: 
 
 
       -3 18.10 66 
 
19.90 43 
 
3.72 40 
 -2 15.40 73 
 
4.47 48 
 
0.19 50 
 -1 13.66 78 
 
1.26 52 
 
-0.02 58 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 15.75 78  6.09 52  0.52 58  
1 8.74 78 
 
2.92 52 
 
0.56 58 
 2 7.95 78 
 
0.28 50 
 
-0.60 58 
 3 7.32 78 
 
0.37 48 
 
-1.47 58 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 8.48 78  1.61 52  -0.70 58  
Median difference 6.26 *** 78 
 
2.30 ** 52 
 
0.67 58 
           Measure 5: 
                   
-3 13.93 68 
 
17.97 42 
 
0.68 40 
 -2 13.13 74 
 
1.42 47 
 
-0.34 50 
 -1 11.70 80 
 
-2.85 53 
 
-1.26 58 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 12.76 80  3.15 53  -0.39 58  
1 24.17 80 
 
1.66 53 
 
2.94 58 
 2 23.49 80 
 
1.54 51 
 
1.23 57 
 3 22.53 80 
 
0.10 49 
 
1.15 57 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 24.71 80  1.06 53  2.24 58  
Median difference 3.89 *** 80 
 
0.66 53 
 
1.29 58 
 Measure 6: 
                   
-3 0.01 67 
 
0.01 40 
 
0.004 38 
 -2 0.01 72 
 
-27.14 43 
 
-0.002 45 
 -1 0.01 78 
 
-0.003 51 
 
-0.004 56 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 0.01 78  -0.01 51  -0.003 56  
1 12.24 78 
 
0.001 51 
 
0.003 56 
 2 11.02 78 
 
-21.31 49 
 
0.00004 55 
 3 11.86 78 
 
0.01 47 
 
0.004 55 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 11.79 78  -0.002 51  0.002 56  
Median difference 9.67 *** 78 
 
0.46 51 
 
2.23 ** 56 
 Measure 7:  
 
 
       -3 10.39 85 
 
1.47 57 
 
-1.56 58 
 -2 10.68 91 
 
1.34 62 
 
-1.09 62 
 -1 9.52 98 
 
0.43 75 
 
-1.15 72 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 10.50 98  1.45 75  -1.06 72  
1 13.12 98 
 
0.62 75 
 
-1.43 72 
 2 11.40 98 
 
-0.04 73 
 
-3.05 71 
 3 12.40 98 
 
-1.75 70 
 
-0.90 71 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 12.02 98  0.31 75  -1.34 72  
Median difference 1.99 * 98 
 
1.72 * 75 
 
0.64 72 
 
          
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
median 
(%) 
Nr. 
Obs   
Measure 8:  
                   
-3 26.26 86 
 
4.52 56 
 
-3.22 58 
 -2 27.98 90 
 
2.72 62 
 
-0.07 62 
 -1 27.60 98 
 
1.91 75 
 
-1.48 72 
 Median pre-acquisition 
performance 26.98 98  3.81 75  -0.56 72  
1 0.02 98 
 
-4.30 75 
 
-0.25 72 
 2 0.02 98 
 
4.29 73 
 
1.82 71 
 3 0.02 98 
 
0.91 73 
 
0.56 71 
 Median post-acquisition 
performance 0.02 98  2.68 75  2.38 72  
Median difference 10.61 *** 98 
 
1.37 75 
 
0.07 72 
 Median difference between the median post- acquisition performance and median pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms is 
conducted using Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
The results for the raw performance of acquirers (without adjustment) presented in Table 4.9 
show significant positive changes in operating performance of acquirers for all the measures 
used except measure 2, which is the cash flow measure deflated by sales. The positive 
significant results range between 1.99% and 10.61%. However, the result for measure 2 
shows statistically insignificant positive changes in operating performance. 
When the adjustment is made for the industry median performance, the results show 
significant positive changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms for three out of the 
eight measures used which are measures 1, 4 and 7, which all have a book value of total assets 
scale. However, the other measures didn’t show any significant differences between the 
median post- and median pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms. 
On the other hand, when the control is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance, the results show statistically insignificant positive differences between the 
median post- and median pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms for all the measures 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
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used except measure 6, which is the ‘pure’ cash flow deflated by total market value, which 
shows positive improvements of 2.23% and is significant at the 5% level. 
4.4.2.1.2 Cross-border Sample  
Table 4.10 presents the empirical results from using the change model for examining the 
cross-border sample of UK acquirer firms using different performance measures and 
benchmarks.  
Table 4.10: Analysis (B) Operating Performance Changes of UK Acquirer Firms (Cross-
border Sample) 
  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
Measure 1: 
 
 
       -3 16.19 30 
 
2.43 18 
 
-1.45 18 
 -2 14.85 33 
 
2.65 22 
 
1.41 20 
 -1 14.64 36 
 
1.31 26 
 
-0.07 24 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
14.64 36  2.78 26  0.45 24  
1 14.32 36 
 
0.30 26 
 
-2.01 24 
 2 11.37 36 
 
0.37 26 
 
-4.33 24 
 3 8.62 36 
 
-0.61 25 
 
-2.16 24 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
11.52 36  0.37 26  -2.16 24  
          Median 
difference 2.01 ** 36 
 
1.75 * 26 
 
1.08 24 
 Measure 2: 
 
                  
-3 17.34 30 
 
4.22 17 
 
7.38 18 
 -2 17.30 33 
 
0.84 22 
 
2.94 20 
 -1 15.61 36 
 
0.07 26 
 
-1.62 24 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
16.13 36  2.67 26  2.94 24  
1 13.56 36 
 
0.39 26 
 
0.06 24 
 2 13.05 36 
 
1.36 25 
 
-5.63 24 
 3 13.94 36 
 
0.57 24 
 
-3.31 24 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
13.56 36  0.39 26  -3.49 24  
          Median 
difference 0.95 36 
 
13.58 26 
 
1.38 24 
           
Sales
EBITDA
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
Measure 3: 
 
                  
-3 0.01 26 
 
-0.003 14 
 
0.003 16 
 -2 0.01 31 
 
-27.92 19 
 
0.001 18 
 -1 0.01 35 
 
-0.003 23 
 
-0.003 23 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
0.01 35  -0.01 23  -0.001 23  
1 0.02 35 
 
-0.002 23 
 
-0.004 23 
 2 0.02 35 
 
-20.70 23 
 
-0.01 23 
 3 0.01 35 
 
-0.002 23 
 
-0.001 23 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
0.02 35  -0.01 23  -0.004 23  
          Median 
difference 1.71 * 35 
 
1.19 23 
 
0.69 23 
 Measure 4: 
 
 
       -3 18.14 25 
 
33.35 14 
 
7.44 12 
 -2 17.63 28 
 
8.80 19 
 
0.49 16 
 -1 11.70 30 
 
2.46 20 
 
-3.31 18 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
15.63 30  8.75 20  5.49 18  
1 9.38 30 
 
3.95 20 
 
-3.23 18 
 2 8.90 30 
 
-0.33 20 
 
-0.65 18 
 3 4.77 30 
 
0.37 20 
 
-1.79 18 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
9.38 30  2.03 20  -3.23 18  
          Median 
difference 3.42 *** 30 
 
2.29 * 20 
 
0.79 18 
 
          Measure 5: 
 
                  
-3 11.53 27 
 
24.42 13 
 
8.88 13 
 -2 15.46 29 
 
4.63 18 
 
0.29 16 
 -1 11.67 31 
 
4.05 20 
 
-6.70 18 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
12.43 31  5.91 20  -2.36 18  
1 25.52 31 
 
8.89 20 
 
6.88 18 
 2 24.53 31 
 
1.22 20 
 
0.83 18 
 3 19.84 31 
 
1.19 20 
 
3.12 18 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
25.52 31  1.90 20  3.49 18  
          Median 
difference 1.89 * 31 
 
0.74 20 
 
0.55 18 
 
          
TMV
EBITDA
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
Measure 6: 
                   
-3 0.01 26 
 
0.01 12 
 
0.003 12 
 -2 0.01 27 
 
-23.95 16 
 
-0.01 15 
 -1 0.01 30 
 
-0.01 18 
 
-0.01 17 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
0.01 30  -0.02 18  -0.01 17  
1 13.56 30 
 
0.004 18 
 
0.002 17 
 2 11.91 30 
 
-24.59 18 
 
-0.002 17 
 3 11.20 30 
 
-0.002 18 
 
-0.01 17 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
11.91 30  -0.004 18  -0.001 17  
          Median difference 5.18 *** 30 
 
1.34 18 
 
0.47 17 
 Measure 7:  
 
 
       -3 10.29 32 
 
2.36 19 
 
1.42 17 
 -2 10.55 36 
 
2.41 23 
 
1.12 20 
 -1 9.02 39 
 
1.30 26 
 
0.45 24 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
9.90 39  2.34 26  2.04 24  
1 13.31 39 
 
1.54 26 
 
-1.57 24 
 2 14.28 39 
 
1.77 26 
 
-3.37 24 
 3 12.43 39 
 
-0.85 26 
 
-0.61 24 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
13.21 39  1.54 26  -1.36 24  
          Median difference 1.75 * 39 
 
1.22 26 
 
1.34 24 
           Measure 8: 
                   
-3 29.35 31 
 
3.89 17 
 
-7.73 17 
 -2 33.94 35 
 
3.46 22 
 
6.76 20 
 -1 32.50 39 
 
11.71 26 
 
10.33 24 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
31.30 39  13.39 26  4.30 24  
1 0.02 39 
 
-2.22 26 
 
2.62 24 
 2 0.02 39 
 
4.29 26 
 
-14.23 24 
 3 0.02 39 
 
4.76 26 
 
-1.83 24 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
0.02 39  4.76 25  -11.26 24  
          Median difference 5.92 *** 39 
 
1.92 * 26 
 
1.63 24 
 
          Median difference between the median post- acquisition performance and median pre-acquisition performance of 
acquirer firms is conducted using Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑎𝑎𝑒𝑒
 
   218 
The results presented in Table 4.10 for the raw performance of firms (without adjustment) 
show statistically significant positive changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms 
for all the performance measures used except measure 2, which is the cash flow measure 
deflated by sales. Therefore, the results for the raw performance of acquirers in cross-border 
acquisitions are similar to the raw performance of acquirers in the full sample.  
Similarly to the results of the industry-adjusted performance for the full sample, the results for 
the cross-border sample show significant positive changes in operating performance of 
acquirers for three out of the eight performance measures, which are the cash flow and ‘pure’ 
cash flow measures both deflated by total assets as well as the accrual measure deflated by 
book value of equity. However, the other five measures show insignificant positive changes 
between the median post- and median pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms. 
When the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance of firms, 
the results reveal insignificant positive differences between the median post- and median pre-
acquisition performance of acquirer firms for all the eight performance measures used. 
4.4.2.1.3 Domestic Sample  
Table 4.11 presents the empirical results of the change model for examining the domestic 
sample of UK acquirers using different performance measures and benchmarks.  
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Table 4.11: Analysis (B) Operating Performance Changes of UK Acquirer Firms 
(Domestic Sample) 
  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
Measure 1: 
 
 
       -3 15.69 52 
 
1.28 40 
 
-1.27 42 
 -2 16.47 53 
 
1.78 41 
 
-1.48 43 
 -1 13.78 57 
 
0.87 50 
 
-2.08 49 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
16.35 57  1.48 50  -1.51 49  
1 11.70 57 
 
-0.10 50 
 
-1.56 49 
 2 10.22 57 
 
-0.12 48 
 
-2.58 48 
 3 11.36 57 
 
-0.97 49 
 
-1.96 48 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
11.70 57  0.45 50  -1.06 49  
Median 
difference 2.30 ** 57 
 
1.32 50 
 
0.00 49 
           Measure 2: 
 
                  
-3 15.54 52 
 
1.12 40 
 
-4.13 42 
 -2 14.62 53 
 
2.31 41 
 
-2.58 43 
 -1 14.67 58 
 
0.04 50 
 
-2.45 49 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
14.80 58  1.04 50  -2.52 49  
1 11.62 58 
 
-1.62 50 
 
-2.35 49 
 2 12.61 58 
 
1.40 48 
 
0.28 48 
 3 11.51 58 
 
-1.49 48 
 
-0.86 48 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
12.82 58  1.14 50  0.21 49  
Median 
difference 0.83 58 
 
0.09 50 
 
1.16 49 
           Measure 3: 
                   
-3 0.01 51 
 
-0.001 39 
 
-0.001 40 
 -2 0.01 52 
 
-24.14 39 
 
-0.001 40 
 -1 0.01 58 
 
-0.003 50 
 
-0.004 49 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
0.01 58  -0.004 50  -0.003 49  
1 0.01 58 
 
0.001 50 
 
-0.0004 49 
 2 0.02 58 
 
-23.33 47 
 
0.002 48 
 3 0.02 58 
 
0.002 48 
 
-0.001 48 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
0.02 58  -0.003 50  0.001 49  
Median 
difference 1.99 58 
 
0.49 50 
 
2.25 ** 49 
 
TMV
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
Measure 4: 
 
 
       -3 18.07 42 
 
16.13 30 
 
0.14 29 
 -2 15.17 45 
 
2.35 30 
 
0.19 35 
 -1 14.76 49 
 
0.57 33 
 
0.27 41 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
15.87 49  3.10 33  0.27 41  
1 8.65 49 
 
2.25 33 
 
2.61 41 
 2 6.45 49 
 
1.46 31 
 
-0.55 41 
 3 7.60 49 
 
0.48 29 
 
-1.15 41 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
7.20 49  1.52 33  -0.11 41  
          Median 
difference 5.32 *** 49 
 
1.31 33 
 
0.16 41 
 
          Measure 5: 
 
                  
-3 15.01 43 
 
13.16 30 
 
-0.95 29 
 -2 12.76 46 
 
-0.48 30 
 
-1.41 35 
 -1 11.74 49 
 
-4.8 34 
 
-0.72 41 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
12.76 49  2.95 34  0.17 41  
1 23.76 48 
 
0.76 34 
 
2.50 41 
 2 23.48 49 
 
1.76 32 
 
1.65 40 
 3 22.86 49 
 
-1.89 30 
 
-0.23 40 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
24.43 49  0.76 34  1.75 41  
          Median 
difference 3.55 *** 49 
 
0.37 34 
 
1.11 41 
 
          Measure 6: 
                   
-3 0.01 43 
 
0.01 29 
 
0.004 27 
 -2 0.01 46 
 
-27.14 28 
 
-0.001 31 
 -1 0.02 49 
 
-0.003 34 
 
-0.003 40 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
0.01 49  -0.002 34  -0.002 40  
1 11.79 48 
 
0.001 34 
 
0.004 40 
 2 10.65 49 
 
-18.31 32 
 
0.003 39 
 3 12.25 49 
 
0.01 30 
 
0.01 39 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
11.60 49  -0.002 34  0.004 40  
          Median 
difference 8.18 *** 49 
 
0.41 34 
 
2.23 ** 40 
 
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
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  Raw' performance   Industry-adjusted   
Industry, Size and 
Performance -
adjusted   
 Year 
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
median 
(%) Nr. Obs   
Measure 7:  
 
 
       -3 10.84 54 
 
1.10 40 
 
-1.75 42 
 -2 11.54 56 
 
1.24 41 
 
-1.11 43 
 -1 10.58 60 
 
0.38 50 
 
-2.33 49 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
11.74 60  1.09 50  -1.53 49  
1 12.67 60 
 
0.36 50 
 
-1.23 49 
 2 11.35 60 
 
-0.12 48 
 
-3.00 48 
 3 12.40 60 
 
-2.77 46 
 
-1.37 48 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
11.44 60  -0.38 50  -1.32 49  
          Median 
difference 0.99 60 
 
1.49 50 
 
0.13 49 
           Measure 8: 
                   
-3 25.49 54 
 
5.15 40 
 
-1.22 42 
 -2 25.02 56 
 
2.72 41 
 
-3.34 43 
 -1 23.56 60 
 
0.90 50 
 
-2.30 49 
 Median pre-
acquisition 
performance 
24.43 60  2.35 50  -2.70 49  
1 0.02 60 
 
-5.54 50 
 
-0.26 49 
 2 0.02 60 
 
4.01 48 
 
2.12 48 
 3 0.02 60 
 
-0.40 48 
 
0.71 48 
 Median post-
acquisition 
performance 
0.02 60  2.05 50  2.62 49  
          Median 
difference 8.81 *** 60 
 
0.32 50 
 
1.24 49 
 
           
Median difference between the median post- acquisition performance and median pre-acquisition performance of 
acquirer firms is conducted using Wilcoxon signed rank test. 
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
 
The results for the domestic sample presented in Table 4.11 show that the change in the raw 
performance of acquirer firms (without adjustment) is significantly positive for measures 1, 4, 
5, 6 and 8 and ranges between 2.30% and 8.81%. The other three measures, which are the 
cash flow measures deflated by sales and total market value as well as the accrual measure 
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
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deflated by total assets, show insignificant positive changes in operating performance of 
acquirer firms.  
However, when the adjustment is made for the industry median performance, the results for 
the domestic sample do not show any significant differences between the median post- and 
median pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms for all the performance measures used.  
When the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, the 
results reveal significant positive improvements in operating performance of acquirer firms 
for only two out of the eight measures used, which are the cash flow measure and the ‘pure’ 
cash flow measure both deflated by total market value. The overall results of the change 
model show insignificant positive changes in the adjusted operating performance of acquirer 
firms involved in domestic mergers and acquisitions. 
4.4.2.2 Intercept Model Results 
Table 4.12 presents the results of the intercept model of analysis (B) using different 
performance measures with different deflators and two performance benchmarks for the full, 
cross-border and domestic samples of UK acquirers. 
Models 1, 3 and 4 show the results of acquirer firms from the intercept model using an 
industry-adjusted median performance for the full, cross-border and domestic acquisitions 
respectively. Models 5, 7 and 8 show the results for the full, cross-border and domestic 
samples of acquirer firms respectively using a matched group based on the industry, size and 
pre-acquisition performance.    
Moreover, models 2 and 6 in Table 4.12 extend the intercept model results by adding the 
cross-border dummy for the purpose of checking the impact of cross-border acquisitions on 
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the changes in operating performance of acquirer firms for the industry- adjusted and 
industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance of acquirer firms respectively.   
Table 4.12: Regression of Post-takeover-adjusted Performance of Acquirer Firms on 
Pre-takeover-adjusted Performance / Analysis (B) 
Independent 
variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
performance adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
   (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8)   
Measure 1: 
 
               Intercept 
 
-0.019 
(-1.60) 
-0.010 
(-0.68) 
 
-0.039 
(-1.36) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.85) 
 
-0.021** 
(-2.13) 
-0.006 
(-0.55) 
 
-0.052*** 
(-2.94) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.80) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.117 
(1.29) 
0.124 
(1.37) 
 
0.173 
(0.57) 
 
0.115 
(1.45) 
 
0.399*** 
(6.53) 
0.413*** 
(6.90) 
 
0.553*** 
(5.39) 
 
0.329*** 
(4.56) 
 Cross-border 
  
-0.028 
(-1.10) 
      
-0.045** 
(-2.17) 
     F-statistic 
 
1.65 1.44 
 
0.33 
 
2.10 
 
42.69*** 24.82*** 
 
29.09*** 
 
20.79*** 
 p.value 
 
0.20 0.24 
 
0.57 
 
0.15 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.01 0.01 
 
-0.03 
 
0.02 
 
0.37 0.40 
 
0.56 
 
0.29 
 
                Measure 2: 
                               
Intercept 
 
0.004 
(0.19) 
0.017 
(0.60) 
 
-0.022 
(-0.40) 
 
0.013 
(0.90) 
 
-0.015 
(-0.61) 
0.006 
(0.19) 
 
-0.063 
(-1.11) 
 
0.017 
(0.63) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.008 
(0.11) 
-0.002 
(-0.02) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.03) 
 
0.717*** 
(8.02) 
 
0.148*** 
(13.42) 
0.148*** 
(13.10) 
 
0.148*** 
(10.43) 
 
0.285*** 
(2.91) 
 Cross-border 
  
-0.038 
(-0.77) 
      
-0.069 
(-1.26) 
     F-statistic 
 
0.01 0.30 
 
0.001 
 
6.44*** 
 
18.34*** 9.25*** 
 
11.54*** 
 
8.47** 
 p.value 
 
0.91 0.74 
 
0.98 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.01 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.01 -0.02 
 
-0.04 
 
0.56 
 
0.99 0.99 
 
0.99 
 
0.13 
 
                Measure 3: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.004 
(-1.03) 
-0.005 
(-1.21) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.16) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.74) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.40) 
0.003 
(0.71) 
 
-0.0001 
(-1.17) 
 
0.003* 
(1.74) 
 Pre-performance 
 
-0.015 
(-0.14) 
0.009 
(0.08) 
 
0.008*** 
(3.91) 
 
12.876 
(0.83) 
 
-0.002** 
(-2.30) 
-0.002** 
(-2.18) 
 
0.352 
(1.04) 
 
-0.002*** 
(-5.39) 
 Cross-border 
  
0.005 
(0.65) 
      
-0.0001* 
(-1.86) 
     F-statistic 
 
0.02 0.22 
 
15.30*** 
 
0.69 
 
5.27** 4.46** 
 
1.08 
 
29.01*** 
 p.value 
 
0.89 0.80 
 
0.001 
 
0.41 
 
0.02 0.02 
 
0.31 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.01 -0.02 
 
0.39 
 
-0.01 
 
0.06 0.09 
 
0.004 
 
0.37 
 
                Measure 4: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.014 
(-0.72) 
-0.003 
(-0.13) 
 
-0.045 
(-1.20) 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.02) 
 
-0.011 
(-0.83) 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
 
-0.036 
(-1.24) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.09) 
 Pre-performance 
 
-0.027 
(-0.29) 
-0.028 
(-0.30) 
 
0.242 
(0.82) 
 
-0.072 
(-0.80) 
 
0.101 
(1.46) 
0.110 
(1.57) 
 
0.138 
(0.80) 
 
0.102 
(1.36) 
 Cross-border 
  
-0.027 
(-0.72) 
      
-0.035 
(-1.15) 
     F-statistic 
 
0.08 0.30 
 
0.67 
 
0.64 
 
2.12 1.72 
 
0.64 
 
1.85 
 p.value 
 
0.78 0.74 
 
0.42 
 
0.43 
 
0.15 0.19 
 
0.43 
 
0.18 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.02 -0.03 
 
-0.02 
 
-0.01 
 
0.02 0.02 
 
-0.02 
 
0.02 
                 
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
TMV
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
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Independent 
variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
performance adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
   (1) (2) 
 
(3) 
 
(4) 
 
(5) (6) 
 
(7) 
 
(8)   
Measure 5: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.002 
(-0.07) 
-0.003 
(-0.06) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.03) 
 
0.001 
(0.02) 
 
0.006 
(0.19) 
0.015 
(0.42) 
 
-0.019 
(-0.33) 
 
0.051* 
(1.79) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.006*** 
(17.47) 
0.006*** 
(17.02) 
 
0.006*** 
(18.98) 
 
-0.156 
(-1.36) 
 
-0.28*** 
(-23.11) 
-0.276*** 
(-22.82) 
 
-0.276*** 
(-22.94) 
 
0.199** 
(2.23) 
 Cross-border 
  
0.001 
(0.01) 
      
-0.034 
(-0.49) 
     F-statistic 
 
30.52*** 14.96*** 
 
3.61*** 
 
1.86 
 
5.29*** 26.11*** 
 
4.93*** 
 
4.99** 
 p.value 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.18 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.03 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.85 0.85 
 
0.95 
 
0.03 
 
0.99 0.99 
 
0.99 
 
0.09 
                 
Measure 6: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.008 
(-1.45) 
-0.012** 
(-1.80) 
 
-0.0003 
(-1.09) 
 
-0.012 
(-1.45) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.16) 
0.004 
(0.88) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.63) 
 
0.004 
(1.24) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.002 
(0.19) 
0.004 
(0.31) 
 
0.004 
(0.11) 
 
0.004 
(0.25) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.54) 
-0.001 
(-0.39) 
 
1.20 
(1.43) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
 Cross-border 
  
0.012 
(1.06) 
      
-0.0002 
(-0.39) 
     F-statistic 
 
0.03 0.57 
 
0.01 
 
0.06 
 
0.30 1.96 
 
2.03 
 
0.31 
 p.value 
 
0.85 0.57 
 
0.91 
 
0.80 
 
0.59 0.15 
 
0.18 
 
0.58 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.02 -0.02 
 
-0.06 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.01 0.03 
 
0.06 
 
-0.02 
                 
Measure 7: 
                               
Intercept 
 
-0.018 
(-1.48) 
-0.009 
(-0.61) 
 
-0.039 
(-1.36) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.78) 
 
-0.020* 
(-1.96) 
-0.006 
(-0.48) 
 
-0.050*** 
(-2.61) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.53) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.179** 
(2.06) 
0.186** 
(2.15) 
 
0.325 
(1.32) 
 
0.146* 
(1.89) 
 
0.324*** 
(4.99) 
0.344*** 
(5.35) 
 
0.367*** 
(3.39) 
 
0.328*** 
(4.04) 
 Cross-border 
  
-0.027 
(-1.04) 
      
-0.043** 
(-1.99) 
     F-statistic 
 
4.26** 2.67* 
 
1.73 
 
3.59* 
 
24.98*** 15.01*** 
 
11.47*** 
 
16.33*** 
 p.value 
 
0.04 0.08 
 
0.20 
 
0.06 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.003 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.04 0.04 
 
0.03 
   
0.25 0.28 
 
0.32 
 
0.24 
                 
Measure 8: 
                               
Intercept 
 
0.016 
(0.32) 
0.021 
(0.34) 
 
-0.187 
(-1.55) 
 
0.025 
(0.52) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.09) 
0.053 
(0.96) 
 
-0.135 
(-1.59) 
 
0.053 
(1.02) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.025 
(0.67) 
0.025 
(0.66) 
 
0.790*** 
(2.87) 
 
0.005 
(0.17) 
 
0.052 
(1.41) 
0.054 
(1.47) 
 
0.185** 
(2.17) 
 
0.020 
(0.52) 
 Cross-border 
  
-0.015 
(-0.15) 
      
-0.179* 
(-1.84) 
     F-statistic 
 
0.44 0.23 
 
8.26** 
 
0.03 
 
1.99 2.72* 
 
4.70** 
 
0.27 
 p.value 
 
0.51 0.79 
 
0.01 
 
0.86 
 
0.16 0.07 
 
0.04 
 
0.60 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.01 -0.02 
 
0.23 
 
-0.02 
 
0.01 0.05 
 
0.14 
 
-0.02 
                           
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
𝐸𝐸𝐵𝐵𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎𝑎
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4.4.2.2.1 Full Sample  
The results for model (1), which represents the full sample, show no significant changes 
between the post-acquisition and pre-acquisition industry-adjusted performance of acquirer 
firms for all the eight measures used, whether being cash flow, ‘pure’ cash flow or accrual 
measures.  
Moreover, when the control is done for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance of 
firms the results for the full sample shown by model (5) show no significant changes in 
operating performance between the post- and pre-acquisition adjusted performance for six out 
of the eight measures used. However, measures 1 and 7, which are the cash flow measure 
deflated by total assets and the accrual measure deflated by total assets, show negative 
changes in operating performance of acquirer firms that are statistically significant at the 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. 
4.4.2.2.2 Cross-border Sample  
The examination of the cross-border sample shows similar results as those of the full sample 
with insignificant changes in the industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms as 
shown in model (3). The results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted 
performance are similar to the full sample with insignificant changes in the operating 
performance of acquirer firms for six out of the eight measures used. However, measures 1 
and 7, which are the cash flow measure deflated by total assets and the accrual measure 
deflated by total assets, show negative changes in operating performance of acquirer firms 
that are both significant at the 1% level. 
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4.4.2.2.3 Domestic Sample  
The results for the domestic sample presented by model (4) also didn’t show any significant 
changes between the post-acquisition and pre-acquisition industry-adjusted performance of 
acquirer firms for all the performance measures used.  
However, when the control is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance in 
model (8) the results show insignificant changes in the operating performance of acquirer 
firms for six out of the eight measures used. The other two measures, which are the cash flow 
measure deflated by total market value and the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by sales, 
show significant positive improvements in operating performance by 0.30% and 5.10% 
respectively and are both significant at the 10% level.  
In general, whether the adjustment is made for the industry median performance or the 
industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, most of the intercept model results do not 
show any significant changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms for the full, 
cross-border and domestic samples.  
4.4.2.2.4 Cross-border Effect 
When the examination is done for the impact of cross-border acquisitions on the post-
acquisition performance of acquirer firms using models (2) and (6), the industry-adjusted 
operating performance of acquirer firms do not show any significant impact of cross-border 
deals on post-acquisition adjusted performance of acquirer firms for all the eight measures 
used. 
On the other hand, when the matching is done on the basis of industry, size and pre-
acquisition performance of firms, the results show a significant negative impact of cross-
border acquisitions on post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms for four out of the eight 
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measures used, which are the cash flow measure deflated by total assets and total market 
value and the accrual measure deflated by total assets and the book value of equity. 
The results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance show more 
significant negative impacts for the cross-border acquisitions on the post-acquisition 
performance of acquirer firms in comparison with the industry-adjusted performance and 
suggest lower operating performance for acquirer firms involved in cross-border M&As in 
comparison with domestic M&As. 
4.4.2.2.5 The Relationship between Pre- and Post-acquisition Performance 
The relationship between the post-acquisition adjusted performance and pre-acquisition 
adjusted performance of acquirer firms is presented by the slope coefficients as the pre-
acquisition performance in Table 4.12. Some of those slope coefficients are significant which 
suggests a relationship between the post- and pre-acquisition performance of acquirer firms.  
When the adjustment of the operating performance is made only by industry, the results for 
the full, cross-border and domestic acquirers show either an insignificant relationship or a 
significant positive relationship between the pre- and post-acquisition performance of acquirer 
firms depending on the measure used. However, when the adjustment is made on the basis of 
the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, the results show mixed results with some 
of the measures showing an insignificant relationship, others showing a significant positive 
relationship, while others show a significant negative relationship between pre-acquisition and 
post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms. 
The difference in the results between the two performance benchmarks highlights the 
importance of the adjustment approach and may help in explaining the contradictory results 
across many of the previous studies.  
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4.4.2.3 Change Model vs. Intercept Model Results 
Table 4.13 presents a comparison between the previous results of the change model and the 
intercept model in order to check whether or not the intercept model yields conclusions that 
are different from the change model. 
Table 4.13: Change Model vs. Intercept Model / Analysis (B) 
   
Analysis B: Median change in operating performance (%) 
Measure 
Industry adjusted   Industry, Size and Performance adjusted   
Change model   Intercept model   Change model   Intercept model   
Full CB D   Full CB D   Full CB D   Full CB D   
Measure 1  
 
  +2.0* +1.8* +1.3   -1.9 -3.9 -0.9   +0.6 +1.1 0.0   -2.1** -5.2*** -0.9 
  
Measure 2     +0.1 +13.6 +0.1   +0.4 -2.2 +1.3   +0.1 +1.4 +1.2   -1.5 -6.3 +1.7 
  
Measure 3     +1.0 +1.2 +0.5   -0.4 -0.2 -0.4   +1.5 +0.7 +2.3**   -0.1 -0.01 +0.3* 
  
Measure 4     +2.3** +2.3* +1.3   -1.4 -4.5 -0.04   +0.7 +0.8 +0.2   -1.1 -3.6 -0.1 
  
Measure 5     +0.7 +0.7 +0.4   -0.2 -0.2 +0.1   +1.3 +0.6 +1.1   +0.6 -1.9 -5.1* 
  
Measure 6     +0.5 +1.3 +0.4   -0.8 -0.03 -1.2   +2.2** +0.5 +2.2**   -0.1 -0.6 +0.4 
  
Measure 7     +1.7* +1.2 +1.5   -1.8 -3.9 -0.9   +0.6 +1.3 +0.1   -2.0* -5.0** -0.6 
  
 Measure 8      +1.4  +1.9*  +0.3    +1.6  -18.7  +2.5    +0.1  +1.6  +1.2    -0.4  -13.5  +5.3 
  
 
The results presented in Table 4.13 show that the change model gives higher estimates of 
improvements in the industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms than the 
intercept model for the full, cross-border and domestic samples for the majority of the 
measures used. However, measures 2 and 8, which are the cash flow measure deflated by 
sales and the accrual measure deflated by the book value of equity, show higher 
improvements using the intercept model over the change model for the full and domestic 
samples.  
   229 
Moreover, when the matching is done on the basis of the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance, the change model also shows higher estimates of operating performance 
improvements than the intercept model for the full, cross-border and domestic samples for 
most of the measures used. However, measures 2 and 8, which are the cash flow measure 
scaled by sales, and the accrual measure scaled by the book value of equity for the domestic 
sample of acquirers, show higher estimates of performance improvements using the intercept 
model over the change model. 
The results from comparing the changes in adjusted-operating performance of acquirer firms 
between the change model and the intercept model show higher estimates of operating 
performance improvements when the change model is used in comparison with the intercept 
model for most of the measures used. Those results are of great similarity to the results shown 
in the previous chapter for the combined firms. 
4.4.2.4 Regression Analysis 
The results of the regression analysis tests are presented in Table 4.14 which is conducted by 
using different performance measures and benchmarks for the full, cross-border and domestic 
samples. It investigates whether any improvements in the performance of acquirer firms can 
be explained by some of the deals’ characteristics using a multiple regression analysis. The 
dependent variable is the post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms adjusted 
for the industry median and industry, size and pre-acquisition performance respectively. The 
independent variables include some of the deals’ characteristics such as the method of 
payment, industrial relatedness, relative size of target to acquirer firm and whether the 
acquisition is cross-border or domestic deal. The results are summarised in the following 
table. 
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Table 4.14: Regression Analysis of Determinants of Post-acquisition Performance of 
Acquirer Firms / Analysis (B) 
 
Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
performance adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) 
 
(2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
(6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 1:  
 
                 Intercept 
 
-0.049* 
(-1.87) 
 
-0.034 
(-0.99) 
 
-0.058 
(-1.12) 
 
-0.037 
(-1.13) 
 
-0.037* 
(-1.75) 
 
-0.020 
(-0.77) 
 
-0.033 
(-1.07) 
 
-0.043 
(-1.44) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.125 
(1.32) 
 
0.136 
(1.29) 
 
0.087 
(0.20) 
 
0.124 
(1.47) 
 
0.410*** 
(6.84) 
 
0.357*** 
(4.72) 
 
0.446*** 
(3.97) 
 
0.339*** 
(4.55) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
-0.024 
(-0.72) 
       
-0.033 
(-1.44) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
-0.015 
(-0.05) 
       
0.164 
(1.26) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.039 
(1.30) 
 
0.028 
(0.82) 
 
0.034 
(0.32) 
 
0.034 
(1.02) 
 
0.026 
(1.11) 
 
0.016 
(0.65) 
 
-0.039 
(-0.80) 
 
0.054* 
(1.75) 
   Mix Payment 
 
0.007 
(0.21) 
 
0.001 
(0.03) 
 
-0.030 
(-0.38) 
 
0.024 
(0.65) 
 
-0.034 
(-1.34) 
 
-0.030 
(-1.13) 
 
-0.086** 
(-1.98) 
 
0.015 
(0.45) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.021 
(0.84) 
 
0.017 
(0.67) 
 
0.040 
(0.60) 
 
0.005 
(0.19) 
 
0.030 
(1.53) 
 
0.019 
(0.94) 
 
0.041 
(1.09) 
 
0.006 
(0.25) 
   Relative Size 
 
0.002 
(0.34) 
 
0.003 
(0.42) 
 
0.002 
(0.23) 
 
0.0001 
(0.40) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.31) 
 
0.001 
(0.19) 
 
0.0003 
(0.06) 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.48) 
 F-statistic 
 
0.87 
 
0.70 
 
0.22 
 
0.72 
 
10.89*** 
 
8.52*** 
 
7.40*** 
 
4.93*** 
 p.value 
 
0.50 
 
0.67 
 
0.95 
 
0.61 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.01 
 
-0.03 
 
-0.21 
 
-0.03 
 
0.41 
 
0.43 
 
0.60 
 
0.29 
 
                  Measure 2: 
                                 
Intercept 
 
-0.033 
(-0.63) 
 
-0.030 
(-0.55) 
 
-0.079 
(-0.80) 
 
-0.015 
(-0.35) 
 
-0.099* 
(-1.88) 
 
-0.049 
(-0.76) 
 
-0.057 
(-0.69) 
 
-0.106 
(-1.49) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.0001 
(0.12) 
 
0.751*** 
(5.01) 
 
0.0001 
(0.11) 
 
0.738***
(8.07) 
 
0.147 
(1.41) 
 
0.286*** 
(2.69) 
 
0.147*** 
(11.86) 
 
0.289*** 
(2.96) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
-0.036 
(-0.70) 
       
-0.071 
(-1.20) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
-0.751***
(-5.01) 
       
-0.139 
(-1.30) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.032 
(0.55) 
 
0.029 
(0.54) 
 
0.070 
(0.42) 
 
0.025 
(0.60) 
 
0.062 
(1.06) 
 
0.036 
(0.58) 
 
0.065 
(0.49) 
 
0.087 
(1.21) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.008 
(-0.12) 
 
-0.013 
(-0.22) 
 
-0.052 
(-0.35) 
 
0.009 
(0.19) 
 
-0.049 
(-0.79) 
 
-0.061 
(-0.96) 
 
-0.229** 
(-2.08) 
 
0.054 
(0.70) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.041 
(0.83) 
 
0.058 
(1.33) 
 
0.101 
(0.78) 
 
0.031 
(0.97) 
 
0.112** 
(2.33) 
 
0.100* 
(2.01) 
 
0.064 
(0.61) 
 
0.102* 
(1.88) 
   Relative Size 
 
0.0002 
(1.26) 
 
0.0002* 
(1.66) 
 
0.0002 
(1.02) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.18) 
 
0.0003** 
(2.53) 
 
0.0003***
(2.69) 
 
0.0003** 
(2.10) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.10) 
 F-statistic 
 
0.52 
 
4.23*** 
 
0.43 
 
13.05*** 
 
41.89*** 
 
30.26*** 
 
31.91*** 
 
2.65** 
 p.value 
 
0.76 
 
0.00 
 
0.82 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.04 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.04 
 
0.24 
 
-0.15 
 
0.56 
 
0.99 
 
0.99 
 
0.99 
 
0.15 
 
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
AssetsTotal
EBITDA
Sales
EBITDA
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Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
performance adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) 
 
(2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
(6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 3: 
                                 
Intercept 
 
0.003 
(0.43) 
 
0.003 
(0.31) 
 
-0.005 
(0.80) 
 
0.007 
(0.47) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.50) 
 
0.007 
(0.77) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.26) 
 
0.002 
(0.46) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.003 
(0.02) 
 
10.754 
(0.79) 
 
0.008***
(3.45) 
 
9.300 
(0.56) 
 
-0.002** 
(-2.49) 
 
-0.002** 
(-2.42) 
 
0.318 
(0.79) 
 
-0.002*** 
(-5.20) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
0.0002 
(0.02) 
       
-0.0002 
(-1.86) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
-10.75 
(-0.79) 
       
0.348 
(1.68) 
       Cash Payment 
 
-0.008 
(-0.96) 
 
-0.008 
(-0.79) 
 
0.0001 
(0.45) 
 
-0.012 
(-0.85) 
 
0.006 
(0.67) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.38) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.04) 
 
0.003 
(0.69) 
   Mix Payment 
 
0.0003 
(0.03) 
 
0.001 
(0.08) 
 
-0.0003 
(-1.08) 
 
0.001 
(0.001) 
 
-0.0001 
(-1.10) 
 
-0.0001 
(-1.57) 
 
-0.0004 
(-1.39) 
 
0.002 
(0.30) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
-0.007 
(-0.92) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.73) 
 
0.0002 
(0.82) 
 
-0.009 
(-0.80) 
 
0.005 
(0.72) 
 
0.0002 
(0.34) 
 
0.008 
(0.35) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.70) 
   Relative Size 
 
0.00003 
(0.02) 
 
0.00003 
(0.01) 
 
-0.00001 
(-0.21) 
 
0.007 
(0.44) 
 
0.000003 
(0.17) 
 
0.000003 
(0.20) 
 
0.000002 
(0.06) 
 
0.00001 
(0.14) 
 F-statistic 
 
0.43 
 
0.39 
 
3.38** 
 
0.45 
 
1.84 
 
2.19 
 
0.72 
 
5.72*** 
 p.value 
 
0.83 
 
0.90 
 
0.03 
 
0.81 
 
0.12 
 
0.05 
 
0.62 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.04 
 
-0.07 
 
0.36 
 
-0.06 
 
0.06 
 
0.11 
 
-0.07 
 
0.33 
 
                  Measure 4: 
                                 
Intercept 
 
-0.052 
(-1.35) 
 
-0.028 
(-0.54) 
 
-0.042 
(-0.67) 
 
-0.062 
(-1.07) 
 
0.001 
(0.05) 
 
0.035 
(0.84) 
 
0.055 
(1.31) 
 
-0.018 
(-0.38) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.006 
(0.05) 
 
-0.046 
(-0.36) 
 
0.304 
(0.77) 
 
-0.018 
(-0.15) 
 
0.094 
(1.30) 
 
0.119 
(1.48) 
 
-0.080 
(-0.42) 
 
0.111 
(1.43) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
-0.037 
(-0.70) 
       
-0.042 
(-1.09) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
0.313 
(0.96) 
       
-0.096 
(-0.46) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.049 
(1.12) 
 
0.029 
(0.55) 
 
0.052 
(0.38) 
 
0.054 
(0.94) 
 
0.006 
(0.19) 
 
-0.022 
(-0.52) 
 
-0.027 
(-0.33) 
 
0.023 
(0.49) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.045 
(-0.89) 
 
-0.060 
(-1.10) 
 
-0.134 
(-1.35) 
 
0.001 
(0.02) 
 
-0.048 
(-1.28) 
 
-0.070 
(-1.64) 
 
-0.199***
(-3.17) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.05) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.060 
(1.56) 
 
0.054 
(1.34) 
 
0.025 
(0.30) 
 
0.069 
(1.53) 
 
0.0002 
(0.01) 
 
-0.004 
(-0.15) 
 
-0.065 
(-1.38) 
 
0.019 
(0.56) 
   Relative Size 
 
-0.001 
(-1.16) 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.92) 
 
-0.0004 
(-0.46) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.15) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.43) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.18) 
 
0.0001 
(0.34) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.41) 
 F-statistic 
 
1.25 
 
1.01 
 
0.65 
 
0.89 
 
1.05 
 
0.96 
 
2.67* 
 
0.84 
 p.value 
 
0.30 
 
0.44 
 
0.67 
 
0.50 
 
0.40 
 
0.47 
 
0.08 
 
0.53 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.03 
 
0.001 
 
-0.12 
 
-0.02 
 
0.004 
 
-0.01 
 
0.34 
 
-0.02 
 
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
( )
AssetsTotal
WCEBITDA ∆−
TMV
EBITDA
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Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
performance adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) 
 
(2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
(6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 5: 
                                 
Intercept 
 
-0.045 
(-0.59) 
 
-0.048 
(-0.47) 
 
-0.038 
(-0.44) 
 
-0.048 
(-0.33) 
 
0.041 
(0.63) 
 
0.092 
(1.33) 
 
0.066 
(0.82) 
 
0.031 
(0.40) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.006***
(16.3) 
 
-0.162 
(-1.29) 
 
0.006***
(17.99) 
 
-0.150 
(-1.07) 
 
-0.275***
(-23.42) 
 
0.181* 
(1.99) 
 
-0.276***
(-24.85) 
 
0.195** 
(2.33) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
0.030 
(0.32) 
       
-0.087 
(-1.32) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
0.168 
(1.33) 
       
-0.456*** 
(-5.04) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.039 
(0.44) 
 
0.030 
(0.28) 
 
0.008 
(0.04) 
 
0.072 
(0.50) 
 
-0.079 
(-1.10) 
 
-0.090 
(-1.29) 
 
-0.106 
(-0.61) 
 
-0.028 
(-0.36) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.082 
(-0.79) 
 
-0.096 
(-0.89) 
 
-0.208 
(-1.50) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.02) 
 
-0.218***
(-2.79) 
 
-0.208*** 
(-3.04) 
 
-0.354***
(-2.99) 
 
-0.125 
(-1.50) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.097 
(1.24) 
 
0.096 
(1.21) 
 
0.202 
(1.40) 
 
0.037 
(0.34) 
 
0.106* 
(1.79) 
 
0.102** 
(2.06) 
 
0.031 
(0.30) 
 
0.131** 
(2.38) 
   Relative Size 
 
-0.001 
(-0.80) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.78) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.66) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.75) 
 
0.008 
(0.16) 
 
0.0002 
(0.38) 
 
0.001 
(1.08) 
 
-0.002 
(-1.58) 
 F-statistic 
 
5.61*** 
 
4.03*** 
 
6.88*** 
 
0.52 
 
11.85*** 
 
12.45*** 
 
13.48*** 
 
3.16** 
 p.value 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.76 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.02 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.85 
 
0.85 
 
0.95 
 
-0.09 
 
0.99 
 
0.99 
 
0.99 
 
0.21 
 
                  Measure 6: 
                                 
Intercept 
 
-0.002 
(-0.19) 
 
-0.10 
(-0.60) 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.49) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.22) 
 
-0.003 
(-0.42) 
 
0.0001 
(0.99) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.06) 
 
0.005 
(0.55) 
 Pre-performance 
 
-0.001 
(-0.10) 
 
0.001 
(0.06) 
 
0.005 
(1.08) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.07) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.83) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.75) 
 
0.955 
(1.09) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.66) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
0.010 
(0.67) 
       
-0.0002 
(-1.55) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
-0.050 
(-0.36) 
       
1.094* 
(1.92) 
       Cash Payment 
 
-0.011 
(-0.77) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.36) 
 
0.001 
(0.93) 
 
-0.013 
(-0.48) 
 
0.006 
(0.61) 
 
-0.006 
(-0.57) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.13) 
 
0.001 
(0.15) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.019 
(-1.15) 
 
-0.017 
(-0.96) 
 
0.001 
(1.11) 
 
-0.030 
(-0.99) 
 
-0.010 
(-0.98) 
 
-0.0002* 
(-1.70) 
 
-0.0004* 
(-1.68) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.47) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.004 
(0.34) 
 
0.007 
(0.51) 
 
-0.001 
(-1.23) 
 
0.009 
(0.49) 
 
0.004 
(0.50) 
 
0.002 
(0.22) 
 
-0.002 
(-0.09) 
 
0.001 
(0.08) 
   Relative Size 
 
0.006 
(0.41) 
 
0.003 
(0.20) 
 
0.0001 
(0.21) 
 
0.0001 
(0.41) 
 
0.00004 
(0.66) 
 
0.0001 
(1.17) 
 
0.0001 
(1.19) 
 
-0.0001 
(-0.95) 
 F-statistic 
 
0.32 
 
0.32 
 
0.45 
 
0.29 
 
0.76 
 
1.86 
 
1.17 
 
0.34 
 p.value 
 
0.90 
 
0.94 
 
0.80 
 
0.91 
 
0.58 
 
0.10 
 
0.39 
 
0.88 
 Adjusted R2 
 
-0.08 
 
-0.11 
 
-0.21 
 
-0.13 
 
-0.02 
 
0.10 
 
0.05 
 
-0.09 
 
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
                  
( )
TMV
WCEBITDA ∆−
( )
Sales
WCEBITDA ∆−
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Independent variables 
  
Industry-adjusted median   Industry, size and pre-
performance adjusted   
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
Full 
 
CB 
 
D 
 
  (1) 
 
(2)   (3)   (4)   (5) 
 
(6)   (7)   (8)   
Measure 7:  
                                 
Intercept 
 
-0.047* 
(-1.75) 
 
-0.025 
(-0.73) 
 
-0.051 
(-0.95) 
 
-0.044 
(-1.35) 
 
-0.047** 
(-2.11) 
 
-0.026 
(-0.94) 
 
-0.031 
(-0.94) 
 
-0.057* 
(-1.74) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.196** 
(2.14) 
 
0.156 
(1.52) 
 
0.460 
(1.26) 
 
0.149* 
(1.84) 
 
0.341*** 
(5.25) 
 
0.356*** 
(4.15) 
 
0.268** 
(2.29) 
 
0.335*** 
(3.98) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
-0.039 
(-1.19) 
       
-0.032 
(-1.27) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
0.282 
(1.13) 
       
-0.012 
(-0.087) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.042 
(1.38) 
 
0.022 
(0.63) 
 
-0.005 
(-0.05) 
 
0.044 
(1.34) 
 
0.032 
(1.27) 
 
0.018 
(0.68) 
 
-0.043 
(-0.81) 
 
0.061 
(1.86) 
   Mix Payment 
 
0.018 
(0.52) 
 
0.010 
(0.30) 
 
-0.033 
(-0.42) 
 
0.046 
(1.26) 
 
-0.013 
(-0.47) 
 
-0.019 
(-0.69) 
 
-0.085* 
(-1.86) 
 
0.034 
(0.94) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
0.012 
(0.46) 
 
0.006 
(0.25) 
 
0.014 
(0.20) 
 
0.002 
(0.09) 
 
0.033 
(1.61) 
 
0.027 
(1.24) 
 
0.042 
(1.04) 
 
0.016 
(0.66) 
   Relative Size 
 
0.003 
(0.48) 
 
0.004 
(0.67) 
 
0.004 
(0.38) 
 
0.004 
(0.11) 
 
0.001 
(0.14) 
 
0.002 
(0.37) 
 
0.001 
(0.22) 
 
-0.0002 
(-0.45) 
 F-statistic 
 
1.34 
 
1.25 
 
0.50 
 
1.18 
 
6.30*** 
 
4.70*** 
 
3.42** 
 
4.02*** 
 p.value 
 
0.26 
 
0.29 
 
0.77 
 
0.33 
 
0.00 
 
0.00 
 
0.03 
 
0.00 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.02 
 
0.02 
 
-0.13 
 
0.02 
 
0.27 
 
0.27 
 
0.35 
 
0.24 
 
                  Measure 8:  
                                 
Intercept 
 
-0.103 
(-1.16) 
 
0.022 
(0.20) 
 
-0.161 
(-1.35) 
 
-0.089 
(-0.67) 
 
-0.105 
(-1.03) 
 
-0.024 
(-0.19) 
 
-0.073 
(-0.46) 
 
-0.142 
(-1.01) 
 Pre-performance 
 
0.017 
(0.52) 
 
0.009 
(0.31) 
 
0.704***
(2.85) 
 
0.007 
(0.22) 
 
0.047 
(1.22) 
 
0.016 
(0.39) 
 
0.157 
(1.59) 
 
0.009 
(0.23) 
 Controls 
                   Cross-border 
   
-0.277** 
(-2.39) 
       
-0.175 
(-1.58) 
       Cross-border*Pre-performance 
  
-0.620*** 
(3.02) 
       
0.193** 
(2.11) 
       Cash Payment 
 
0.213** 
(2.11) 
 
0.091 
(0.84) 
 
-0.034 
(-0.14) 
 
0.172 
(1.27) 
 
0.218* 
(1.93) 
 
0.167 
(1.39) 
 
0.153 
(0.61) 
 
0.295** 
(2.05) 
   Mix Payment 
 
-0.225** 
(2.00) 
 
-0.186* 
(1.70) 
 
0.044 
(0.258) 
 
-0.293** 
(1.98) 
 
0.162 
(1.34) 
 
0.179 
(1.47) 
 
-0.137 
(-0.63) 
 
-0.391*** 
(2.58) 
   Industrial Relatedness 
 
-0.105 
(-1.22) 
 
-0.148* 
(-1.78) 
 
-0.270* 
(-1.82) 
 
-0.092 
(-0.89) 
 
-0.071 
(-0.76) 
 
-0.104 
(-1.11) 
 
-0.154 
(-0.80) 
 
-0.104 
(-0.98) 
   Relative Size 
 
0.0001 
(0.55) 
 
0.0002 
(0.89) 
 
0.0001 
(0.60) 
 
0.001 
(0.39) 
 
0.0003 
(0.01) 
 
0.0001 
(0.58) 
 
0.007 
(0.27) 
 
-0.001 
(-0.56) 
 F-statistic 
 
1.48 
 
2.59** 
 
2.66* 
 
0.99 
 
1.31 
 
1.96* 
 
1.25 
 
1.66 
 p.value 
 
0.21 
 
0.02 
 
0.06 
 
0.43 
 
0.27 
 
0.07 
 
0.33 
 
0.16 
 Adjusted R2 
 
0.03 
 
0.14 
 
0.27 
 
-0.0003 
 
0.02 
 
0.09 
 
0.05 
 
0.06 
                                     
Values between brackets are t-statistics.  
***Statistical significance at the 1% level 
**Statistical significance at the 5% level 
*Statistical significance at the 10% level 
CB: Cross-border sample  
D: Domestic sample 
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4.4.2.4.1 Full Sample 
Models (1) and (5) in Table 4.14 present the results of the impact of some of the deal 
characteristics on the post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms for the full 
sample using different performance measures and two benchmarks that control for the 
industry and industry, size and pre-acquisition performance respectively. 
Models (2) and (6) expand the examination conducted by models (1) and (5) by including a 
cross-border dummy variable and another variable, which is a cross-border dummy variable 
multiplied by the pre-acquisition adjusted performance, which examines whether there is any 
significant difference from the impact of pre-acquisition adjusted performance on post-
acquisition adjusted performance between domestic mergers and acquisitions and cross-
border mergers and acquisitions.  
The results for the industry-adjusted performance shown by model (1) doesn’t show any 
significant impact of the deal characteristics on the post-acquisition adjusted performance of 
acquirer firms for all the measures used except measure 8, which is the accrual measure 
deflated by the book value of equity, which shows a positive impact from the cash method of 
payment and a negative impact from the mixed payment method on the post-acquisition 
operating performance of acquirer firms.  
Moreover, model (2) shows a significant negative impact of cross-border acquisitions on the 
post-acquisition performance of firms in only one of the measures used, which is the accrual 
measure deflated by the book value of equity, whereas there is no significant impact from the 
other measures. Also, measure 2 and measure 8, which are the cash flow measure deflated by 
sales and the accrual measure deflated by the book value of equity, show negative impact 
from pre-acquisition adjusted performance on post-acquisition adjusted performance of 
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acquirer firms involved in cross-border acquisitions in comparison with domestic 
acquisitions. 
The results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance presented by model 
(5) show significant positive impact from the industrial relatedness and relative size on the 
post-acquisition performance of acquirers using measure 2, which is the cash flow measure 
deflated by sales. Also, measure 5, which is the ‘pure’ cash flow measure scaled by sales, 
shows a significant negative impact from the mixed payment method and a significant 
positive impact from the industrial relatedness on the post-acquisition performance. 
Moreover, measure 8, which is the accrual measure scaled by the book value of equity, shows 
a significant positive impact from the cash payment method on post-acquisition performance 
of acquirer firms. 
However, model (6) does not show any significant impact of cross-border acquisitions on the 
post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms for all the measures used. Also, measure 5 and 
measure 8, which are the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by sales and the accrual measure 
deflated by the book value of equity, show negative impact from pre-acquisition adjusted 
performance on post-acquisition adjusted performance of acquirer firms involved in cross-
border acquisitions in comparison with domestic acquisitions. However, measure 6, which is 
the ‘pure’ cash flow deflated by total market value, shows a positive impact from pre-
acquisition adjusted performance on post-acquisition adjusted performance of acquirer firms 
involved in cross-border acquisitions in comparison with domestic acquisitions. 
4.4.2.4.2 Cross-border Sample 
Models (3) and (7) in Table 4.14 examine the impact of some of the deal characteristics on the 
post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms in the cross-border sample using 
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different performance measures and two benchmarks that control for the industry and 
industry, size and pre-acquisition performance respectively. 
The results for the industry-adjusted performance in model (3) do not show any significant 
impact of the deal characteristics on the post-acquisition adjusted performance of firms for all 
the measures used except measure 8, which is the accrual measure scaled by the book value of 
equity, which shows a negative impact from the industrial relatedness on the operating 
performance of acquirer firms. 
The results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance presented by model 
(7) show a significant negative impact from the mixed payment method on the post-
acquisition performance of acquirer firms for six out of the eight measures used, which are 
measures 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 7. Those negative results from the mixed payment method on the 
post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms are of great similarity to the results presented 
in the previous chapter for the impact on the combined firms and also support the arguments 
in the previous literature which suggest lower results for takeovers financed by other payment 
methods than cash payment methods (Ghosh, 2001). 
Also, measure 2, which is the cash flow deflated by sales, shows significant positive impact 
from the relative size on the post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms.  
4.4.2.4.3 Domestic Sample 
Models (4) and (8) in Table 4.14 examine the impact of some of the deal characteristics on the 
post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms involved in domestic acquisitions 
using different performance measures and two benchmarks that control for the industry and 
industry, size and pre-acquisition performance respectively. 
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The results for the industry-adjusted performance in model (4) show insignificant impact for 
the deal characteristics on the post-acquisition adjusted performance of acquirer firms for 
seven out of the eight measures used. However, measure 8, which is the accrual measure 
deflated by the book value of equity, shows a significant negative impact from the mixed 
payment method. 
Also, the results for the industry, size and pre-acquisition adjusted performance presented by 
model (8) show a significant positive impact of the cash payment method on the post-
acquisition performance of acquirer firms using the cash flow measure deflated by total 
assets, significant positive impact from the industrial relatedness between acquirer and target 
firms using the cash flow and the ‘pure’ cash flow measures deflated by sales, as well as a 
significant impact of the payment method using the accrual measure deflated by the book 
value of equity, which is positive for the cash payment method and negative for the mixed 
method of payment. 
The overall results of the regression analysis show an impact of the payment method on the 
post-acquisition performance of acquirer firms being positive for the cash method of payment 
and negative for other means of payment. However, the remaining results provide little 
evidence about the ability of any of the other deal characteristics to explain the post-
acquisition performance of acquirer firms across all the different performance measures, 
deflators and benchmarks used. 
4.4.2.5 Summary of Analysis (B) Results 
The results of Analysis (B), which was conducted to examine the operating performance of 98 
acquirer firms, show insignificant changes in the adjusted operating performance of acquirer 
firms using different measures, models and benchmarks. Also, the results for the industry-
adjusted performance do not show any significant difference between the operating 
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performance of acquirer firms involved in cross-border and domestic acquisitions. However, 
when control is made on the basis of the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, the 
results show that cross-border acquisitions have lower post-acquisition operating performance 
than domestic acquisitions.  
More specifically, when the adjustment is made for the industry median performance, the 
change model results show insignificant changes in the industry-adjusted operating 
performance of acquirer firms involved in domestic M&As.  
However, the results for acquirer firms in the full sample show significant positive 
improvements in the industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms for measures 
1, 4 and 7, which are the measures deflated by the book value of total assets, whether being 
cash flow, ‘pure’ cash flow or accrual. Also, the cross-border sample results show significant 
positive changes in the operating performance of acquirers for measures 1, 4 and 8, which are 
the cash flow and ‘pure’ cash flow measures deflated by the book value of total assets and the 
accrual measure deflated by the book value of equity. However, the other measures have 
shown insignificant positive changes in the operating performance of acquirers. 
When the intercept model is used, the results show insignificant changes in the industry-
adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms for the full, cross-border and domestic 
samples for all the measures used.  
When control is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, most of the 
change model results show insignificant changes in the operating performance of acquirer 
firms. More specifically, the results for the full sample show insignificant positive changes in 
the operating performance of acquirers for all the measures used except measure 6, which is 
the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by total market value, which shows significant positive 
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changes. Also, the cross-border sample shows insignificant positive changes in the operating 
performance of acquirers for all the measures used. The domestic sample shows insignificant 
changes in the operating performance of acquirers for all the measures used except measures 
3 and 6, which are the cash flow and ‘pure’ cash flow measures deflated by total market 
value. 
When the intercept model is used, the results of the different measures are contradictory with 
some showing significant increase in the operating performance of acquirer firms, some 
others showing significant decrease, whereas the rest of the measures shows insignificant 
changes. 
More specifically, the results for the full and cross-border sample show insignificant changes 
in the operating performance of acquirer firms for all the measures used except measures 1 
and 7, which are the cash flow and accrual measure, both deflated by the book value of total 
assets, which show significant negative changes in the operating performance of acquirer 
firms. However, the domestic sample results show insignificant changes in the operating 
performance of acquirers for six out of the eight measures used whereas there are significant 
positive improvements in the operating performance of acquirers for measure 3 and 
significant negative changes for measure 5, which are the cash flow measure deflated by total 
market value and the ‘pure’ cash flow measure deflated by sales respectively. 
In general, the results for the full, cross-border and domestic samples show insignificant 
changes in the adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms for most of the measures 
used in the change and intercept models. Also, there hasn’t been a strong evidence of 
significant differences between the operating performances of firms involved in cross-border 
and domestic samples. 
   240 
4.4.3 Comparison between Analysis (A) Results and Analysis (B) Results 
This section presents a comparison between the main results of Analysis (A) which is 
conducted for the acquirer and target firms combined and Analysis (B) which examines the 
acquirer firms only. The reason for the comparison is to find out whether the impacts of 
domestic and cross-border M&As on the operating performance of UK acquirers only are 
different from their impacts on the operating performance of UK acquirers and targets 
combined. 
Table 4.15 presents the comparison of the results when the adjustment is made on the basis of 
the industry median performance. 
Table 4.15: Comparison of the Results for UK Acquirers and Targets Combined with 
the Results for UK Acquirers Only (Industry-adjusted Performance) 
 
Models/Measures 
Results for UK Acquirers and 
Targets Combined (%) 
Results for UK Acquirers Only 
(%) 
Full 
Sample 
Cross-
border 
Domestic Full 
Sample 
Cross-
border 
Domestic 
Change Model 
Measure 1 0.98 1.22 0.33 2.00* 1.75* 1.32 
Measure 2 0.97 0.10 1.32 0.06 13.58 0.09 
Measure 3 0.23 0.73 0.20 1.01 1.19 0.49 
Measure 4 0.46 0.80 0.06 2.30** 2.29* 1.31 
Measure 5 0.23 0.28 0.37 0.66 0.74 0.37 
Measure 6 0.39 0.68 0.03 0.46 1.34 0.41 
Measure 7 1.08 1.13 0.64 1.72* 1.22 1.49 
Measure 8 1.77* 3.14*** 0.28 1.37 1.92* 0.32 
       
Intercept Model 
Measure 1 -2.2* -3.9 -1.3 -1.9 -3.9 -0.9 
Measure 2 3.3 1.1 5.3** 0.4 -2.2 1.3 
Measure 3 -0.2 0.1 -0.2 -0.4 -0.2 -0.4 
Measure 4 -0.7 -2.0 0.1 -1.4 -4.5 -0.04 
Measure 5 -2.1 -8.1 0.6 -0.2 -0.2 0.1 
Measure 6 -0.2* -0.1* -0.3 -0.8 -0.03 -1.2 
Measure 7 -2.0* -3.6 -1.3 -1.8 -3.9 -0.9 
Measure 8 -3.6 -19.6 2.9 1.6 -18.7 2.5 
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The results of Table 4.15 for the change and intercept model show similar results for UK 
acquirers and targets combined in comparison with UK acquirers only, with insignificant 
changes in the industry-adjusted operating performance of firms. 
When the change model is used, some of the results for the UK acquirers only are similar to 
the results of UK acquirers and targets combined whereas other results show higher 
improvements in the industry-adjusted operating performance of UK acquirer firms in 
comparison with acquirer and target firms combined. 
For example, the full and cross-border samples of UK acquirer and target firms combined 
show insignificant changes in the operating performance for seven out of the eight measures 
used whereas there are significant positive improvements for measure 8, which is the accrual 
measure. However, the full and cross-border samples of UK acquirers only show insignificant 
positive changes in the operating performance for five out of the eight measures used whereas 
there are significant positive improvements for three measures, which are cash flow, ‘pure’ 
cash flow and accrual measures. 
On the other hand, the domestic sample show insignificant positive changes in the industry-
adjusted operating performance of firms for both the UK acquirers and targets sample as well 
as the UK acquirers only. 
When the intercept model is used, some of the results for the full, cross-border and domestic 
samples show higher results for the UK acquirers only in comparison with acquirer and target 
firms combined whereas other measures show the opposite. 
For example, the intercept model shows insignificant negative and positive changes in the 
industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms for all the measures used in the 
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full, cross-border and domestic samples. However, the examination for the acquirer and target 
firms combined show contradictory results with significant and insignificant negative changes 
in the operating performance of the full and cross-border samples whereas there are 
insignificant changes for the domestic sample except for the cash flow measure 2, which 
shows significant positive changes in the operating performance of firms. 
Table 4.16 presents the comparison of the results when the adjustment is made on the basis of 
the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance of firms. 
Table 4.16: Comparison of the Results for UK Acquirers and Targets Combined with 
the Results for UK Acquirers Only (Industry, Size and Pre-acquisition-adjusted 
Performance) 
 
Models/Measures 
Results for UK Acquirers and 
Targets Combined (%) 
Results for UK Acquirers Only 
(%) 
Full 
sample 
Cross-
border 
Domestic Full 
sample 
Cross-
border 
Domestic 
Change Model 
Measure 1 0.28 0.79 0.96 0.63 1.08 0.00 
Measure 2 1.74* 0.22 2.32** 0.08 1.38 1.16 
Measure 3 1.10 0.31 1.59 1.51 0.69 2.25** 
Measure 4 1.47 1.05 2.50** 0.67 0.79 0.16 
Measure 5 2.54** 0.24 3.24*** 1.29 0.55 1.11 
Measure 6 2.11** 0.76 2.99*** 2.23** 0.47 2.23** 
Measure 7 0.09 0.98 0.82 0.64 1.34 0.13 
Measure 8 0.53 1.62 1.99** 0.07 1.63 1.24 
       
Intercept Model 
Measure 1 -1.0 -3.0* 0.7 -2.1** -5.2*** -0.9 
Measure 2 2.0 -0.7 8.3*** -1.5 -6.3 1.7 
Measure 3 -0.3 -0.2 0.3 -0.1 -0.01 0.3* 
Measure 4 -0.1 -2.4 2.6* -1.1 -3.6 -0.1 
Measure 5 1.7 0.4 11.2*** 0.6 -1.9 5.1* 
Measure 6 -0.2 -0.2** 0.5 -0.1 0.6 0.4 
Measure 7 -1.0 -2.7 0.9 -2.0* -5.0*** -0.6 
Measure 8 2.1 -9.8 8.6 -0.4 -13.5 5.3 
       
 
   243 
The results shown in Table 4.16 for the change model show similar results for UK acquirers 
and targets combined in comparison with UK acquirers only in the full and cross-border 
samples, with insignificant changes in the industry, size and pre-acquisition-adjusted 
performance of firms. On the other hand, the domestic sample shows higher improvements in 
the adjusted operating performance of acquirer and target firms combined in comparison with 
acquirer firms only. 
When the intercept model is used, most of the results for the full, cross-border and domestic 
samples of acquirer and target firms combined are similar to those of UK acquirers only with 
insignificant changes in the operating performance of firms. However, the size of most of the 
results of combined firms is generally higher than acquirer firms only.  
4.5 Summary of the Results and Conclusions  
The issue of measuring the operating performance of firms involved in mergers and 
acquisitions is essential for the companies in order to evaluate the extent of the achievement 
of their objectives and goals, as well as in helping them to develop future strategic plans. 
However, only a few number of studies have been conducted to examine the operating 
performance of firms following mergers and acquisitions. Most of those studies concentrated 
on the impact of mergers on the post-acquisition performance of the combined firms without 
taking into consideration the difference between cross-border and domestic acquisitions. 
The previous chapter has dealt with the issue of the changes in operating performance of 
acquirer firms, using a sample of 555 acquirer firms during the period 1996 to 2003 in order 
to check whether there is any difference in the changes in operating performance of acquirer 
firms between cross-border and domestic acquisitions. Different benchmarks and measures of 
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operating performance have been used and two models have been applied to assess changes in 
operating performance of acquirer firms, which are the change model and the intercept model.  
The results in general show that when the adjustment is made for the industry median 
performance, the change model shows significant improvements in the operating performance 
of acquirer firms for the full and domestic samples, whereas there are insignificant changes in 
the operating performance for the cross-border sample. When the intercept model is used, the 
results show opposite results with a significant decrease in the operating performance of 
acquirer firms in the full, cross-border and domestic samples. 
On the other hand, when the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance, most of the results for the change model and the intercept model show 
insignificant changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms. Also, the results show 
insignificant differences between the impacts of domestic and cross-border acquisitions on the 
post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms.  
The regression analysis shows some significant positive effect from the cash method of 
payment on the post-acquisition operating performance of acquirer firms, whereas there is 
little or no significant impact of the other characteristics.  
The previous chapter examined the impact of M&As on the operating performance of acquirer 
firms only. Therefore, this chapter gives a broader idea about the impact of M&As by the 
examination of acquirer and target combined firms in order to check the difference between 
the impacts of cross-border and domestic M&As on the operating performance by conducting 
Analysis (A). Another examination is conducted for the acquirer firms only in order to check 
whether excluding the target firms and their peers from the analysis has any impact on the 
results in Analysis (B). 
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The main examination in this chapter is based on 98 pairs of acquirer and target firms over a 
period of one, two or three years before, and one, two or three years after the acquisition, 
using cash flow, ‘pure’ cash flow and accrual performance measures and relative to 
benchmarks adjusted for the industry median performance as well as the industry, size and 
pre-acquisition performance. Also, two models have been used to assess changes in the 
operating performance of the full, cross-border and domestic samples, which are the change 
model and the intercept model. 
The results of analysis (A) conducted for the combined firms show that firms involved in 
cross-border M&As have a significantly lower operating performance than domestic 
combined firms, especially when the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-
acquisition performance.  
When the adjustment is made for the industry median performance the results of the change 
model and the intercept model show insignificant changes in the operating performance of 
combined firms for the full, cross-border and domestic samples.  
When the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, the 
results of the change model show insignificant changes in the operating performance of 
combined firms in the full and cross-border samples whereas there is a significant increase in 
the operating performance of combined firms in the domestic sample. However, when the 
intercept model is used, the results show insignificant changes in the operating performance 
of combined firms in the full, cross-border and domestic samples. 
The results of analysis (B) conducted for acquirer firms only show similar results to analysis 
(A) which includes both acquirer and target firms in the analysis, with insignificant changes in 
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the adjusted operating performance of firms. This suggests that acquirer firms and combined 
firms experience similar changes in the operating performance following M&A deals.  
The results in this chapter show some similarities and some differences with the previous 
literature. The results reflect some similarities to Martynova et al. (2007) results which show 
insignificant changes in the operating performance of combined firms. However, other results 
contradict those of Powell and Stark (2005) and Martynova et al. (2007) since their results 
show higher improvements in post-takeover performance when a regression-based 
methodology is used in comparison to a change model. The results in this chapter show 
different conclusions about this issue since most of the measures show higher estimates of 
improvements in the post-takeover performance when the change model is used compared to 
the intercept model.  
This contradiction in the results may be related to the difference between this study and the 
previous studies in the sample used and the time period covered. For example, Powell and 
Stark (2005) examined a UK sample that took place during the time period 1985 to 1993 
whereas this study covers a more recent period, this being from 1996 to 2003. Also, the 
contradiction with Martynova et al. (2007) may be because their study examined a European 
sample whereas this study examines a UK sample. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The importance of cross-border M&As has increased over the years and become more 
significant with companies acquiring targets all over the world. This requires more 
examination and investigation of this phenomenon in order to check whether going abroad 
leads the companies to achieve better performance than when they acquire domestically. 
Therefore, the aim of this thesis is to examine and investigate cross-border M&As in a way 
that can lead us to answer the main question of the thesis, which is: are cross-border M&As 
better or worse than domestic M&As? Therefore, in order to achieve this aim, the thesis 
examines the following questions: 
• Do cross-border M&As bring higher returns to shareholders of UK acquirer firms than 
domestic M&As? 
• Do cross-border M&As achieve better operating performance for UK acquirer firms 
than domestic M&As? 
•  Are changes in the operating performance of acquirers and targets combined in cross-
border M&As greater than changes in the operating performance of acquirers and 
targets combined in domestic M&As? 
These research questions have been addressed by using a sample of UK public acquirer firms 
who were involved in cross-border and domestic M&As during the years 1996 to 2003. The 
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examination has been conducted by carrying out three empirical studies connected to the 
consequences of M&As by examining the market reaction as well as the operating 
performance of firms involved in cross-border and domestic M&As.  
This chapter presents the conclusions and key findings of the research in a way that shows 
how they meet the objectives set at the beginning of the thesis. Accordingly, the chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 5.2 summarizes the key findings of the empirical studies. 
Section 5.3 discusses the implications of the findings. Section 5.4 discusses the main 
problems and limitations of the study. Finally, section 5.5 presents some suggestions for 
further research. 
5.2 Summary and Key Findings from the Empirical Investigations 
This section summarizes the key findings of the thesis which are represented by the following 
three empirical studies. 
5.2.1 Returns to Shareholders of UK Acquirers: Cross-border vs. Domestic 
Study one, which is presented in chapter two of the thesis, extends the findings of previous 
literature conducted on the market reaction due to the announcement of merger and 
acquisition deals by examining the difference between the reactions of the returns on share 
prices of UK acquirers who are involved in cross-border and domestic M&As.  
The empirical examination is conducted by applying the event study methodology using a 
sample of 585 acquirer firms which have returns data available and uses three different 
models in calculating abnormal returns, which are the mean-adjusted model, the market 
model and the market-adjusted model. The examination is conducted around the 
announcement date using five different event windows which are (-1, +1), (-2, +2), (-5,+5), (-
10, +10) and (-40, +40). Most of the results using all the models and during all the event 
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windows show insignificant changes in the returns to shareholders of UK acquirers involved 
in cross-border acquisitions. On the other hand, most of the results for UK acquirers’ 
shareholders involved in domestic M&As show a significant increase in the share market 
returns. 
More specifically, the results obtained from using the mean-adjusted model show 
insignificant changes in the cumulative average abnormal returns of cross-border acquisitions 
during all the event windows. However, the domestic sample shows a significant increase in 
the cumulative average abnormal returns over the (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-10, +10) windows, 
whereas significant decrease in the returns when lengthening the period up to (-40, +40) days 
around the announcement day. 
The equality tests shows no significant difference in means between cross-border and 
domestic M&As using the t- test, whereas significant negative difference in medians over the 
(-1, +1) and (-2, +2) event windows which suggests lower returns to cross-border acquirers. 
When applying the market model in the analysis, the results show insignificant changes in the 
cumulative abnormal returns of UK acquirer firms involved in cross-border M&As using all 
the event windows except the (-10, +10) days which shows a significant decrease in the 
returns. However, the results for the domestic sample show a significant increase in the 
returns of UK acquirers over the event windows (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-40, +40) days. 
The equality tests give the same results as in the mean-adjusted model with an insignificant 
difference in means whereas there is a significant negative difference in medians between 
cross-border and domestic M&As over the event windows (-1, +1) and (-2, +2).   
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Finally, when applying the market-adjusted model, the results of the analysis of the cross-
border sample show insignificant changes in the cumulative abnormal returns over the event 
windows (-1, +1), (-2, +2) and (-5, +5) whereas there is a significant decrease in the returns 
over the (-10, +10) and (-40, +40) days around the announcement day. On the other hand, the 
domestic sample results show a significant increase in returns over most of the event 
windows, which are (-1, +1), (-2, +2), (-5, +5) and (-10, +10) days around the announcement 
day.  
The equality tests show significant negative differences in means and medians over the (-1, 
+1) and (-2, +2) event windows which means lower returns for cross-border M&As in 
comparison with domestic M&As. 
Also, a regression analysis has been conducted to examine the impact of some of the acquirer 
and deal characteristics on the returns to shareholders of acquirer firms. The results in general 
do not show that cross-border M&As affect the returns to acquirers’ shareholders differently 
than domestic M&As. The results also show a significant positive impact of the deal value on 
the returns of domestic acquirers whereas there is a significant negative impact from the 
acquirer’s size on the returns of domestic acquirer firms. However, no significant impact for 
those characteristics has been shown on the cross-border acquirers’ returns.  
The results of the first study generally support the findings from the previous literature 
conducted on the returns to shareholders of acquirer firms, which concluded that acquirers 
have generally insignificant negative returns to shareholders in cross-border deals, whereas 
there are significant positive returns to shareholders in domestic M&A transactions. This 
research adds to the previous studies by the direct comparison of the two types of acquisitions 
(cross-border vs. domestic) with results generally showing no significant difference between 
the returns to shareholders of acquirer firms involved in cross-border and domestic M&As, 
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which is surprising given the vast increase in the number of cross-border deals during recent 
years. 
5.2.2 Operating Performance of UK Acquirers: Cross-border vs. Domestic 
The evidence provided in study one, which is presented in chapter two of the thesis, shows 
that share market prices on the London Stock Exchange do not respond in a significantly 
different way to the announcement of cross-border acquisitions in comparison to domestic 
acquisitions, which may indicate that investors in the market may have felt that acquiring 
abroad is not profitably different than domestic acquisitions.  
Study two, which is presented in chapter three of the thesis, also examines the UK acquirer 
firms using a longer time period than study one and using different performance measures in 
order to provide further insight into the difference between cross-border and domestic M&As. 
The study examines whether cross-border acquisitions have a less or more favourable impact 
on the operating performance of acquirer firms than domestic acquisitions by using acquirer 
firms’ data over a period of up to three years before, and up to three years after, the 
acquisition. The major contribution of this study lies in the fact that according to my 
knowledge, it is the first study that compares the operating performance of UK acquirer firms 
involved in cross-border and domestic acquisitions by using the acquirer’s data in the pre- and 
post-acquisition periods and by applying different benchmarks in the examination.  
The empirical examination is conducted using eight different measures of operating 
performance and by applying the change model and the intercept model in order to calculate 
the changes in operating performance of acquirer firms. Also, two benchmarks are used in this 
study in order to control for the industry as well as the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance. 
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The results do not show significant differences between the operating performance of acquirer 
firms involved in cross-border and domestic M&As for most of the performance measures 
used, which is consistent with the results of the previous chapter conducted on the 
announcement period returns. However, there are some contradictions in the results when the 
change model is used in comparison with the intercept model, since the intercept model 
shows significantly lower operating performance of acquirer firms than the change model. 
More specifically, when the change model is used, the results for the acquirer firms involved 
in cross-border M&As show significant positive changes in the industry-adjusted operating 
performance of acquirers using three measures, which are the cash flow deflated by total 
assets, the cash flow deflated by total market value and the ‘pure’ cash flow deflated by total 
assets whereas there are insignificant changes using the other measures. When the potential 
effects of industry, size and pre-acquisition performance are controlled, the results show 
insignificant changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms for all the measures used. 
On the other hand, the results for acquirer firms involved in domestic M&As show significant 
positive changes in the industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirers using four 
measures, which are the cash flow measure deflated by total assets and total market value and 
the accrual measure deflated by total assets and the book value of equity respectively. The 
other measures show insignificant positive changes in the operating performance of acquirer 
firms. However, when control is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance, 
the results show significant positive changes in the adjusted operating performance for two 
measures, which are the cash flow and ‘pure’ cash flow measures both deflated by total 
market value whereas there are insignificant changes for the other measures. 
When the intercept model is used, the analysis shows different results from the change model. 
For example, the results for acquirer firms involved in cross-border M&As show significant 
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negative changes in the industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms for all the 
performance measures used, except the accrual measure deflated by the book value of equity 
which shows positive changes. However, when industry, size and pre-acquisition performance 
effects are controlled, the results are more contradictory. Two measures show significant 
decreases in the operating performance of acquirers, which are the cash flow and the accrual 
measure both deflated by total assets whereas the accrual measure deflated by the book value 
of equity shows a significant increase. However, the other measures show insignificant 
changes in the operating performance of acquirer firms. 
The results for acquirer firms involved in domestic M&As also show significant negative 
changes in the industry-adjusted operating performance of acquirer firms for five out of the 
eight measures used, which are the cash flow measure deflated by total assets and sales, pure 
cash flow deflated by total assets and sales and the accrual measure deflated by total assets. 
However, the other measures show insignificant changes in the operating performance of 
acquirers. When the adjustment is made for the industry, size and pre-acquisition 
performance, the results show insignificant changes in the operating performance of acquirer 
firms for all the measures used. 
The regression analysis results for the impact of cross-border M&As on the post-acquisition 
operating performance of acquirer firms show an insignificant negative impact of cross-border 
M&As on the post-acquisition performance for most of the operating performance measures 
and benchmarks used. 
5.2.3 Operating Performance of Combined Firms: Cross-border vs. Domestic 
Study three, which is in chapter four of the thesis, is based on two kinds of analysis. Analysis 
(A) examines whether there is a significant difference between the impacts of cross-border 
and domestic M&As on the operating performance of UK bidders and targets combined. The 
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performance measures and benchmarks used in this study are the same as those used in 
chapter three of the thesis. However, the calculation in this study differs from the one in study 
two by using the acquirer and target firms’ data during the three years before the acquisition 
and the combined firms’ data during the three years after the acquisition. On the other hand, 
analysis (B) of the chapter is conducted for the same acquirer firms used in analysis (A) by 
using the acquirer’s data only in the pre- and post-acquisition period in order to check whether 
or not excluding target firms from the analysis has a qualitative impact on the results. 
The results of analysis (A) conducted for the combined firms show that firms engaged in 
cross-border M&As have lower operating performance than domestic combined firms. More 
specifically, the results using the change model show that firms involved in cross-border 
M&As have insignificant changes in the industry-adjusted operating performance for all the 
measures used except the accrual measure deflated by the book value of equity, which shows 
significant positive changes in the operating performance of combined firms. When the 
industry, size and pre-acquisition performance effects are controlled, the results for the cross-
border sample show insignificant changes in the operating performance of combined firms for 
all the measures used. 
When the operating performance of firms involved in domestic M&As is examined, the 
results show insignificant changes in the industry-adjusted operating performance of 
combined firms for all the performance measures used. When the industry, size and pre-
acquisition performance effects are controlled, the results show a significant increase in the 
operating performance of combined firms for five measures, which are the cash flow measure 
deflated by sales, the pure cash flow measures deflated by total assets, sales and total market 
value respectively and the accrual measure deflated by the book value of equity. 
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When the intercept model is used, the results for the cross-border sample show insignificant 
changes in the industry-adjusted performance of combined firms for all the measures used 
except the pure cash flow measure deflated by total market value, which shows significant 
negative changes in the operating performance of combined firms. When the control is made 
for the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance of firms, the results also show 
insignificant changes in the operating performance of firms for all the measures except the 
cash flow measure deflated by total assets and the pure cash flow measure deflated by total 
market value. 
The results for the combined firms involved in domestic M&As show insignificant changes in 
the industry-adjusted performance of combined firms for all the measures used except the 
cash flow measure deflated by sales, which shows significant positive changes in operating 
performance of combined firms. When the industry, size and pre-acquisition performance of 
firms is controlled, the results also show insignificant changes in the operating performance of 
firms for all the measures except the cash flow measure deflated by sales and the pure cash 
flow measures deflated by total assets and sales respectively, which show significant positive 
changes in operating performance of combined firms. 
The regression analysis results for the impact of cross-border M&As on the post-acquisition 
operating performance of combined firms show different results depending on the kind of 
benchmark used in the examination. For example, when the adjustment is made for the 
industry median performance, the results show insignificant negative impact of cross-border 
M&As. When the effects of industry, size and pre-acquisition performance are controlled, the 
results show significant negative impact of cross-border M&As on the post-acquisition 
performance of combined firms, which implies that cross-border M&As have a lower 
operating performance for combined firms than domestic M&As. 
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The results of analysis (B) of this chapter which is conducted for acquirer firms only are 
similar to the results achieved in analysis (A), which includes both acquirer and target firms in 
the analysis.  
5.3 Implications of the Results 
The M&A activity should be beneficial to the economy as a whole if the managers use the 
firm’s resources wisely and act in the best interests of the firm and the shareholders in order to 
maximize the value of the firm following the M&A deal. 
The findings of this thesis have obvious implications for the managers, shareholders as well 
as the decision and policy makers as to whether cross-border M&As should be actively 
encouraged or discouraged in comparison with domestic M&As.  
Some of the results of the thesis show lower returns and operating performance for UK 
acquirer and combined firms in cross-border M&As in comparison with domestic M&As for 
some of the measures used. However, this doesn’t mean that those transactions should be 
discouraged, since the maximum period after the M&A covered by the analysis in this thesis 
is three years. If firms usually undertake cross-border M&As as long term strategic 
investment activities by which they expect to generate higher profits than domestic M&As 
after more than three years, then the evidence reported in the thesis could have misrepresented 
the difference between the operating performances of cross-border M&As and domestic 
M&As. If that is so, and if empirical evidence shows that cross-border M&As usually 
generate higher profits than domestic M&As after more than three years, then it will be wrong 
and irrational to discourage firms from engaging in cross-border M&As.  
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5.4 Limitations of the Study  
The results of this study should be considered with a degree of knowledge of its limitations. 
Those limitations have resulted from a problem which occurred at the beginning of the data 
collection period which is the need to collect the data manually from the Acquisitions 
Monthly magazine due to the unavailability of the suitable electronic databases. 
This problem has resulted in some of the limitations which can be summarized in the 
following four points: 
- The manual collection of the data proved to be a time and effort- consuming exercise. 
- The size of the sample used to conduct the various studies in the thesis might have been 
larger if an electronic database was available. 
- Another limitation was the unavailability of the data needed to analyse the impacts of 
some firm characteristics on the differences between the reactions of the market to the 
announcements of domestic and cross-border M&As by UK acquirers, as well as the 
impacts of the characteristics on the difference between the effects of domestic and 
cross-border M&As on the operating performance of UK acquirers. 
- Another important limitation is that the difference between the impacts of domestic and 
cross-border M&As on the operating performance of UK acquirers in periods longer 
than three years after the M&As is not examined in the thesis. This could be an 
important limitation if firms undertake cross-border M&As as long term strategic 
activities which they expect to generate higher profits than domestic M&As after three 
years. 
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5.5 Suggestions for Further Research 
On the basis of the findings from this study as well as the other previous literature, 
recommendations and suggestions for further investigation are provided in order to obtain 
greater understanding of the findings presented in this thesis and to improve them.  
For example, different approaches can be used in future studies in order to add to the 
understanding of the antecedents and consequences of M&A transactions. One approach is to 
examine the issue of M&As more closely and in greater detail by using a case study analysis 
since this approach may provide better insights into the actual antecedents, motives and 
consequences of the M&A transactions. The findings of those case studies might explain any 
variations in the results of this current thesis and complement the findings in it. 
Furthermore, some firms may undertake M&As as long-term strategic activities which they 
expect to generate high profits for them over a very long time period. Therefore, future 
research should examine time periods longer than three years after the M&As in order to 
check whether or not the impacts on the operating performance of firms change over longer 
time periods. 
Also, subsequent studies might increase the power of this research by examining a bigger 
sample size or conducting the examination in developing countries rather than developed 
countries. 
Sudarsanam (2010) suggests that acquirer firms involved in cross-border M&As may benefit 
from the strength of the currency of their home country at the time of the acquisition. 
Therefore, it would be beneficial if future research examines the impact of the changes in the 
exchange rates between the currencies of the acquirer and target firms at the time of the 
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acquisition on the differences between the returns and operating performances of firms 
involved in cross-border and domestic acquisitions.  
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A
ppendix 1: U
N
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T
A
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 2008 T
ables 
Number of Cross-border M&A's, by region/economy of purchaser, 1987-2008a 
(Number of deals) 
                       Country / region 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008a 
World 1 174 1 879 2 723 3 360 3 908 3 724 3 965 4 566 5 498 5 868 6 740 7 995 9 007 10 031 8 098 6 553 6 621 7 270 8 560 9 075 10 145 4 370 
Developed economies 1 057 1 703 2 459 2 840 3 234 3 106 3 196 3 740 4 726 5 002 5 760 6 947 7 966 8 829 6 982 5 324 5 158 5 708 6 761 7 233 8 143 3 414 
Europe 546 1 016 1 430 1 594 2 066 1 891 1 759 2 070 2 685 2 660 3 014 3 650 4 801 5 472 4 373 3 226 2 865 3 018 3 806 4 036 4 610 1 987 
European Union 505 936 1 328 1 463 1 864 1 730 1 609 1 881 2 444 2 425 2 763 3 357 4 456 5 046 4 042 2 952 2 627 2 752 3 430 3 624 4 171 1 798 
Austria 4 6 8 14 40 40 33 45 70 41 47 56 83 109 97 76 69 91 97 95 127 38 
Belgium 12 14 17 27 45 56 39 49 68 72 101 141 189 247 165 95 85 89 103 96 112 42 
Bulgaria 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 2 1 3 4 1 4 2 2 3 
Cyprus - - - - - - - - 7 4 3 1 9 17 22 12 6 7 9 26 32 12 
Czech Republic - - - - 2 2 - 2 3 5 10 3 7 8 10 15 5 4 11 16 12 5 
Denmark 7 17 22 37 64 58 57 55 100 62 91 94 138 177 167 94 79 100 147 120 103 72 
Estonia - - - - - 2 - 1 - 4 9 6 8 7 4 6 6 6 4 8 12 4 
Finland 9 18 39 32 54 57 43 50 34 62 80 108 149 173 144 137 96 66 93 109 91 65 
France 59 101 178 267 310 284 211 247 319 327 353 410 527 665 535 359 291 329 454 468 588 241 
Germany 37 71 113 160 251 265 234 313 422 402 344 453 787 835 559 450 386 351 433 444 491 213 
Greece - - 2 - 2 5 14 9 3 3 13 14 34 58 77 37 27 10 29 32 24 17 
Hungary - - - - - - 1 1 7 1 10 13 18 18 8 15 24 11 13 16 18 7 
Ireland 9 33 41 46 25 37 44 75 75 77 82 95 126 162 127 76 73 76 81 112 140 45 
Italy 24 26 55 65 104 105 91 76 105 66 78 138 183 202 206 131 140 113 165 155 232 85 
Latvia - - - - - - 1 - - - - 3 3 6 3 2 7 5 2 1 3 1 
Lithuania - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 4 - 2 4 8 2 4 3 3 4 
Luxembourg 4 3 2 6 26 18 20 22 13 16 26 29 25 41 33 25 25 31 41 63 62 42 
Malta - - - - - - 1 - 2 - 3 - 2 - 1 - - 3 - 2 2 1 
Netherlands 38 54 62 89 159 132 151 191 279 286 294 365 413 427 332 253 195 196 249 263 307 158 
Poland - - - 1 1 - 2 2 4 7 4 2 9 12 14 9 14 15 21 14 40 17 
Portugal - - 2 1 7 14 15 13 15 6 17 26 36 50 39 38 22 27 25 38 37 23 
Romania - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 2 1 - - 4 3 1 2 4 1 3 
Slovakia - - - - - 1 1 1 1 8 1 2 5 2 9 5 3 4 4 6 5 7 
Slovenia - - - 1 - - - 1 - 1 - - - 4 14 10 8 8 7 8 10 3 
Spain 7 9 28 31 39 45 32 26 39 60 85 152 181 198 156 126 137 128 154 187 218 84 
Sweden 20 56 90 102 176 127 98 105 159 172 175 221 322 335 239 156 150 177 215 233 293 130 
United Kingdom 274 528 669 584 559 482 521 596 717 743 936 1 022 1 196 1 291 1 078 814 764 901 1 063 1 103 1 206 476 
Other developed Europe 41 80 102 131 202 161 150 189 241 235 251 293 345 426 331 274 238 266 376 412 439 189 
Andorra - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 - - 
Faeroe Islands - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 - 
Gibraltar - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - 1 4 3 2 
Guernsey - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 2 - - - 11 5 1 15 23 5 
Iceland - - - - - 1 - - 2 - 2 1 3 6 7 8 13 18 45 57 40 11 
Isle of Man - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 3 1 3 2 11 9 19 2 
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Number of Cross-border M&A's, by region/economy of purchaser, 1987-2008a 
(Number of deals) 
                       Country / region 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008a 
                                             
                                              
                                            
                                            
                       
                       
                       
                       
                        
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                       
                               
                         
                       
                        
                       
                       
                       
                         
Jersey - - - - - - 1 - - 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 3 10 28 8 
          Liechtenstein - 3 5 6 2 1 - - 2 3 3 1 2 2 3 - 6 1 - 1 2 1 
Monaco - 1 2 1 2 1 - 4 5 2 4 2 3 1 4 2 3 - 1 - - 1 
Norway 9 8 16 27 63 48 43 47 62 65 66 89 94 114 89 89 51 95 113 112 122 57 
Switzerland 32 68 79 97 134 110 106 138 169 164 174 198 240 299 222 173 149 143 200 203 201 102 
North America 373 466 721 776 843 1 011 1 211 1 396 1 738 1 977 2 337 2 815 2 624 2 747 2 048 1 652 1 841 2 131 2 225 2 430 2 604 1 101 
Canada 77 88 163 160 142 204 233 271 320 391 437 512 409 506 430 381 425 500 488 552 612 235 
United States 296 378 558 616 701 807 978 1 125 1 418 1 586 1 900 2 303 2 215 2 241 1 618 1 271 1 416 1 631 1 737 1 878 1 992 866 
Other developed countries 138 221 308 470 325 204 226 274 303 365 409 482 541 610 561 446 452 559 730 767 929 326 
Australia 59 63 60 83 56 55 84 109 126 94 156 207 187 231 217 185 205 286 363 398 503 140 
Bermuda 6 1 7 10 10 8 12 22 18 49 43 41 53 53 72 26 20 25 26 32 38 23 
Greenland - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Israel - - 1 5 3 9 15 17 9 13 21 31 34 66 33 28 26 37 55 59 69 25 
Japan 58 134 223 347 248 125 99 106 133 186 159 184 233 210 188 152 165 171 255 235 248 122 
New Zealand 15 23 17 25 8 7 16 20 16 23 30 19 34 50 51 55 36 40 31 43 71 16 
Developing economies 47 63 101 154 221 242 359 469 496 609 668 654 676 866 743 830 917 1 090 1 269 1 345 1 454 682 
Africa 11 11 15 24 26 24 24 39 45 57 72 107 130 124 96 75 49 63 95 93 77 42 
North Africa - - 1 2 1 5 4 3 4 2 2 3 16 6 8 3 4 4 12 17 9 4 
Algeria - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - - - 1 - - 
Egypt - - 1 1 - - 2 - 1 1 1 1 7 6 3 1 3 2 3 14 6 3 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya - - - 1 1 5 1 2 1 - - 1 1 - 2 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 
Morocco - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 1 6 - 2 - - 1 8 2 2 1 
Sudan - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 
Tunisia - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 
Other Africa 11 11 14 22 25 19 20 36 41 55 70 104 114 118 88 72 45 59 83 76 68 38 
Côte d' Ivoire - - - - - - 1 1 2 - 1 1 1 1 - - - 1 - - - - 
Ghana - - - - - - - 1 1 4 1 - - - - - - 1 1 - - - 
Liberia - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - - 1 - 1 1 - 2 - - - 
Niger - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Nigeria - - - - - 1 1 - 1 - - - 1 2 3 2 1 3 3 - 4 6 
Senegal - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 
Sierra Leone - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - 
Congo - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 
Equatorial Guinea - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Gabon - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - 1 - - 3 - - - - - - - 
São Tomé and Principe - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 
Eritrea - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 
Kenya 1 - - - 1 - - - 1 - 1 1 - 2 1 1 1 3 2 4 4 1 
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Mauritius - - - - - - - - - 1 3 1 1 2 2 5 2 - 17 11 7 2 
Reunion - - - - - - - - - 4 - - 1 - 1 - 1 - - - - - 
Seychelles - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 3 - 2 2 
Uganda - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - 2 - - - - - 2 - 
United Republic of Tanzania - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Angola - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Botswana - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 1 1 1 - - - - - 
Lesotho - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 
Malawi - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - - - 1 - - - - 
Namibia - - - - - - 1 1 - 1 - 1 1 - - - - 1 - 2 - 1 
South Africa 9 11 14 20 21 18 15 28 34 40 61 96 103 105 69 57 34 47 51 55 46 24 
Swaziland - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 
Zambia 1 - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 1 - - - - - 1 1 1 - 
Zimbabwe - - - 2 2 - - 3 - 1 1 2 2 1 4 5 3 1 1 3 2 1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 12 14 16 22 28 51 61 98 98 91 105 153 133 185 145 179 151 180 153 213 248 108 
South and Central America 8 10 13 16 19 34 49 77 75 70 82 124 104 152 102 126 104 130 101 143 170 73 
South America 6 9 7 9 15 26 33 46 63 50 50 83 73 108 76 86 71 95 62 92 116 54 
Argentina 1 - 1 - 2 6 11 7 8 10 21 37 27 36 20 21 18 17 13 12 7 4 
Bolivia - - - - - - - 2 1 1 - - - - 1 3 1 3 - 1 3 1 
Brazil 2 2 5 2 5 7 10 16 20 8 8 23 24 35 38 29 32 40 30 43 58 40 
Chile - 1 - 1 1 3 4 8 18 21 9 10 10 22 11 15 12 17 7 20 22 3 
Colombia 1 1 - - - 1 2 7 3 - 4 7 2 3 2 5 1 6 5 6 14 2 
Ecuador - - - - - 2 - 2 2 1 - - - 1 - 1 1 - - - 1 1 
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 
Guyana - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 
Paraguay - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - 
Peru - - - - - - - 1 6 3 2 1 2 6 2 6 1 10 4 3 2 2 
Suriname - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Uruguay 1 1 - - 2 2 - - 1 - 1 1 1 2 1 2 3 - 2 1 - - 
Venezuela 1 3 1 6 4 5 6 3 4 6 5 4 7 2 1 4 - 2 - 6 9 1 
Central America 2 1 6 7 4 8 16 31 12 20 32 41 31 44 26 40 33 35 39 51 54 19 
Belize - - - 1 - 1 1 1 2 - - 2 2 - 1 - - 1 - 1 - - 
Costa Rica - - - - - - 2 - 1 2 - 11 4 1 1 - 1 - 2 3 6 - 
El Salvador - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - 2 - - - 1 2 9 - - 
Guatemala - - - - 2 - - - - - 1 - - 4 6 4 - 1 5 10 4 2 
Honduras - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 
Mexico 2 - 5 4 2 6 12 27 7 17 27 25 24 36 16 32 26 26 25 24 36 15 
Nicaragua - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
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Panama - 1 1 2 - 1 - 3 2 1 4 2 1 1 2 4 5 6 5 4 8 1 
Caribbean 4 4 3 6 9 17 12 21 23 21 23 29 29 33 43 53 47 50 52 70 78 35 
Anguilla - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 2 1 1 1 
Antigua and Barbuda - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 2 - - 
Aruba - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 
Bahamas - - - 1 - 1 1 4 8 3 2 4 3 1 6 7 6 3 3 8 1 4 
Barbados - - - 1 1 1 - - - 1 1 - 2 1 - - 1 - 7 3 9 3 
British Virgin Islands 1 - - - - 1 2 6 10 7 6 3 7 13 22 27 19 19 13 16 21 7 
Cayman Islands 2 3 - - 1 1 1 4 1 - 6 4 4 3 9 7 6 9 5 17 35 18 
Cuba - - - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Dominican Republic - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - 1 1 1 - 5 - 1 1 - 
Haiti - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Jamaica - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 1 1 6 7 4 - 
Martinique - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 
Netherlands Antilles 1 1 1 2 4 3 4 - 2 3 1 10 5 6 1 1 3 1 2 4 1 - 
Puerto Rico - - 1 2 2 3 1 3 - 2 6 7 3 5 4 8 6 8 9 8 4 1 
Saint Kitts and Nevis - - - - - - - - - 3 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Trinidad and Tobago - - 1 - - 5 1 3 - - - 1 3 2 - 1 5 3 3 1 - 1 
Turks and Caicos Islands - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 
US Virgin Islands - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 2 1 - - 
Asia and Oceania 24 38 70 108 167 167 274 332 353 461 491 394 413 557 502 576 717 847 1 021 1 039 1 129 532 
Asia 24 38 70 107 167 166 272 331 351 458 489 393 411 556 496 568 716 842 1 020 1 032 1 124 530 
West Asia 4 8 15 13 14 16 19 19 18 25 36 35 43 46 47 40 44 44 78 108 135 98 
Bahrain - - 2 2 2 3 5 3 - 1 6 11 13 7 10 8 13 12 12 20 22 16 
Iraq - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 
Jordan - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 - - 2 - 1 - 2 3 3 3 2 
Kuwait 3 6 9 5 5 3 1 1 4 13 6 2 7 8 10 4 4 4 13 10 16 10 
Lebanon - - - - - 1 2 - 1 1 1 - - 3 2 2 3 1 2 2 2 1 
Oman - - - - - - - 1 - - 2 5 1 2 1 4 2 - 2 4 2 5 
Qatar - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 1 - - 2 3 4 1 8 8 
Saudi Arabia 1 1 2 1 4 3 5 8 8 2 11 8 3 7 9 5 6 4 7 13 10 7 
Syrian Arab Republic - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - 
Turkey - - 2 3 1 6 6 4 3 5 5 6 9 12 9 9 5 7 11 11 10 9 
United Arab Emirates - 1 - 2 1 - - 2 2 2 4 3 6 4 6 7 9 11 24 44 61 40 
Yemen - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 
South, East and South-East 
Asia 20 30 55 94 153 150 253 312 333 433 453 358 368 510 449 528 672 798 942 924 989 432 
China 1 4 6 5 9 14 39 28 21 27 58 51 49 47 54 79 112 110 102 88 122 51 
Hong Kong, China 16 13 21 30 64 49 78 76 58 76 93 97 89 141 121 128 144 157 189 186 186 62 
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Korea, Democratic People's 
Republic of - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 
Korea, Republic of 1 2 3 9 4 5 8 17 21 29 23 11 17 14 31 17 29 17 32 56 56 29 
Macao, China - - - - - - - 1 - - - - 1 - - - 1 - 1 1 1 - 
Mongolia - - - - - - - - - 2 2 2 1 - - - - - - - - - 
Taiwan Province of China - 2 6 15 6 11 4 4 14 9 23 24 28 28 13 22 29 26 22 20 25 13 
Afghanistan - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 
Bangladesh - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - 1 - 2 2 - 1 - - - - - 
India 1 2 3 1 4 8 2 7 13 7 13 9 31 56 40 48 70 77 122 162 194 110 
Iran, Islamic Republic of - - - - 2 - 1 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Nepal - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 - - 
Pakistan 1 - - - 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 - 2 - 3 2 3 3 - 3 - - 
Sri Lanka - - - - - - - 1 2 - - 1 1 1 4 2 2 1 1 2 4 1 
Brunei Darussalam - - - - - - 1 - 2 3 1 - - 1 - - 1 - - 1 - - 
Cambodia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 1 - - - - 
Indonesia - 2 2 8 7 4 11 12 13 19 16 10 10 11 4 3 14 11 18 15 13 7 
Lao People's Democratic 
Republic - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Malaysia - 1 3 8 17 16 28 54 74 107 103 38 34 48 37 76 90 147 193 164 162 72 
Myanmar - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 
Philippines - - 1 - 3 - 3 3 15 24 7 4 14 13 9 9 6 13 17 12 17 5 
Singapore - 4 9 15 32 28 69 99 87 111 108 102 79 135 112 122 154 211 221 189 192 69 
Thailand - - 1 3 4 11 8 9 11 17 5 7 11 10 18 18 15 24 22 19 15 12 
Viet Nam - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - 1 1 1 1 1 1 - 1 5 1 - 
Oceania - - - 1 - 1 2 1 2 3 2 1 2 1 6 8 1 5 1 7 5 2 
American Samoa - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Cook Islands - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - 1 - - - - 
Fiji - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - 1 - 1 - - 
French Polynesia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - 1 3 - 2 1 - 
Marshall Islands - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - 
Nauru - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
New Caledonia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 2 - - 
Niue - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - 
Norfolk Island - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - 
Northern Mariana Islands - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - 
Papua New Guinea - - - 1 - - 2 1 1 2 1 - 1 1 - 1 - - - - 3 1 
Samoa - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - 1 - - 
Solomon Islands - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - 
Tonga - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
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Vanuatu - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
South-East Europe and the CIS  - - - 1 3 7 4 9 6 16 9 19 20 31 56 52 71 52 87 96 133 84 
Southeast Europe - - - - - 1 1 1 1 2 1 3 4 2 6 10 9 2 4 10 10 3 
Albania - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Bosnia and Herzegovina - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Croatia - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 3 4 2 3 7 7 1 3 5 6 1 
     Czechoslovakia (former) - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Macedonia, TFYR - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 1 1 - - - - - 
        Serbia and Montenegro - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 1 1 1 4 3 1 
Serbia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 
Montenegro - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 
Yugoslavia (former) - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 1 - - - - - - 
Commonwealth of Independent 
States (CIS) - - - 1 3 6 3 8 5 14 8 16 16 29 50 42 62 50 83 86 123 81 
Armenia - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - - 
Azerbaijan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - - - 1 
Belarus - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - 1 1 - 
Georgia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 
Kazakhstan - - - - - - - 1 - 2 1 - - 2 2 1 3 2 9 6 17 4 
Moldova, Republic of - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 
Russian Federation - - - 1 3 6 3 7 5 11 4 13 15 23 45 38 49 38 67 75 94 72 
Ukraine - - - - - - - - - 1 2 3 1 3 3 3 8 8 7 3 10 3 
Uzbekistan - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 1 - - 
unspecified 70 113 163 365 450 369 406 348 270 241 303 375 345 305 317 347 475 420 443 401 415 190 
                       Source:  UNCTAD cross-border M&A database(www.unctad.org/fdistatistices). 
                 
                       Note:  The data cover only those deals that involve an acquisition of an equity of more than 10%. 2008 is first half January through June. 
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Value of Cross-border M&A's, by region/economy of purchaser, 1987-2008a 
(Millions of dollars) 
                       
  1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008a 
World 97 311 137 630 167 068 200 389 116 642 112 939 123 492 170 575 231 577 264 254 370 987 692 686 903 868 1 349 777 730 441 483 238 411 302 565 871 929 362 1 118 068 1 637 107 621 282 
Developed economies 87 894 130 929 149 972 172 537 94 856 89 436 82 130 133 950 207 768 232 508 319 050 614 253 842 887 1 202 786 673 772 420 022 334 807 469 332 784 411 937 747 1 414 753 499 396 
Europe 35 298 53 474 79 353 98 212 54 302 62 800 47 041 82 955 111 803 127 595 182 115 376 363 595 019 924 022 405 206 264 394 168 496 232 801 522 526 576 820 893 010 317 094 
European Union 34 844 44 662 76 339 88 493 47 267 57 288 44 454 70 114 101 195 113 106 169 340 335 310 569 202 864 911 381 250 246 501 159 462 219 397 477 530 509 018 847 882 284 700 
Austria 62 - 181 236 208 171 169 43 157 4 352 804 2 375 2 428 1 468 2 009 1 909 4 557 5 761 10 189 6 228 3 952 
Belgium 20 226 321 852 776 625 197 3 209 4 707 3 349 2 079 3 604 16 376 17 317 20 404 5 148 3 555 9 749 6 171 8 168 9 083 1 125 
Bulgaria 8 - - - - - - - - 3 60 - 800 12 - 9 17 1 519 22 78 94 1 
Cyprus - - - 13 - - - - - 58 1 881 - 108 19 32 36 118 9 515 2 901 1 699 2 575 
Czech Republic - - - - - 67 - 24 46 148 82 133 33 58 36 42 142 360 650 1 048 308 66 
Denmark 61 71 304 785 615 263 338 400 154 488 1 743 1 311 7 439 4 693 4 433 2 242 3 087 7 073 16 045 14 060 14 158 1 127 
Estonia - - - - - - - 22 - 17 8 19 10 15 41 - 25 - 3 3 - - 
Finland 58 176 979 1 136 574 52 106 742 471 1 845 2 515 8 077 3 462 21 902 9 310 5 677 972 3 450 4 373 4 848 1 327 5 436 
France 3 262 5 664 18 322 22 852 10 548 13 777 6 840 9 398 9 203 13 352 26 198 42 325 91 344 175 452 62 260 41 446 12 574 23 215 59 860 80 469 105 268 34 052 
Germany 1 487 2 614 3 576 6 919 8 030 7 637 5 662 7 662 19 396 19 399 15 042 70 414 89 591 71 518 61 289 44 368 23 782 21 038 47 667 51 983 94 122 55 393 
Greece - - 100 - 13 19 134 35 - 1 2 338 1 839 896 3 943 1 325 218 371 82 2 285 7 124 811 1 637 
Hungary - - - - - - 62 - 25 - 12 46 157 468 1 332 193 1 279 317 620 2 148 6 41 
Ireland 67 698 1 088 762 399 532 542 1 621 1 228 2 277 1 978 3 773 4 700 6 192 4 529 2 560 2 041 4 170 5 570 10 699 10 008 3 775 
Italy 3 387 1 499 3 660 2 887 1 160 5 484 1 379 1 795 7 510 1 760 6 363 16 058 14 109 21 527 20 592 10 426 14 398 11 860 54 744 20 384 65 521 24 636 
Latvia - - - - - - 18 - - - - 2 0 2 - 2 14 1 2 - 4 28 
Lithuania - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - 25 25 6 27 180 30 - 
Luxembourg 59 80 2 736 1 714 1 023 1 373 1 559 189 51 1 037 1 970 1 537 4 065 6 599 16 902 4 605 1 236 565 12 107 7 477 13 939 8 018 
Malta - - - - - - 7 - - - 0 - 4 - 43 - - 57 - 115 110 - 
Netherlands 2 731 2 383 3 292 5 958 5 794 5 774 3 134 8 947 7 581 15 770 16 169 26 005 50 940 43 031 34 217 18 803 10 124 11 228 99 641 59 463 155 841 44 538 
Poland - - - - 14 - 8 11 10 76 45 472 135 264 420 541 711 196 835 3 467 1 458 711 
Portugal - - 14 17 181 875 74 312 1 279 96 612 4 201 1 689 4 047 932 1 770 1 252 3 156 726 3 019 4 322 1 133 
Romania - - - - - - - - - - 0 9 - - 10 19 7 16 10 4 23 34 
Slovakia - - - - - - - 1 - 42 1 14 425 26 119 17 7 234 499 1 178 - 
Slovenia - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 12 14 63 15 59 59 32 138 319 
Spain 305 576 1 329 1 243 3 713 2 463 1 564 3 948 745 3 457 8 320 16 055 36 969 55 699 12 050 7 606 6 090 35 792 28 912 82 881 58 828 10 483 
Sweden 1 004 3 775 1 651 13 242 1 468 2 186 1 964 1 926 11 500 3 288 8 135 16 987 11 160 23 070 9 339 12 839 5 482 10 053 17 022 12 528 34 671 4 329 
United Kingdom 22 333 26 901 38 786 29 877 12 751 15 988 20 697 29 827 37 132 46 638 73 437 121 624 232 410 406 621 120 155 85 838 70 227 70 636 113 406 125 747 269 709 81 291 
Other developed Europe 454 8 812 3 014 9 719 7 035 5 512 2 588 12 841 10 608 14 489 12 775 41 053 25 817 59 111 23 955 17 893 9 034 13 404 44 996 67 802 45 127 32 394 
Andorra - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 38 433 - - - 
Gibraltar - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - 18 - - 0 - 13 404 116 7 
Guernsey - - - - - - - - - - - 11 - - - - 343 415 14 128 6 051 1 269 173 
Iceland - - - - - 7 - - - - - - - 154 167 387 307 2 446 2 912 2 328 3 850 666 
Isle of Man - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 50 - 3 3 483 976 357 10 
Jersey - 69 - - - - - - - 24 20 23 82 24 926 865 119 5 623 139 1 990 15 461 
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Liechtenstein - - - 160 - - - 62 10 - 142 - 8 - - - 159 - - - 270 - 
Monaco - - 15 - 35 113 - 4 - - 0 - - - 102 - 77 - 4 - - - 
Norway 53 19 166 1 382 1 322 401 130 1 004 1 607 4 032 1 295 1 213 2 079 9 284 1 916 6 355 414 4 532 9 412 11 548 13 025 1 736 
Switzerland 401 8 724 2 834 8 177 5 675 4 991 2 458 11 773 8 990 10 433 11 317 39 806 23 647 49 630 20 795 10 286 7 613 5 965 16 988 46 356 24 252 14 341 
North America 44 406 51 874 56 326 44 333 25 597 19 671 30 664 44 754 83 606 85 952 114 183 214 118 179 806 227 963 191 902 127 214 130 948 198 899 201 949 262 265 448 386 144 828 
Canada 4 724 15 911 10 983 3 922 5 103 4 354 5 066 7 250 13 689 12 303 20 483 42 799 21 576 42 238 42 018 15 035 17 810 41 886 28 374 53 080 78 007 20 506 
United States 39 682 35 963 45 344 40 410 20 494 15 317 25 598 37 505 69 916 73 649 93 699 171 319 158 230 185 725 149 883 112 179 113 138 157 014 173 575 209 185 370 378 124 323 
Other developed countries 
8 190 25 581 14 292 29 992 14 957 6 965 4 424 6 241 12 359 18 961 22 752 23 772 68 062 50 801 76 665 28 414 35 363 37 632 59 936 98 662 73 358 37 473 
Australia 3 390 9 258 4 788 7 650 1 485 1 720 2 272 3 252 7 748 10 232 12 852 10 359 13 479 9 241 39 844 12 410 18 868 21 129 42 712 51 014 36 949 15 855 
Bermuda 724 - 34 1 691 125 64 537 1 628 87 1 260 3 913 9 116 35 499 12 543 17 149 1 822 733 1 883 1 886 4 788 2 247 4 766 
Israel - - - 28 25 59 395 146 106 484 547 1 095 694 2 534 912 432 1 473 4 129 1 456 9 400 5 376 503 
Japan 3 559 13 846 8 221 15 425 12 439 4 565 1 076 1 081 3 838 5 960 3 429 2 049 12 918 23 945 17 462 11 663 8 963 8 366 12 363 31 048 23 550 13 019 
New Zealand 518 2 476 1 249 5 198 883 558 145 134 580 1 027 2 011 1 153 5 472 2 538 1 298 2 087 5 326 2 124 1 519 2 412 5 237 3 331 
Developing economies 3 886 2 826 5 401 13 297 5 997 10 551 13 191 16 056 17 746 26 005 46 157 56 995 43 442 127 600 43 593 45 567 38 437 48 479 90 479 151 605 178 438 100 718 
Africa 554 208 446 350 765 1 768 761 4 280 817 2 395 2 864 17 473 7 010 7 367 3 502 1 840 1 405 3 852 3 949 23 106 13 086 8 078 
North Africa 139 - - - - 309 54 15 33 8 32 3 430 213 132 - 585 111 1 730 4 431 1 413 4 188 
Egypt 139 - - - - - 18 - 22 - 4 - 8 213 - - 155 61 1 712 4 140 1 331 4 188 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya - - - - - 309 - 5 - - - 3 - - 45 - 430 50 - - - - 
Morocco - - - - - - 36 10 - 8 28 - 399 - 87 - - - 18 291 82 - 
Tunisia - - - - - - - - 11 - - - 23 - - - - - - - - - 
Other Africa 414 208 446 350 765 1 459 707 4 265 784 2 388 2 832 17 470 6 579 7 154 3 370 1 840 821 3 741 2 219 18 675 11 672 3 890 
Botswana - - - - - - - 8 4 - - - - - 3 - 87 - 88 - - - 
Chad - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 203 - 
Côte d' Ivoire - - - - - - - 3 7 - 1 2 - - - - - 53 - - - - 
Gabon - - - - 229 - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - - - - 
Ghana - - - - - - - 0 35 506 2 137 - 31 - - - 0 16 - - - 
Kenya 100 - - - - - - - 2 - - 5 - 6 17 - 2 22 12 - - 16 
Lesotho - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - 
Liberia - - - - - - - - - 15 - - - - - 46 37 - 6 - - - 
Malawi - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - 
Mauritius - - - - - - - - - 3 36 7 25 188 14 40 1 22 395 654 1 191 198 
Namibia - - - - - - - - - 11 - - - - 8 - - 14 - - 0 11 
Nigeria - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - 81 74 - - - 21 174 1 044 
Senegal - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 22 - - - 
Seychelles - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 7 - 115 6 0 67 
Sierra Leone - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - 
South Africa 314 208 446 329 537 1 459 707 4 249 733 1 773 2 778 17 303 6 545 6 881 2 938 1 636 687 3 322 1 538 17 993 10 074 352 
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Value of Cross-border M&A's, by region/economy of purchaser, 1987-2008a 
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Uganda - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 1 - - - 250 - - - - 
United Republic of Tanzania - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 - - - - - - - - 
Zambia - - - - - - - - - 15 - - - 43 - 22 - - 29 - 25 - 
Zimbabwe - - - 22 - - - 4 - 64 - 16 6 - 309 22 - 57 - 1 5 1 
Latin America and the Caribbean 156 480 1 887 6 770 2 256 3 786 3 523 3 950 6 020 7 725 18 773 25 251 15 531 17 066 9 742 12 648 14 424 17 860 15 244 39 270 47 625 14 394 
South and Central America 23 234 1 678 6 458 2 236 1 930 3 250 3 280 5 373 7 063 18 533 22 569 14 377 16 404 6 758 11 110 12 095 14 909 11 441 36 991 39 598 9 964 
South America - 234 91 5 764 2 233 912 2 795 1 021 4 991 6 045 10 982 21 213 9 086 10 863 6 068 5 916 6 373 12 460 7 884 31 738 19 756 9 531 
Argentina - - - 5 604 240 274 1 500 155 1 981 393 3 817 7 692 1 361 1 471 440 1 002 507 164 903 3 488 5 328 2 315 
Bolivia - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - 92 38 - - - 39 112 - 
Brazil - 2 2 40 65 64 778 258 1 102 1 170 3 181 9 409 4 849 6 064 5 215 2 050 4 914 11 087 5 343 24 582 9 858 6 194 
Chile - 53 - - - 443 59 439 914 3 936 2 004 669 2 292 2 690 211 2 021 865 775 1 259 1 291 1 996 232 
Colombia - - - - - - 11 10 90 - 1 109 81 119 217 20 530 3 71 258 778 1 285 725 
Ecuador - - - - - 43 - 22 50 45 - - - - - 0 1 - - 1 - - 
Paraguay - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - 
Peru - - - - - - - 7 808 430 49 116 356 81 28 271 74 242 122 1 098 235 66 
Suriname - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Uruguay - 18 - - - 8 - 120 3 - - 25 25 32 - - 5 - - 3 - - 
Venezuela - 161 89 120 1 926 80 446 10 42 71 824 3 222 84 308 61 4 - 120 - 460 942 - 
Central America 23 - 1 587 694 3 1 018 455 2 259 382 1 018 7 551 1 357 5 291 5 541 690 5 194 5 721 2 449 3 557 5 253 19 842 432 
Belize - - - - - - 55 1 25 - - 63 319 - 13 - - 5 - - - - 
Costa Rica - - - - - - - - 100 21 3 - - - - - 13 - - 302 772 - 
El Salvador - - - - - - - - - - - - - 57 - - - 63 - - - - 
Guatemala - - - - - - - - - - 48 - - - - - - - - 49 140 - 
Honduras - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 21 - - - - - 
Mexico 23 - 1 587 690 3 1 018 400 2 258 168 871 7 411 1 076 2 755 5 479 644 4 944 5 548 2 283 3 488 4 655 18 428 432 
Panama - - - 4 - - - - 89 127 89 218 2 217 6 33 250 140 97 69 247 502 - 
Caribbean 133 246 208 312 19 1 856 273 670 647 662 240 2 681 1 154 663 2 984 1 537 2 329 2 951 3 804 2 279 8 027 4 431 
Antigua and Barbuda - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - - 
Aruba - - - - - 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Bahamas - 83 - 1 - 17 - 15 141 344 - 51 460 - 748 44 825 810 8 322 1 814 - 
Barbados - - - - 5 - - - - - 15 1 - - - 638 - - 123 - - - 
British Virgin Islands 2 - - - - 62 29 89 62 271 90 31 177 240 670 539 133 1 561 74 166 1 939 187 
Cayman Islands - - - - - - 24 530 - 7 128 67 90 73 1 559 137 1 053 69 2 902 278 4 155 3 635 
Cuba - - - - - - - 8 341 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Dominican Republic - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 109 1 8 8 - 16 - - 93 - 
Jamaica - - - 16 - 10 - - 4 - - - - - - - - - 1 196 1 - 
Netherlands Antilles 132 - 16 287 - 11 44 - 99 7 7 528 309 3 - 0 188 125 - 350 - 586 
Puerto Rico - 163 169 8 14 1 500 - 28 - 17 1 1 998 - 226 - 148 130 370 574 812 25 - 
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Saint Kitts and Nevis - - - - - - - - - 4 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Trinidad and Tobago - - 24 - - 245 175 1 - - - 5 10 120 - 23 - - 30 155 - - 
Turks and Caicos Islands - - - - - - - - - 12 - - - - - - - - - 0 - - 
Asia and Oceania 3 177 2 139 3 069 6 177 2 976 4 996 8 908 7 827 10 909 15 885 24 520 14 272 20 901 103 167 30 350 31 079 22 608 26 767 71 286 89 229 117 728 78 246 
Asia 3 177 2 139 3 069 6 062 2 976 4 995 8 766 7 827 10 888 15 819 24 422 14 272 20 760 102 733 30 350 31 046 22 607 26 765 71 110 89 022 117 450 78 242 
West Asia 170 124 253 2 126 113 17 995 1 499 1 716 1 548 1 929 846 1 624 1 747 422 3 193 1 569 2 086 19 879 30 372 40 474 22 074 
Bahrain - - 168 1 537 - - 581 356 - - 1 472 325 690 79 274 646 432 - 554 2 068 1 689 1 529 
Iraq - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 33 - 
Jordan - - - - - - - - - - - - - 22 - - - 9 - 4 98 356 
Kuwait 170 - 83 - 112 - - - 4 647 - 70 120 32 105 114 441 845 3 173 1 870 1 758 154 
Lebanon - - - - - - 21 - 3 0 58 - - - - - - 7 103 1 522 210 - 
Oman - - - - - - - - - - 18 151 - - - 69 125 - 33 5 9 565 
Qatar - - - - - - - - - 42 - - - 2 - - 15 438 352 127 5 263 2 400 
Saudi Arabia - - - - - - 282 630 1 687 350 335 219 3 1 550 39 2 020 473 78 53 1 257 13 139 1 080 
Turkey - - 2 14 - 12 111 36 22 356 43 4 97 49 - 133 22 441 1 733 1 814 1 585 1 744 
United Arab Emirates - 124 - 576 1 - - 476 - 153 2 77 676 13 4 211 60 268 13 877 21 704 16 689 14 247 
Yemen - - - - - 5 - - - - - - 37 - - - - - - - - - 
South, East and South-East Asia 3 007 2 015 2 816 3 936 2 864 4 978 7 771 6 328 9 172 14 272 22 494 13 426 19 136 100 986 29 928 27 853 21 039 24 679 51 231 58 650 76 976 56 168 
China - 17 33 60 295 596 480 145 205 312 1 041 1 428 207 973 775 1 295 1 908 1 678 5 599 15 384 4 529 9 363 
Hong Kong, China 2 879 1 652 1 005 1 383 1 363 2 930 5 393 2 771 2 644 5 821 10 836 6 934 10 184 81 321 4 273 20 039 5 883 5 957 13 740 10 628 13 430 4 816 
Korea, Democratic People's Republic of - - - - - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - - - - 
Korea, Republic of - - 235 33 187 76 74 500 1 791 1 143 2 451 187 1 181 1 845 717 217 593 345 2 236 4 075 10 228 4 327 
Macao, China - - - - - - - - - - - - 450 - - - 0 - 0 - 7 - 
Taiwan Province of China 29 - 464 1 564 72 165 151 30 252 6 837 788 794 1 830 664 145 406 786 634 623 1 525 570 
Afghanistan - - - - - 13 14 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Bangladesh - - - - - - - - 12 - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 
India 87 49 11 - 1 3 219 147 39 81 1 298 429 431 1 185 2 629 396 1 668 950 5 654 6 030 11 265 8 221 
Nepal - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 15 - - 
Pakistan 4 - - - - - - - - - 6 223 - 7 4 81 - 16 - - 339 - 
Sri Lanka - - - - - - - 2 3 - - 26 12 - 14 13 - - - 3 1 8 
Brunei Darussalam - - - - - - 202 - 31 189 - - - - - - - - - 112 - - 
Cambodia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - 
Indonesia - 260 - 48 3 229 65 304 688 261 994 349 628 1 446 548 262 1 253 1 022 5 836 374 1 389 171 
Malaysia - - 27 304 231 175 168 980 1 412 3 677 1 592 1 073 1 151 995 747 1 964 3 902 881 2 724 2 833 5 610 1 455 
Myanmar - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 1 - 
Philippines - - - - 14 374 25 42 442 414 257 1 478 1 398 1 528 38 131 270 7 339 353 763 941 
Singapore 7 38 773 501 606 403 926 1 300 1 462 2 176 3 079 1 383 3 436 9 497 16 741 3 174 4 966 11 913 6 309 17 806 27 436 24 855 
Thailand - - 269 42 91 11 55 106 191 181 76 603 182 487 1 251 230 324 863 1 160 398 431 1 441 
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Viet Nam - - - - - 6 - 0 - 11 27 1 - - 37 - 4 - - 15 22 0 
Oceania - - - 115 - 1 142 - 22 66 97 - 141 434 - 33 1 2 176 208 278 4 
American Samoa - - - - - 1 - - - - - - - - - - 1 - - - - - 
Fiji - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 - - - - 2 - - - 1 
Guam - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 150 - - - 
New Caledonia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 3 100 - - 
Papua New Guinea - - - 115 - - 142 - 12 66 97 - 136 434 - 28 - - 23 - 275 - 
Samoa - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 - - - 18 3 3 
Vanuatu - - - - - - - - 9 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 
South-East Europe and the CIS (Transition economies) - - - - - 22 26 245 451 419 212 353 226 428 687 1 409 10 181 1 623 24 976 8 536 18 432 15 335 
Southeast Europe - - - - - 4 19 - 1 176 100 21 3 24 - 284 258 34 57 49 941 2 
Croatia - - - - - - - - 1 1 100 21 3 24 - 254 32 21 51 39 - 2 
Czechoslovakia (former) - - - - - 4 19 - - 173 - - - - - - - - - - - - 
Macedonia, TFYR - - - - - - - - - 2 - - - - - 16 - - - - - - 
Montenegro - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 4 - 
Serbia - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 5 77 - 
Serbia and Montenegro - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 14 227 12 6 5 860 - 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) - - - - - 18 6 245 450 242 112 331 223 404 687 1 124 9 923 1 589 24 919 8 487 17 492 15 333 
Armenia - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - - - - - - - - 
Kazakhstan - - - - - - - - 450 - - - - 106 - - 170 5 - 3 254 2 978 1 512 
Kyrgyzstan - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 0 - 
Russian Federation - - - - - 18 6 245 - 242 112 308 223 265 662 1 100 9 700 1 550 24 529 5 229 14 465 12 806 
Ukraine - - - - - - - - - - - 23 - 32 25 24 53 34 390 5 49 1 009 
unspecified 5 530 3 875 11 695 14 554 15 784 12 931 28 145 20 324 4 430 5 322 5 516 21 084 17 032 18 445 11 792 16 241 25 732 36 915 26 274 20 179 23 012 5 833 
                       
Source:  Thompson Finance 
                      
                       
a  First half of 2008 
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Appendix 2.A: List of Acquirers and Targets Used in the Sample 
 
[not available in the digital version of this thesis] 
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Appendix 2.B: Datastream Definitions 
 Return index (RI): 
A return index (RI) is available for individual equities and unit trusts. This shows a theoretical growth in value of 
a share holding over a specified period, assuming that dividends are re-invested to purchase additional units of 
an equity or unit trust at the closing price applicable on the exdividend date. For unit trusts, the closing bid price 
is used.  
For all countries except the USA and Canada detailed dividend payment data is only available on Datastream 
from 1988 onwards. Up to this time the RI is constructed using an annualized dividend yield, as follows:  
 
 
Where:  
RIt = return index on day t 
RIt-1 = return index on previous day 
PIt = price index on day t 
PIt-1 = price index on previous day 
DYt = dividend yield % on day t 
N = number of working days in the year (taken to be 260) 
From 1988 onwards (and from 1973 for US and Canadian stocks), the availability of detailed dividend payment 
data enables a more realistic method to be used in which the discrete quantity of dividend paid is added to the 
price on the ex-date of the payment. Then:  
 
except when t = ex-date of the dividend payment D then:  
 
Where:  
Pt = price on ex-date 
Pt-1 = price on previous day 
D = dividend payment associated with ex-date t’’. 
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 02999 Total assets 
Asset Data, Annual Item 
Applies to Description Footnotes 
Industrials TOTAL ASSETS represent the sum of total 
current assets, long term receivables, investment 
in unconsolidated subsidiaries, other 
investments, net property plant and equipment 
and other assets. 
B. Excludes contra items 
(contingent liabilities) 
C. Includes trust business assets 
D. Adjusted to exclude foreign 
currency translation gains/losses 
Banks TOTAL ASSETS represent the sum of cash & 
due from banks, total investments, net loans, 
customer liability on acceptances (if included in 
total assets), investment in unconsolidated 
subsidiaries, real estate assets, net property, plant 
and equipment and other assets. 
F. Adjusted to exclude provision 
for bad debt/loan losses 
G. Adjusted to exclude treasury 
stock 
H. Adjusted to exclude investment 
in own bonds 
Insurance 
Companies 
TOTAL ASSETS represent the sum of cash, total 
investments, premium balance receivables, 
investments in unconsolidated subsidiaries, net 
property, plant and equipment and other assets. 
I. Adjusted to exclude foreign 
currency translation losses and 
provision for bad debts 
J. Adjusted to excluded treasury 
stock and investment in own bonds 
Other 
Financial 
Companies 
TOTAL ASSETS represent the sum of cash & 
equivalents, receivables, securities inventory, 
custody securities, total investments, net loans, 
net property, plant and equipment, investments in 
unconsolidated subsidiaries and other assets. 
 
 Market value / market capitalisation – datatype (MV)  
Market value on Datastream is the share price multiplied by the number of ordinary shares in issue. The 
amount in issue is updated whenever new tranches of stock are issued or after a capital change. 
      For companies with more than one class of equity capital, the market value is expressed according to 
the individual issue.  
      Market value is displayed in millions of units of local currency.  
 
 18191 Earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) 
Supplementary (Income) Data, Annual Item 
Applies to Description  
All 
Industries 
EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST AND TAXES (EBIT) represent the earnings of a 
company before interest expense and income taxes. It is calculated by taking the pretax 
income and adding back interest expense on debt and subtracting interest capitalized.  
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 18198 Earnings before interest, taxes and depreciation (EBITDA) 
Supplementary (Income) Data, Annual Item 
Applies to Description  
All 
Industries 
EARNINGS BEFORE INTEREST, TAXES AND DEPRECIATION (EBITDA) 
represent the earnings of a company before interest expense, income taxes and 
depreciation. It is calculated by taking the pretax income and adding back interest 
expense on debt and depreciation, depletion and amortization and subtracting interest 
capitalized. 
  
  
  
  
 
 03151 Working capital 
Supplementary Data, Annual Item 
Applies to Description  
Industrials WORKING CAPITAL represents the difference between current assets and current 
liabilities. It is a measure of liquidity and solvency. 
  
 
 
 01001 Net sales or revenues 
Income Data, Annual Item 
Applies to Description Footnotes 
Industrial 
Companies 
NET SALES OR REVENUES represent gross 
sales and other operating revenue less discounts, 
returns and allowances.  
It includes but is not restricted to: 
Franchise sales when corresponding costs are 
available and included in expenses.  
Consulting fees 
Service income 
Royalty income when included in revenues by the 
company. 
Contracts-in-progress income 
Licensing and franchise fees 
Income derived from equipment lease or rental 
when considered part of operating revenue 
Commissions earned (not gross billings) for 
advertising companies 
A. Gross total sales or revenue 
AA. Length of fiscal period is 18 
months 
AB. Length of fiscal period is 15 
months 
AC. Length of fiscal period is 9 
months 
AD. Length of fiscal period is 6 
months 
AF. Length of fiscal period is 5 
months 
AG. Length of fiscal period is 13 
months 
AH. Length of fiscal period is 14 
months 
AI. Length of fiscal period is 7 
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Income from leased departments 
It excludes: 
Non-operating income 
Interest income 
Interest capitalized 
Equity in earnings of unconsolidated subsidiaries 
Rental income 
Dividend income 
Foreign exchange adjustment 
Gain on debt retired 
Sale of land or natural resources 
Sale of plant and equipment 
Sale of investment 
Sales from discontinued operations 
Security transactions 
Income on reserve fund securities when shown 
separately 
Operating differential subsidies for shipping 
companies 
Net mutual aid assistance for airlines companies 
General and Service Taxes 
Value-Added taxes 
Excise taxes 
Windfall Profit Taxes  
months 
AJ. Length of fiscal period is 8 
months 
AK. Length of fiscal period is 48 
weeks 
AL. Length of fiscal period is 3 
months 
AM. Length of fiscal period is 11 
months 
AN. Length of fiscal period is 53 
weeks 
AP. Length of fiscal period is 16 
months 
AQ. Length of fiscal period is 10 
months 
AR. Length of fiscal period is 20 
months 
AS. Length of fiscal period is 2 
months 
AT. Length of fiscal period is 17 
months 
AU. Length of fiscal period is 4 
months 
AV. Length of fiscal period is 21 
months 
AX. Length of fiscal period is 22 
months 
B. Net sales includes value-
added, excise, windfall profit or 
sales tax 
BA. Major accounting standards 
switch 
    
 03501 Common equity 
Shareholders' Equity Data, Annual Item 
Applies to Description Footnotes 
All 
Industries 
COMMON EQUITY represents common 
shareholders' investment in a company. 
It includes but is not restricted to: 
Common stock value 
Retained earnings 
Capital surplus 
Capital stock premium 
Cumulative gain or loss of foreign currency 
translation, if included in equity per FASB 52 
A. Common shareholders' equity 
is not delineated 
B. Preferred stock cannot be 
separated 
C. Treasury stock appears on 
asset side and cannot be 
separated 
D. Minority interest in current 
year's income and/or the entire 
minority interest cannot be 
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treatment 
Monetary correction-capital (03482) 
Goodwill written off (03491) 
For Non-U.S. Corporations preference stock which 
participates with the common/ordinary shares in 
the profits of the company 
For Non-U.S. Corporations, if shareholders equity 
section is not delineated then the following 
additional accounts are included: 
Appropriated and unappropriated retained earnings 
Net income for the year, if not included in retained 
earnings (majority share of income is only 
included) 
Compulsory statutory/legal reserves without 
specific purpose 
Discretionary Reserves if other companies in that 
country include in their delineated shareholders' 
equity 
Negative Goodwill 
It excludes: 
Common treasury stocks 
Accumulated unpaid preferred dividends 
For U.S. Corporations, excess of involuntary 
liquidating value for outstanding preferred stock 
over stated value is deducted 
Redeemable common stock (treated as preferred) 
separated 
F. A small amount of special 
reserves cannot be separated 
(Germany) 
G. Common shareholders' equity 
is not delineated and is not 
comparable 
H. Policyholders equity cannot 
be separated 
I. Includes non-equity reserves 
and/or other provisions which 
cannot be separated 
J. Before appropriation on net 
income for the year 
K. Increase/Decrease due to 
revaluation of assets 
L. No standard text 
M. No standard text 
N. Adjusted to include foreign 
currency translation gains/losses 
O. Adjusted to exclude treasury 
stock 
P. Adjusted to include 
unappropriated net loss 
Q. Adjusted to include unrealized 
gain/loss on marketable 
securities 
R. Includes equity portion of 
untaxed reserves 
T. Includes consolidation 
adjustments 
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Appendix 3.A: List of Acquirer Firms Used in the Sample and Their Benchmarks 
(Analysis B) 
 
[not available in the digital version of this thesis] 
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Appendix 3.B: Number of M&As within Different Time Periods 
 
Years Raw Firm Data Industry-adjusted Data Industry, size and 
performance -adjusted Data 
 maximum minimum maximum minimum maximum minimum 
(-3,+3) 525 466 407 325 394 316 
(-3,+2) 525 466 412 337 398 318 
(-3,+1) 525 466 415 343 401 323 
(-2,+3) 549 481 445 369 452 358 
(-2,+2) 549 481 450 382 457 362 
(-2,+1) 549 481 453 388 459 367 
(-1,+3) 555 503 509 454 485 407 
(-1,+2) 555 503 521 420 489 409 
(-1,+1) 555 503 503 409 485 408 
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Appendix 4.A: List of Acquirers and Targets Used in the Sample with Their 
Benchmarks 
 
[not available in the digital version of this thesis] 
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Appendix 4.B: Number of M&As within Different Time Periods 
 
Years Raw Firm Data Industry-adjusted Data Industry, size and 
performance -adjusted Data 
 maximum minimum maximum minimum maximum minimum 
(-3,+3) 85 66 53 36 57 35 
(-3,+2) 85 66 56 38 57 35 
(-3,+1) 85 66 56 39 58 36 
(-2,+3) 91 71 60 40 62 46 
(-2,+2) 91 72 63 42 62 46 
(-2,+1) 91 72 63 44 63 47 
(-1,+3) 98 77 71 46 71 55 
(-1,+2) 98 77 75 49 71 55 
(-1,+1) 98 77 75 51 72 56 
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